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This dissertation argues that a new paradigm of selfhood emerged in nineteenth-century 
British literature, one that recognized the individual will and environmental influence not 
as antithetical but as dialectical forces in the formation of the self. The concept of an 
externally negotiated subject challenges both the inward and socially determined 
conceptions of self that have dominated the relevant criticism. Informed by empiricist, 
associationist, and evolutionary theories of the mind, the portrayals of subject-formation 
in this study highlight the radical changes occurring in the human environment in 
nineteenth-century, which catalyzed the conception of a malleable yet self-forming 
subject. Along with the increased variability of the modern environment, the urban sphere 
afforded an array of cultural artifacts and spatial tools by which human subjects could 
shape their cognitive tendencies and affective states of being. With an emphasis on 
human adaptability and agency, nineteenth-century literature espouses the paradigm of 
environmental self-fashioning and develops a form of psychological realism predicated 
less on depictions of interiority than on increasingly sophisticated portrayals of mental 













 Nineteenth-century British literature portrays the industrial city as an unnatural 
space that threatened individual identity and the sense of an autonomous self, or so the 
received wisdom tells us. This dissertation offers a divergent perspective, in which the 
city proves an ecological extension of human life-processes and significantly informs 
how British culture understood psychological development. In the literature under 
consideration, the city evinces the sway of material conditions on the psycho-physiology 
of human subjects while at the same time attesting to the ability of individuals and 
society at large to shape those material conditions. From such a perspective, the city 
proves a technology of self, one replete with an array of cultural objects and material 
influences that altered cognitive, emotional, and psycho-physiological tendencies.1 
Stemming from this context, the nineteenth-century city in literature becomes a dynamic 
environment in which characters discover and develop their agency in self-formation. 
The rise of the modern metropolis in Britain, then, was integral to the emergence 
of this new paradigm of subject-formation, one that I refer to as environmental self-
fashioning. This paradigm presupposes not only a malleable self but also a theory of the 
mind as relationally constituted – that is, a sense of mental development predicated on 
externality as much as interiority. In proposing this view of subject formation, I offer an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




alternative to long-held assumptions about the deep psychology of an autonomous and 
inward self in nineteenth-century literature or the decentered, discursively determined 
self proposed by poststructuralism.  Considered as an “inward turn” and a “linguistic 
turn,” respectively, neither of these approaches adequately regards the role of the physical 
environment in the formation of psychological functions, either as they are understood 
today or in the nineteenth century. To be clear, I am not suggesting that an environmental 
determinism replace the social / linguistic determinism espoused by poststructuralism. 
Rather, I argue that significant changes to the human environment coupled with cultural 
discourses concerning the psycho-physiological nature of the human subject resulted in a 
profound awareness of how individuals could negotiate desired forms of selfhood by 
conscientiously shaping the environment shaping themselves. 
In concert with the alterations to the human environment, then, the 
Enlightenment’s theories on the human subject informed the portrayal of subject 
formation in nineteenth-century British literature. A helpful starting point is George 
Cheyne’s English Malady (1735), which modernized Robert Burton’s humoral study The 
Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) by building upon the psycho-physiological principles of 
John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) and Isaac Newton’s 
Opticks (1704). In his own English Malady, Cheyne outlined several key causes of 
distemper, an umbrella term for the disorder of the nervous system. After noting several 
activities and modes of existence closely associated with urban life, Cheyne discusses the 
city directly, where “[d]istempers are to be found in their highest and most astonishing 
Symptoms” (54-55). Largely due to overstimulation, confined quarters, and poor air 
quality, the nervous malady of urban life could only be cured once the ailing subject had 
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“suck’d in and incorporated the sweet, balmy, clear Air of the Country, and driven the 
other out of their Habit” (55). In medically prescribing the rural environment as a cure for 
psycho-physiological disorders cultivated in the city, Cheyne ushers the environmental 
self-fashioning paradigm into a modern and medical age. Over the eighteenth century, 
medical sciences would develop a more sophisticated understanding of physiological and 
psychological components of the human subject and a more complex understanding of 
climatic influences, both through direct effects and through the inducement of customs 
and habits. William Falconer’s Remarks on the Influence of Climate (1781) proves 
exemplary, as it focuses on the physical, psychological, and social manifestations unique 
to various climates (e.g. temperate and cold), to modes of existence (e.g. agrarian and 
commercial), and to densities of population (e.g. rural and urban).  
Also expanding on Locke’s philosophy of self and mind, the associationist 
philosopher David Hume would provide the groundwork for an adaptionist view of 
psychology (Leahey 117, 174); David Hartley and Joseph Priestly, who largely adopted 
Hartley’s theory, would further reinforce the role of experience and habit in the 
adaptation of mental processes to external conditions, while also bringing associationist 
thought more firmly into a psychological schema, locating it within the laws of the 
natural world. Arguing for the determining influences of the environment, Priestley 
stresses that one’s “own actions and determinations” were “necessary links in this chain 
of causes and events” (502). In other words, Priestley integrates human agency into a 
chain of determining causation. Such integration was not just significant to philosophical 
conceptions, particularly those concerning free will and materiality, but it would also 
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become central to educational and social practice, as environmental conditions would be 
seen as either a lift or a limit to physical, mental, and moral development. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, these physiological and associationist 
theories of the self would became entrenched in British culture via the discourse of 
sensibility,2 which reached its height in the 1770s and 80s. Sensibility proved an 
intersection for these discourses and the rise of the modern city; thus, it offers this 
dissertation a crucial point of departure. Both Ava Arendt and G. J. Barker-Benfield have 
noted the correlation between the urban commercialization and the heightened attention 
paid to sensibility (Arendt 94, Barker-Benfield xxv-xxvi). Yet, the commercial aspect 
was only one part of the over-stimulation experienced in the urban environment, which 
inevitably forced British subjects to become more aware of how their lived spaces 
constantly influenced their physiological systems and ways of thinking.  The narratives of 
self-formation under consideration in this dissertation would gain from the culture of 
sensibility a sense of the city as integral to characters’ awareness of environmental 
influence and as a necessary source of influence for desired forms of subjectivity. In this 
way, the literature of environmental self-fashioning accomplishes what its supporting 
theories do not, showing how such a paradigm of self was deployed in a modern world.  
In particular, I have chosen four canonical texts as my subjects of analysis: Ann 
Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), William Wordsworth’s The Prelude 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ann Jessie Van Sant provides, in my mind, the best definition for sensibility, which includes its 
physiological, epistemological, and psychological aspects: sensibility refers to “an organic sensitivity 
dependent on brain and nerves and underlying a) delicate moral and aesthetic perception; b) acuteness of 
feeling, both emotional and physical; and c) susceptibility to delicate passional arousal. Through 
belonging to all, greater degrees of delicacy of sensibility – often to a point of fragility – are characteristic 




(1805), Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South (1855), and Charles Dickens’ Our Mutual 
Friend (1864). I selected these texts, each of which provides a narrative of human 
development, to show that this paradigm was far more than an undercurrent in British 
culture; rather, it was widely disseminated to the British reading audience. Towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, then, literature began to bring the discussion of nerves, 
mind, and environment to a larger public. And this literature did much to advance the 
understanding of human engagement with place by taking the objective knowledge of 
medical sciences, pairing it with phenomenological experience, and codifying this 
engagement through literary representations.  
One possible origin for the paradigm of environmental self-fashioning in literature 
is William Cowper’s The Task (1785), which was the most famous poem of its time and 
one that would prove wildly influential to the poets and novelists I consider in this study. 
Cowper’s poem picks up on all the key points of the discussion thus far, presenting a 
dichotomy of rural virtue and urban immorality that he entrenches in the eighteenth-
century discourse of sensibility. In the country, Cowper depicts the natural sensory 
stimuli as a physic to both body and mind: “Nor rural sights alone, but rural sounds / 
Exhilarate the spirit, and restore / The tone of languid Nature”  (Book I: p. 10). The 
“nerves” become “new-brac’d” and the “spirits cheered” (I: 19). Cowper also highlights 
how remote landscapes and highly private domestic spaces better allow one to cultivate 
mental life; there, one can “possess / The poet's treasure, silence, and indulge / The 
dreams of fancy, tranquil and secure” (I: 13). Like the country, the city can shape the 
mind, but rather than revitalizing, the city generally corrupts: “In cities, foul example on 
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most minds / Begets its likeness” (I: 36).3  In offering a space full of natural stimuli, a 
space away from the commotion of the city’s “peopled scene,” the country greatly 
benefits the body as well as the mind and proves the “proper soil" for the growth of 
human virtues (III: 93; I: 32). While such a dichotomy seems to reinforce the usual 
thinking about the city in literature, I would argue that the urban sphere provides the 
necessary counter point by which Cowper understands the psycho-physiological benefits 
of country life. Furthermore, the relation of Cowper’s poem to the urban sphere proves 
more complex than this initial foray suggests. 
Cowper’s poem proves significant to my discussion not simply because it 
reinforces Cheyne’s understanding of rural amelioration but also because it codifies 
psycho-physiological health in a rural aesthetic. In Cowper’s lines, the rural sphere 
functions as both a causal spur to psycho-physiological health and a poetic signifier for 
positive mental states. This conjoining of the causal and symbolic becomes a foundation 
on which the Gothic and Romantic projects build; it also proves a key element of my 
argument for a more biologically grounded reading of literary depictions of rural and 
urban experience. Too often, the causal relationship between place and mind is 
overlooked in literary criticism, so that the spaces portrayed are read as a canvas on 
which the author projects the psychological state or emotions of a character – what is 
usually referred to as pathetical fallacy. Such a reading reinforces the supremacy of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Across several strophes dedicated to urban life, Cowper outlines the following, commonplace complaints 
of urban life: the sedentary lifestyle leads to “withered muscle, and the vapid soul” (I, p. 21), the capitalism 
of the “gain-devoted cities” brings “[t]he dregs and feculence of every land” (I, p. 36); the “Rank 
abundance breeds / In gross and pampered cities sloth and lust, / And wantonness and gluttonous excess” 
(I, pp. 36-7); dissembling abounds so that “vice is hidden” (I, p. 37). An anthropomorphized London 
“calculates, computes, and scans,” a phrasing that anticipates Simmel’s sense of the “more calculating” 
urban mind (Cowper I, p. 38; Simmel 411). 
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inward self and largely ignores the implications of environmental influence and self-
fashioning that I will develop throughout this dissertation. 
Cowper’s poem, then, reveals the rather complicated and cross-shaping 
relationships among environment, individual, and culture. The poem is, of course, a 
product of the urban arts market, and the rural retreat proves a phenomenon of urban 
culture – a culture that exists because of the conditions of geography and populace. And 
like all rural retreats, Cowper’s own reveals the necessity of returning to the city. 
Referring to his “peasant’s nest,” Cowper admits that his rural spot was “[m]y visit still, 
but never mine abode” and returns to a London that proves a bifurcated space of culture 
(“by taste and wealth proclaimed / The fairest capital in all the world”) and violence (“By 
riot and incontinence the worst”) (I: 14, 37). Not only is the city fair (if violent), Cowper 
further identifies the positive aspects of large cities. For instance: “I do confess them 
nurseries of the arts, / In which they flourish most” (I: 37). Ultimately, then, Cowper 
offers a geographical rendering of potential modes of life and states of being.  
While it would be easy to suggest a pat dichotomy of urban degradation and rural 
virtue, the situation proves more complex as each space bears influences that the ideal 
subject, one of psycho-physiological health as well as taste and culture, requires for his or 
her formation. Following Cowper’s model, the literature covered in this dissertation 
relocates characters across a variety of environments, allowing the characters to 
experience and thus recognize the influences unique to each locality. But even more so 
than Cowper, these texts consistently point to the urban sphere’s role in this recognition, 
and they begin to develop a more sophisticated sense of how the urban seat of culture 
becomes a space for the cultivation of self. 
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The Understanding of Self in the Nineteenth-Century Culture and Criticism 
 
 
The urban sphere of the late eighteenth century offered an altogether new space – 
one that was rather intense, sensorially speaking – but it was also part of a general 
complication and variation of the human environment. Matched by the further 
proliferation of these new and complex spaces across the nineteenth century was the 
proliferation of theories about the psycho-physiological engagement with and 
dependence on the external world. Many physicians would follow Falconer’s lead in 
considering the climatic influence on physical and psychological development and 
wellbeing. The evolutionary theory of Erasmus Darwin, Jean Baptiste Lamarck, and 
Herbert Spencer would also add significantly to this discourse, which took as its 
fundamental tenet that the environment shaped the bodies, brains, and behaviors of all 
organisms. Across the nineteenth century, then, various philosophical, scientific, and 
psychological discourses would concretize and complicate a conception of human 
subjects as shaped by their engagement with place, a conception that suggested the active 
role individuals and societies could take in the environmental form of subject formation.   
 Despite the scientific precedent, the paradigm for subject-formation has gone 
largely, if not entirely, overlooked in criticism on nineteenth-century literature. When 
taking a psychological interest, most criticism has looked back across the nineteenth-
century with a psychoanalytic perspective, one that prioritizes inward mechanisms and 
drives. Conversely, the ecological criticism that does exist, i.e. ecocriticism, has limited 
its scope to a metaphysical sense of the connection with nature or to poststructuralist 
	  
9	  	  
views of conservationist ideology and environmentalism as discourse.4 None of these 
perspectives provide an adequate understanding of the biological reality with which 
human subjects must engage and the lived environment through which they will 
necessarily be formed.  It perplexes me that ecological psychology, which has become a 
fixture in the field of psychology over the last half century, has not had more influence on 
literary criticism, especially considering that this psychology stems from (and greatly 
reinforces) much of the general tenets of the medical, philosophical, and psychological 
discourses mentioned above. This is not to deny the presence of ecological tenets in 
cultural studies and in the literary criticism that coopts it. However, and for instance, 
Gaston Bachelard’s Poetics of Space (1958) remains a fixture in literary criticism 
concerned with the dynamic between subject and place while the still phenomenological 
but much more biologically grounded work of Yi-Fu Tuan, such as Space and Place 
(1977), has received far less attention.  
Perhaps more to the point, I find it interesting, and quite telling, to consider 
Freud’s place in the field of psychology versus his cultural significance. Thomas Leahey 
notes that while psychoanalysis had a greater influence on modern culture than any other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Lawrence Buell’s 2011 summary of first- and second-wave ecocriticism, “Ecocriticism: Some Emerging 
Trends,” affirms the sociocentric and poststructuralist tendencies of this field and evinces the absence of an 
ecological or environmental psychology approach. This is, of course, a generalization of ecocriticism and 
its offshoots in ecofeminism and ecocolonialism. Even so, a survey of the seminal collections and surveys 
in these fields bears out this claim; see  Cheryll Glotfelty and  Harold Fromm  The Ecocriticism Reader : 
 Landmarks in Literary Ecology (1996); Greta Gaard and Patrick Murphey, Ecofeminist Literary Criticism 
(1998); and Graham Haggan and Helen Tiffin, Postcolonial Ecocriticism (2010). These studies, particularly 
ecofeminist and ecocolonialist, prove more interested in environmental forms of subjugation rather than an 
environmental approach to psychological development and self-formation. Some notable exceptions 
include Scott Slovic’s “Nature Writing and Environmental Psychology: The Interiority of Outdoor 
Experience” and Neil Evernden’s “Beyond Ecology: Self, Place, and the Pathetic Fallacy.” Both point to 
the interrelation between self and external environment but ultimately use environmental psychology in an 
argument for the moral value of natural spaces. The ecocriticism on nineteenth-century literature follows 
these trends, and, as far as I can tell, no book-length study has taken an environmental psychology 
approach to nineteenth-century literature or its portrayal of urban life. 
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psychology, “its relations with academic psychology have been ambivalent from Freud’s 
time to our own” (245). Instead, “the psychology of adaptation in one form or another 
[either Lamarckian/associationist or Darwinian] has dominated academic psychology” 
(245). The twentieth-century psychology of adaptation, whether on a phylogenetic or 
ontogenetic scale, has gone a long way towards understanding the ecological realities of 
and environmental influences on perception, cognition, behavioral schemas, etc.. And 
this understanding is based on a lineage beginning with Locke and proceeding to the 
associationists, to the evolutionary psychologists, and then to William James, who further 
entrenches the physiological and ecological bases for the field of psychology as it headed 
into the twentieth century. 
All this being so, scholarship on the nineteenth-century literature has been 
dominated by rather different preoccupations, namely the internal drives and passions 
espoused by psychoanalytic theory or the tyranny of discursive forces and its prison of 
language. The criticism that explores conceptions of subjectivity in nineteenth-century 
literature has generally ignored environmental engagement, though a series of critical 
“turns” has been shifting more and more towards such considerations. The first to be 
discussed here is the “inward turn,” which, while not exclusively psychoanalytic, 
operates along the same principles. According to this criticism, nineteenth-century culture 
conceived of a self as essential, autonomous, and determined largely by interior drives 
and passions. The ideal for such a self was to look inward and discover his or her own 
true nature. Such has been the dominant reading of Romantic literature, and the term 
“Romantic subjectivity” has become synonymous with an essential, autonomous, even 
transcendent self.  While this view of the Romantic project has long existed, certainly 
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studies by M. H. Abrams, Geoffrey Hartman, and Harold Bloom have ensured the 
dominance of this perspective, as has the more recent work of Charles Rzepka.5 Even 
Andrea Henderson’s Romantic Identities (1996), which provides an impressive 
discussion of alternative forms of selfhood in this era, ultimately concedes the dominance 
of the autonomous model.6  
 The inward turn is not limited to Romanticism, of course, and has been seen by 
many critics as endemic to nineteenth-century culture at large. In fact, a critical 
touchstone of the inward turn, Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self (1989), presents a 
narrative of the development of inwardness from Augustine to the present. An alternative 
form of this historical narrative has been recently suggested by Dror Wahrman (The 
Making of the Modern Self [2004]) and Nancy Armstrong (How Novels Think [2005]), 
who both suggest a transition from an external self predicated on social rank, outward 
behavior, as well as physiological and sartorial appearances to a “modern self” for whom 
interior life and essential individuality prove the key attributes. These particular studies 
are exemplary of a much larger critical tradition that subscribes to the premise that the 
truth of modern human subjectivity lies within. Among the approaches of this ilk that 
address the subject / place relationship, environmental influences are regarded as purely 
symbolic, as something to be transcended, and/or as something to be rejected. For 
example, Richard Lehan, in The City and Literature (1998), suggests that the post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Notable studies include Abrams’ The Mirror and the Lamp (1953) and Natural Supernaturalism (1971), 
Hartman’s Wordsworth’s Poetry (1963), Bloom’s “The Internalization of Question Romance” (1969), and 
Rzepka’s The Self as Mind (1986). 
6 Of particular note is Henderson’s chapter on Byron’s “The Prisoner of Chillon,” which points to a 
“context-based identity” (59) espoused by Godwin and French physiologists that is much in line with my 
own sense of an environmentally formed self. Yet, while this form of subjectivity briefly appears in the 
poem, Henderson shows how it is rejected, in typical Romantic style, in favor of an “inwardness” replete 




Romanticists (which he collectively refers to as Modernists) were even more inward than 
their inward predecessors. Continuing a process begun by Wordsworth, Modernism’s 
aesthetic and symbolist turns evince a removal “to a private, autistic state of mind, 
shutting out the urban, commercial, and industrial world that had become hostile. Under 
such pressure the city as a physical place gave way to the city as a state of mind,” thus 
perpetuating the movement “away from physical reality toward inward process and 
subjectivity” (76, 77). Exemplary of the “inward turn,” Lehan begins with a sense that 
subjects and authors engage a real, tangible world but then replace it with one that is 
purely imaginary, only symbolic, as though the psycho-physiological influences of 
external conditions could be shut out at will. The human subject can augment his or her 
lived environment in a variety of ways, but it is mistake to think that this environment 
can be transcended or ignored – and even the nineteenth-century portrayals of such 
attempts belie their projects or ultimately admit to their inevitable failure. 
 Suspicious of the inward turn, many literary critics opted for what has been 
referred to as a “linguistic turn” – i.e. the poststructuralist movement, with Derrida and 
Foucault as its foci. Under the auspices of the linguistic or poststructuralist turn, the 
delusion of autonomous individuality is undone by the examination of systems that 
generate, sustain, and just as often decenter the self.  In many ways, I am sympathetic to 
the poststructuralist project, specifically its effort to analyze the myriad forces that shape 
the individual. To be sure, many of the critics who have informed my approach in this 
study are tied to the poststructuralist project, such as Regenia Gagnier, particularly her 
work in Subjectivities (1991), as well as Raymond Williams, Julian Wolfreys, Sharon 
Marcus, and many other critics who deal with urban life. Indeed, most of the canonical 
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work on the urban sphere in cultural and literary studies takes a poststructuralist 
approach, one that generally views the city as a concretization for social forces. 
  In its examination of person / place relations, poststructuralism, not to mention 
literary criticism that adopts it as a modus operandi, proves limited by its own 
preoccupations and anxieties. These limitations are apparent when dealing with the 
interrelations of people and place as both become subordinated to the rule of discourse. 
Thus, poststructuralism works against the key tenets of my own approach: it undermines 
the validity (i.e. the truth value) of science, the role of the physical environment in 
shaping humanity and culture, and the agency of individuals who are under the influence 
of external forces (including social ones) but are also capable of recognizing those 
forces, engaging them in a life-process of negotiation. I agree, then, with Eric Prieto’s 
sense that poststructuralist views of the external world are marked by their choice of the 
term “space” instead of “place,” which “implies a de-centering of the human perspective” 
(77). Such decentering disallows the potential of self-development through and 
adaptation to various localities, as the environment becomes a further enactment of power 
structures and where “[i]ndividuals are considered to be incidental players in a game of 
structures” (Prieto 87).  
Not only does poststructuralism overlook a reciprocal engagement of place and 
subject, but it also, according to Speculative Realists, constrains reality to “the correlate 
of human thought,” thus perpetuating a Cartesian split that holds subjects separate from 
the object world. Such a view, of course, does not accord with an ecological perspective, 
and both ecologically oriented scholars and Speculative Realists find fault with an 
epistemology where “knowledge of a reality independent of thought is untenable” 
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(Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman 4). From this view, poststructuralism offers a bounded 
network of discourse-informing-discourse that mirrors the self-enclosed psychological 
system of the human being under a psychoanalytic perspective.  
 New Historicist criticism and literary criticism engaging with nineteenth-century 
sciences has responded to the ephemeral prison of language by re-grounding culture and 
individuals in a temporal moment or a physical body.7 Both approaches have been 
informative to my own project, though I inevitably find that, since their “ground” is not 
the physical environment itself, they do not go far enough in recognizing the underlying 
ecological system by which all historical moments and human subjects are shaped and in 
which they develop. Even so, much can be gained from historicist approaches – like Alan 
Liu’s Wordsworth: The Sense of History (1989), for example – which inevitably address 
the environmental contexts even if they remain subordinated to an “historical 
epistemology” (47). The “physiological turn” – that is, a recent focus on the influence of 
physiological sciences on literature – has also proven a further step towards the paradigm 
I am advocating. Many of these texts explicitly refer to the capacity of the physical 
environment to influence the bodies and minds of subjects, as nineteenth-century  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The connections between poststructuralism and New Historicism are quite strong, and there is as much 
that overlaps in their projects (and weaknesses) as there are distinctions. Claire Colebrook makes this point 
well when discussing new historicism as an answer to “the supposedly ahistorical character of post-
structuralist criticism”: “New historicism may have initially appeared as an ‘answer’ to the interpretive 
insecurity precipitated by post-structuralist theories of textuality. But new historicism itself continually 
encountered the problem of its own legitimation. History in general could not be retrieved as some pre-
textual ground so attention was directed to all those local devices and instances from which history was 
formed: anecdotes, artifacts, specific materials and contingent events” (220).  
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physiological sciences affirmed.8 Yet, none of them explore this capacity beyond naming 
it, nor do they consider the ways in which human subjects become conscious of this 
influence, adapt to it, and begin to utilize it in the project of their own self-making. 
 Because these approaches focus primarily on the relationship between mind and 
body or self and historical context, they do not come to an adequate understanding of the 
reciprocal, formative influence of subject and environment – the central tenet of 
ecological psychology, anthropology, and my sense of environmental-self-fashioning. 
They also prove unable to overturn some of the key components of the inward and 
linguistic turns. Both the historical and physiological turns suggest a more malleable self 
but neither fully appreciates the contextual construction of self – that is, they do not see 
how selfhood has as much to do with spatial practice and environmental engagement as 
with social contexts. Also, neither of these approaches adequately resolves the 
destabilization of epistemology and ontology enacted by poststructuralism. To this last 
point I will now turn in order to discuss how an ecological perspective of self helps 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001), Alan Richardson notes the environmental role 
in shaping mind and behavior” (2); Noel Jackson momentarily considers in Science and Sensation in 
Romantic Poetry (2011) “the mind’s response to external stimuli” in regards to sensibility of the poet and 
the influence of poetry on others (27, 9); in George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Psychology (2006), 
Michael Davis suggests that the mind is necessarily “open to the influence . . . of environmental 
conditions” (5); in Embodiment: Victorian Literature and the Senses, William Cohen focuses often on the 
body as site of permeability and flow between internal and external, whether in terms of matter or 
information. Cohen’s study comes the closest to my own though it still lacks a clear and consistent sense of 
psychological engagement with the external environment and how such engagement works to shape and 
develop subjectivity. See also Rick Rylance, Adela Pinch, John Mullen, and Peter Logan for discussions on 
nineteenth-century psychology in relation to the body. 
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Environmental Epistemology, Environmental Realism 
 
 
As mentioned above, this dissertation proposes that significant changes to the 
human environment coupled with cultural discourses concerning the psycho-
physiological nature of the human subject resulted in a profound awareness of how 
individuals could negotiate desired forms of selfhood by shaping the environment 
shaping themselves. “Negotiate” proves a crucial term here, as it alludes to the complex 
and reciprocal dynamic between the environment, the individual subject, and society, 
each of which influences and is influenced by the other elements. In other words, no one 
element should be seen as reigning over the others, particularly in terms of the life 
process of human subjects. Through an ecological understanding of subject-place 
relations, I see the human and social elements as extensions of the physical environment, 
the human an evolving component of the biological milieu and society as the primary 
adaptive function of the human. Because of their reciprocity, alterations to any of these 
three elements necessarily entail an alteration to the others.9 Indeed, the difficulty is not 
in proving their mutual influence but rather determining where changes begin. Neither 
society nor the individual subject can transcend the underlying materiality of their 
survival, and such an understanding was becoming increasingly clear to British culture by 
the end of the eighteenth century.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The triadic approach to understanding the relationship between subject, societies, and environments has 
often been used as a way of obviating subject-object dualism, as it regards these three elements as 
enmeshed within the same overall system. For Alf Hornberg and Timothy Ingold, this larger system is 
ecological; see Hornberg 97-100 and Ingold “Three in One” 40-42. Lefebvre also assumes a triadic 
approach in his seminal The Productions of Space (1974), though, given his ultimate goal to critique the 
capitalistic forces, Lefebvre seems to regards the social has having the greatest influence. 
10 In addition to the philosophers, scientists, and physicians discussed below, zoological studies by George 
Cuvier, Erasmus Darwin, and many others had made clear that external conditions could significantly 
impact if not utterly control the success or failure of both individual animals and entire species. 
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In what follows, I will establish some of the concepts and terms that will be 
integral to this dissertation. My intent is to provide the groundwork for how human 
cognition and affect could be influenced by external conditions. While I will prioritize an 
environmental basis for cognition and affect, I do not mean to ignore the role of cultural 
practice or theory, but I do suggest, in accord with other environmentally oriented studies 
of human behavior, “that culture is the form of human adaptation” to the environment 
(Ingold  “Culture” 39). Like Timothy Ingold, I see culture as based on a knowledge 
evolved from external engagement, and thus, I too follow J. J. Gibson in suggesting, 
“Knowledge of the world cannot be explained by supposing that knowledge of the world 
already exists” (253). Rather, knowledge must necessarily result from (and be tested 
against) continual engagement with the external world,11 with an ecological system where 
the social and material are thoroughly intertwined. Such notions of culture and 
epistemology as developed through external engagement are certainly not unique to 
twentieth-century thought; rather, they are fundamental tenets of the empiricist and 
evolutionary theory that informs the literature discussed in this dissertation.  
  First, it will be helpful to establish a specifically environmental form of 
epistemology, one that will be integral to my readings of Wordsworth’s The Prelude and 
Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend.  To make sense of how meaning is extracted from (instead 
of projected on) the external world, I invoke J. J. Gibson’s sense of “affordances,” which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As with Gibson, Ingold, and other ecological scholars across a variety of fields, Konrad Lorenz 
establishes in Behind the Mirror (1973) the fundamental basis for his approach to cognitive interaction with 
external conditions: “all human knowledge derives from a process of interaction between man as a physical 
entity, an active, perceiving subject, and the realities of an equally physical external world, the object of 
man’s perception” (1). It is through a similar form of trial and error recognized in associationist theory that 
Lorenz argues all information is gained and reaffirmed: human beings are “perpetually making 
experiments, matching their results against reality, and retaining what is fittest” (24).	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“are what [the environment or an object] offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes” 
(Gibson 127). Affordances are necessarily constrained to the capabilities and needs of the 
organism. Thus, while a stone affords throw-ability to a human, it does not to a worm; 
however, for the worm, the stone can afford a shelter-ability it cannot to the human. Such 
organism-specific constraint may seem paradoxical: how can an affordance be inherent to 
the object but also relative to the perceiver / user?  Gibson’s answer to this question is 
helpful to our consideration of affordances, but it also reinforces the sense of meaning 
(including the meaning of the “self”) as something that is constructed in a reciprocal 
process of engagement:  
An important fact about the affordances of the environment is that they are 
in a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which 
are supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But, actually, an 
affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it 
is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-
objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of 
the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, 
yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the 
observer. (Gibson 1979, 129) 
From this perspective, meaning does not lie in the mind nor in the world but through an 
engagement between subject and object – it is that process of engagement, that middle-
ground of interaction, where meaning is created. The mind collaborates in meaning as 
well as records it, and language proves one of several methods for storing and sharing 
that information.  
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 The sense of mental collaboration with the external world to create meaning is 
central to Wordsworth’s own poetic project, which explores “How exquisitely the 
individual Mind . . . to the external World / Is fitted,” but also how “The external World 
is fitted to the Mind.” Thus, the mind and external world make a “creation” through their 
“blended might” (“Prospectus” 63-68). And of course, Wordsworth’s own model for 
mental engagement with the external world draws largely from an associationist model, 
where information is gained from external experiences and applied to future experiences 
through association. By the time this theory moves through associationism to the 
psychological theory of Herbert Spencer, it takes on a more physiological and 
evolutionary aspect. Spencer also highlights more clearly how physical engagement with 
the world – the manipulation of an object, the use of tools, etc. – proves an operative 
progression that is necessarily linked to cognitive progression. As humans develop 
“cognitive and operative processes, the advance is towards a reciprocity so active that 
each further cognition implies elaborate operative aid, and each new operation implies 
sundry elaborate cognitions” (461). More recently, anthropologists have tacitly taken up 
Spencer’s sense that the mind is developed through physical processes taking place 
outside of the body. Pointing to a widely accepted and dramatic cognitive evolution that 
occurred 60,000 to 30,000 years ago, Steven Mithen argues that the mind became 
“extended beyond the brain” as result of “new types of material culture,” which he 
believes was “fundamentally part of the new mind” – “as much the cause as the 
consequences of new ways of thinking” (208). Mithen refers to a 1998 study by Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers, which highlights the “active externalism” of the mind 
through epistemic action or practices that “alter the world so as to aid and augment 
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cognitive processes such as recognition and search” (8). The urban sphere in nineteenth-
century literature, I argue, provides a vast arena for just this kind of epistemic action, as it 
allows subjects to engage with a myriad of cultural artifacts that not only convey 
information but also allow for operative processes to beget new cognitive processes.  It is 
in the city where this reciprocity becomes the most active, and it is in the city where the 
authors in this study reveal the full extent of environmental self-fashioning. 
To consider what, exactly, a place affords the subject, we must keep in mind all 
the elements of a given locality, whether the physical space, the climate, the culture, or 
other people. When speaking of the environment, then, I am not only referring to a 
physical reality surrounding a given subject but also buildings, material objects, other 
organisms, particular weather, cultural assumptions and historical knowledge associated 
with the place. To indicate all these potential elements of a specific locality and their 
influence on human subjects, I will use the term structure of influence.  Here, I have 
coopted and revised Raymond Williams’ structure of feeling to serve my own purposes.  
Williams’ structure of feeling describes the instances and process in which “experience, 
immediate feeling, and then subjectivity and personality are newly generalized and 
assembled” through constant interaction with “social forms” (129). Social forms can be 
fixed or stabilized – like language, manners, cultural products, buildings, etc. – but they 
are also in a constant process of shifting and evolving (129; 129-131). Ultimately, 
Williams’ uses “structures of feeling” to portray how the individual subject engages with 
the deterministic forces around them. Regina Gagnier describes (and later employs) 
Williams’ use of the term as a theory of practice that reintroduces “agency into 
disciplines preoccupied with systems and structures without abandoning recognition of 
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social structures or retreating to methodological individualism” (10). Williams’ and 
Gagnier’s approach to the self as engaged with external systems has proven helpful to my 
thinking on determinism and individual agency, though I also work to evolve this theory 
of practice into an ecological understanding of the self – a critical gesture that proves 
necessary as both the social structures and individual engage within a larger orbit of 
environmental influence. 
 To make more sense of the term structure of influence and how it will operate in 
my analysis of the subject / place dynamic, let us turn to two key spaces within this 
dissertation: the country and the city. As mentioned above, the psycho-physiological 
influence of the rural environment had been recognized by Cheyne and others, and this 
influence, we must acknowledge, is the result of an aggregation or assemblage of aspects 
of the environment12: its direct or climatic influences, its affordances, the adaptations it 
necessitates, and then the extra-environmental layer of those adaptions such as social 
practices associated with that locality. Herbert Spencer outlines a sensory as well as 
cognitive engagement with the assemblage of a particular locality, noting that “daily 
experiences” results in an accumulation of the feelings induced by a place and its usual 
objects, leading to composite states of feeling and still “larger aggregation of states,” 
which ultimately merge into “a more complex feeling . . . produced by being in that 
locality” (Principles of Psychology 589).  The complex feeling results from being in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Here, “assemblage” is offered in the Delueze and Guattari meaning of the word. As with a book, their 
initial example of an assemblage, each environment also has “lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata 
and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorializations. Comparative rates of flow on 
these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and 
rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage” (3-4). In general, I prefer to use 
structures of influence as it renders environmental the structural of feeling that Williams sees as purely 
social; however, assemblage similarly points to the ways in which each space has a multiplicity of objects 
and forces that all afford some quality of experience. 
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particular place, from experiencing its unique structure of influence as augmented by 
one’s own life experiences.  Spencer’s depiction of engagement with locality builds from 
associationism, and thus such assemblages or structures of influence had been identified 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, even if not expressed in such terms. 
Authors of this era similarly portrayed structures of influence in their narratives, 
allowing them to reveal a psychological engagement with the external world and the 
reciprocal dynamic of meaning within this structure. In The Italian (1797), Ann Radcliffe 
portrays an affective moment of environmental experience when the kidnapped Elena 
looks out the window and senses that “the objects” of the mountainous locality “seem to 
impart somewhat of their own force, their own sublimity to the soul” (75). Rather than a 
self-generated feeling, Elena’s experience seems to be imparted from without. What 
follows is a list of particular aspects of the present topography, many of which are 
correlated with a psychological quality:  
Along this deep and shadowy perspective, a river, which was seen 
descending among the cliffs of a mountain, rolled with impetuous force, 
fretting and foaming amidst the dark rocks in its descent, and then flowing 
in a limpid lapse to the brink of other precipices, whence again it fell with 
thundering strength to the abyss . . . .  (75) 
Rather than read this scene – wrought with psychological valences of “fretting” and 
“limpid” – as a moment of pathetic fallacy, I argue that Radcliffe’s direction of influence 
from scene to subject provides a critical clue. As in Gibson’s discussion, the scene 
imparts or affords a particular structure of influence that is simultaneously a quality and 
meaning inherent to that place while also being specific to the perceiver, to his or her 
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own psychophysiological state of being and emotional needs. The notion that aesthetic 
experience was predicated on dynamic engagement with external stimuli is very much at 
the heart of the culture of sensibility and the cultural conception of taste. As we will see 
in Chapter 1 on Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho, the eighteenth-century 
associationist philosopher David Hume emphasizes how aesthetic experiences and the 
refinement of particular tastes allows one to cultivate an affinity for psychologically 
beneficial environmental stimuli. Through engagement with place, or music, or literature, 
one can influence the effect of environmental stimuli on the nervous system and 
passions.13 Once again, we find ourselves at the intersection of environmental forces, 
personal agency, and culture as adaptation. 
Like the mountains, the urban sphere can also produce feelings of sublimity, but 
this was not the psycho-physiological response most often associated with the nineteenth-
century city, which had a different structure to its influence. Even by 1800, 
Wordsworth’s lament in the “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” over the “degrading thirst after 
outrageous stimulation” and the “savage torpor” induced by urban life was commonplace 
(596).  While certain aspects of the city were believed to have a cultivating influence, its 
overall structure of influence was quite often seen to degrade the urban subject in body, 
mind, and morality. Much of this influence had to do with the general state of confusion 
caused by the city’s thrumming masses and labyrinthine spaces. By 1800, London’s 
population would grow to 900,000 (Schwarz 650). The increase of people led to increases 
in street traffic, which was further problematized by the numerous mechanical 
conveyances.  The often-hostile relationship between English perambulators and horse-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Hume’s “On the Delicacy of Taste and Passion” (1742). 
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drawn coaches was well documented even by the 1710s. These coaches proved especially 
troublesome in the late 1800s as their reduced dimensions and improved suspension 
systems allowed for greater numbers on the streets as well as greater speeds. 
Furthermore, the coaches made the city more accessible to both London dwellers and 
tourists, thus bringing greater numbers out into the streets (Whyman 53; Reed 629).  As 
the population grew, so did the streets gain in number. In the 1710s, the entirety of 
London included 2,175 streets, which constituted 250 miles (Bryant and Whyman 4); by 
the end of the eighteenth century, the area of London would be twice as a large as it was 
at the onset (Schwarz 644). While streets increased in number, space itself was on the 
decline as open areas were largely built over and smaller structures were expanded upon. 
While open spaces of the city were being reduced, these environs also served 
more purposes: accommodating various forms of traffic as well as other public, 
commercial, personal, and illicit activities.  The diverse functions of these public spaces 
required a wide variety of sign systems—whether commercial or bureaucratic—and thus 
afforded a highly complex and at times chaotic semiology.  This pandemonium resulted 
in part from the increase of stores and advertising, but it also had much to do with the 
conflicting efforts to systematize these spaces. The Westminster Paving Act of 1762 and 
later paving acts implemented the posting and regulation of street signs and house 
numbers. Yet, these new systems overlapped with the sign systems already in place and 
did more to exacerbate the sensory chaos of the urban space than to correct it.14   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Susan E. Whyman, in “Sharing Public Spaces,” discusses the necessity for new strategies to “negotiate 
public areas” (49); one such strategy was the incorporation of street signs and house numbers, but Whyman 
points out that, even until 1770s, “there was no standardized format for place names,” so that mail and 
directions had to incorporate multiple names and sign systems to describe the same place or places (49). 
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At various levels, then, the urban sphere complicated many of the fundamental 
processes by which humans engaged with their biological environment. Of course, 
because the city is human-built does not negate the fact that the it is an environment of 
ongoing life-processes, i.e. a biological space.  By altering the biological environment, 
though, human beings necessarily alter themselves. In referring to the “degrading thirst 
after outrageous stimulation,” Wordsworth had said as much, and the notion would be 
repeated in various ways over the course of the century: Elizabeth Gaskell would refer to 
“town life” where people’s “nerves are quickened by the haste and bustle and speed of 
everything around them” (North and South 301) and later Georg Simmel recognized that 
the “intensification of nervous stimulation” led to both “the dominance of the intellect,” a 
“more calculating” mind, and a blasé disposition (4-9, 411, 413).  
 Yet, we should not assume that the urban sphere had one structure of influence 
that determined a pervasive but singular form of alienated, overwhelmed, and/or 
dissipated subjectivity. Rather, what proves so fascinating about the British urban sphere, 
and establishes its importance to the paradigm of environmental self-fashioning, is its 
multitude of unique localities, which offer unique structures of influence. In addition to 
the Thames River and the expansion of underground London, inhabitants had to contend 
with a proliferation of alleyways that stemmed off of the bustling streets and further 
complicated the engagement of subjects with an urban environment. The function of such 
spaces proved ambiguous. Sometimes they were a “private space, accessible only to those 
who lived there” (Shoemaker 5). However, they were often used as a space to get away 
from the crowds – either for the purpose of having a conversation (as often portrayed in 
Dickens’s fiction) or to simply remove oneself momentarily from the bustle. Yet, for 
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those unfamiliar with their labyrinthine twists and turns, these alleys could become “sites 
of confusion or entrapment” (Carter 40-1).  Thus, not only did the city prove over-
stimulating as well as difficult to navigate, but subjects also struggled to recognize the 
potential uses and threats posed by many of its spaces.  
Much like the alleyways, commercialized spaces meant to provide a more 
intimate space – such as coffeehouses, alehouses, and taverns – also retained much of the 
racket and unrest found out in the streets, thus becoming “a site for an extraordinary 
mixture of public and private activities” (Shoemaker 7; also see Steward & Cowen 18).  
The highly permeable storefronts in commercialized spaces of the city (as well as the 
communal spaces of apartment constructions and courtyards) resisted the distinctions 
between public and private spaces, and such resistance could itself be seen as causing the 
cultural desire to concretize this distinction across the nineteenth century.15 In other 
words, the distinction between public and private became apparent when compromised or 
challenged, and thus the urban sphere appears to engender a psychological desire for 
privacy that was then sought via material and imaginative practices.16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For more on the role apartment buildings played in the cultural understanding of privacy, see Sharon 
Marcus, Apartment Stories (1999). For more on the permeability of commercialized spaces, see Lynda 
Nead’s Victorian Babylon (2000), 167-185. 
16 Michael Reed suggests that “the distinctions between private, institutional and public space,” while still 
useful, become increasingly difficult to draw in the late eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries 
because of the “increasing fluidity” of the “semi-commercialized social space” of the city; yet, Reed also 
points to the ways in which architecture changed, making the domestic interior more removed for the city 
environment and thus more private (615, 616-17). Patricia Meyer Spacks questions in Privacy: Concealing 
the Eighteenth-Century Self (2003) whether it is accurate to say that distinctions between public and private 
were increasingly complicated in an era where they also took on increasing importance (6). Spacks also 
emphasizes the imaginative component of this distinction; for instance, she suggests, “Privacy is above all 
an imaginative category. If a remarkable act of imagination was required to conceive of back stairs, 
figuring out how to use the new possibilities of new architecture demanded comparable imaginative force” 
(8). I believe Spacks is right, but I would argue that more attention needs to be paid to how the external / 
material constructions help assist in the imaginative processes, so that the mind works in concert with the 
external sphere to recognize psychological needs and to induce social norms from those needs.	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In addition to recognizing the heterogeneity of the multiple localities within the 
urban sphere, my approach to place also identifies a more complicated relationship 
between particular localities and their larger environs, a relationship that is poorly 
expressed via the oppositional terms of interior and exterior. Rather than seeing the shop, 
the arcade, or the home as an interior space offset to the exterior of the city, or the city as 
an interior space within walls or more abstract boundaries that offset it from the 
surrounding geography, I find it more useful to think of these spaces using the term 
nested. Each locality exists within a larger environment, and nesting indicates how 
smaller localities, “however well-defined and apparently self-contained, remain open to 
[external] influences and resonate, so to speak, in response to them” (Malpas 29). Similar 
to nested spaces within the city, the city itself provides a different structure of influence 
than the surrounding countryside, but it does maintain some similarities as well, based on 
the temperature, geology, and flora and fauna of that area.  A perfect example can be seen 
in Gaskell’s North and South, where the northern industrial city is juxtaposed to both the 
northern seaside town of Heston and the southern metropolis of London. While the 
northern city shares many of the same features of London, it ultimately has stronger 
affinities to the northern seaside town because of their shared climate and the modes of 
living commensurate with that environment.  
The climate not only affected individuals directly, then, but also influenced the 
modes of living and cultural practices of a given region. Such a view of culture’s 
indebtedness to climate and place was already evident by late-eighteenth and nineteenth-
century. The aforementioned Remarks on the Influence of Climate is particularly 
significant here, as Falconer argues that “external circumstances” would not only 
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influence the individual’s “disposition and temper” but also “the manners, intellects, laws 
and customs, form of government, and religion” of a region or country (2). Many of 
Falconer’s claims were or would become commonplace assumptions: people of southern 
climates are more friendly but also more passionate and thus prone to violence, the 
nerves are deadened by overexposure to cold temperatures or physical labor, those who 
live in commercialized environments prove more intelligent but also more manipulative, 
rural peoples are more warm in disposition but also lacking in intelligence and culture. 
By affecting the dispositions of individuals, the climate would have a profound influence 
on the larger social tone and cultural practices of a place. The modes of life and labor 
correlated with each locality also shaped social structures – seafaring cultures would have 
different nuances, for example, than agricultural ones. Of course, the cultural practices 
and social norms influenced by climate and geography would in turn influence the 
individual subject. To appreciate fully the paradigm of environmental self-fashioning, 
then, we must always keep the reciprocity of the individual, social, and environmental in 
mind.  
Taking this complex understanding of structures of influence, I want to turn the 
conversation back towards individual agency, to the ways in which these subjects can 
actively control the environmental influences working upon them. Returning to the notion 
of how the environment could induce individual needs and thereby effect cultural 
changes, the burgeoning hyper-awareness of privacy provides a key example. Patricia 
Meyer Spacks argues that while the eighteenth century did not originate the notion of 
privacy, “the evidence indicates a new level of attention to it during the period”; Spacks 
particularly emphasizes the physical evidence of “architectural history” (6). Over the 
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course of the eighteenth century and nineteenth, many trends in domestic design worked 
towards the insulation of these private spaces, as “middle-class homes were designed, 
externally and internally, to ‘ward off’ urbanization” (Byrden and Floyd 12).17 Front 
doors led to an entrance room and not an all-purpose hallway as had previously been the 
style; a parlor could still be found on the ground floor but was no longer accessible from 
the street; and bed chambers were provided with closets and further separated from the 
more heavily trafficked spaces of the house (Reed 616-17).  Just as the urban 
environment engendered new needs, concerns, and values, so too were inhabitants (those 
with the means, at least) able to build their own localities so as to accommodate these 
new needs. 
What proves significant about the home is not that it provided a barrier between 
the subject and the city or a seat for utter privatization. Rather, the upper- and middle-
class home proved a social space. Again, I find the sense of the home as nested within a 
larger space to be more appropriate view of its function, as opposed to figuring it into an 
interior / exterior binary. The point of domestic insulation was not to separate the self 
from the city or public but rather to create a space in which the structure of influence 
could be actively controlled and thus utilized for specific purposes. The home offered a 
different structure of influence from the city, but it was not distinct from the world 
outside. The people and cultural products of the city proved important devices within the 
home, which subjects also utilized to cultivate desired forms of subjectivity. Thus, even 
as we come to recognize the home as “a powerfully influential space for the development 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The relationship between the architectural changes in eighteenth-century urban homes and a growing 
desire for privacy is also addressed by Spacks 6, and Jürgen Habermas  44, though they approach this issue, 
as I do, from a perspective that interrogates the distinctions between public and private spheres. 
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of characters and identity,” as Inga Bryden and Janet Floyd do, we must be careful, I 
argue, when discussing “a conception of the domestic space as separate . . . from those of 
the world ‘outside’” (2). 
As philosophers and physicians began to recognize the influences of external 
spaces – Sir James Kay’s study of the industrial city proves an apt example – so was 
there a concomitant effort to utilize structures of influence in a form of “domestic 
environmentalism,” which “conflated moral guidance with the actual appearance and 
physical layout of the house and its contents” (Grier 6). By 1873, such conceptions had 
permeated British culture and were no longer simply notions espoused in scientific or 
philosophical discourses, as this passage from an 1873 article in The Furniture Gazette, 
entitled “The Domestic Use of Design,” makes clear: 
There can be no doubt that altogether, independently of direct intellectual 
culture, either from books or society, the mind is moulded and coloured to 
a great extent by the persistent impressions produced upon it by the most 
familiar objects that daily meet the eye . .  .  and yet there are few who 
correctly apprehend to how great an extent the character, and especially 
the temper, may be affected by the nature of ordinary physical 
surroundings . . . . 
What architecture is to the mass, furniture in its domestic application is 
to the individual;  . . . it will often happen that a comparatively 
insignificant article in the house does more in the way of impressing, or 
even moulding, the human intelligence with which it is in almost 
persistent contact. (4) 
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Invoking a Lockean language of the mind as matter to be molded and impressed upon, 
this article also evokes the sense of how environmental assemblages can be created in 
order to effect desired states of being as well as desired cognitive processes.  Such 
practices do not remove the subject from the larger urban environment but rather help 
them to adapt to it in ways more desirable than developing a “savage torpor” or a blasé, 
calculating mind. 
 By being able to control the structure of influence in one’s most frequented 
locality, human beings become capable of engendering their own environmental  
enrichment.18 While the home is likely the most exemplary enriched environment, John 
Gwynn’s urban planning treatise London and Westminster Improved (1766) also 
identifies the city as an example on a grander scale. While he addresses the need to 
improve ventilation in the streets of the city for the same reasons that concerned Cheyne, 
much of Gwynn’s argument in the treatise utilizes a Lockean psychology – where 
external objects shape the blank slate of the mind – to explain how the urban scene could 
have a benevolent impact on the human subject. “Publick magnificence,” Gwynn 
suggests, will “stimulate invention,” a cause-and-effect relationship he verifies through 
the examples of the Greeks and Romans. Gwynn suggests that their advances “were not 
actuated by supernatural cause, or any innate principles in their original formation; the 
mind is a mere blank, but capable of receiving such impressions as custom, education, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Environmental enrichment is a more recent principle in animal and human sciences, which recognizes 
that richer, more stimulating environments can increase cognitive functioning and psychological wellbeing. 
This notion has recently evolved into the science or neuroplasticity, which acknowledges how proper 
stimulus can lead to thicker cerebral cortexes and an increased number of synapses. While certainly steeped 
in more modern understanding of brain functioning, the notion of plasticity and environmental stimulus 
goes back to William James who would have likely developed it from the conception of the plasticity of the 
nerves in medical theories of sensibility. In other words, the idea that environments filled with proper 
stimulus can cultivate intelligence, as well as taste, goes back to the eighteenth century. 
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any other relative cause shall make upon it” (xiv-xv). Thus, Gwynn claims that the 
splendor of their urban environments made beneficial impressions upon their minds and 
led to their cultural advances. Building a better city, then, will result in “the advancement 
of grandeur and elegance” and will “increase among all ranks and degrees of people . . . 
refinement of taste” (xv, 1). Rather than relocating the individual to another environment 
in order to refashion the mind, Gwynn posits that human beings might advantageously 
reshape the environment shaping them. 
Relocation, reconstruction, refashioning – these forms of human agency result in 
environmental self-fashioning. But we might also consider spatial practices within certain 
spaces, the playing of music to effect certain moods, the psycho-physiological effects of 
food, the influence of a good, long walk. Individuals have at their disposal a myriad of 
external spaces and objects to effect different psychological states. If these are all truths 
of the biological existence of human beings, we must then consider how the unique 
spaces of the modern world, in providing a different structure of influence, engendered 
new ways of engaging and new ways of thinking. Asked another way, what new selves 
did the modern city create? 
This question will have to be answered over the course of the dissertation, as no 
local discussion could do it justice. Still, I do want to reaffirm that one of the key 
affordances of the modern city was its capacity to make the reciprocal nature of the 
human engagement with place more apparent. In making British subjects aware of this 
paradigm of self as a reality within their own lives – as opposed to an abstract theory – 
the city can be said to function as a technology of self. I take this phrase from Foucault, 
and as with other terms I have appropriated from poststructuralists, I must necessarily 
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revise its connotations. Foucault lists four types of technology – of production, of sign 
systems, of power, and of self – and he suggests that no one thing is relegated to just one 
type of technology. But what interests me in particular is Foucault’s definition for 
technologies of self: such technologies “permit individuals to effect by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being; so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (18). Foucault goes 
on to discuss how different forms of discourse – dialogue, monologue, letter writing, 
autobiography, confessions – functioned as technologies of self, not only allowing the 
individual to “know thyself” but also producing a particular kind of self given the 
technology. For instance, the letter writing of the Romans and confessional practices of 
Christians, as the bases for self-understanding, produced very different conceptions of 
self that these subjects then steered toward.  
The urban sphere proves to be a technology of all four types – it is a production 
technology, a sign system technology, a power technology, and a technology of self. As 
we have seen, the human self is produced through engagement with the environment (and 
other organisms in it) as much as he or she is through linguistic practices. The city and its 
micro-localities of home, alley, street, lobby, etc., allowed for individuals “to effect . .  . a 
certain number of operations” on body, mind, and behavior “so as to transform 
themselves.”  Because it brings all four types together, the city offers an invaluable 
medium for understanding how self-development occurred in conjunction with power 




The question that this raises is why discuss the urban influence on self-formation 
via nineteenth-century fiction and poetry and not, for example, periodical literature.  Or 
why make this a literary study and not an historical or anthropological study. Indeed, for 
Foucault, it is writing itself that proves the quintessential technology of self, where in the 
subject externalizes his or herself and where the self becomes shaped by the kind of 
writing that was culturally expected. Different forms of writing – epistolary, 
autobiographical, confessional – all required the subject to take different perspectives 
towards the self and thus cultivate different conceptions of self.  The mode of writing that 
I explore in this dissertation, the bildungsroman, began to appear early in the eighteenth-
century but gained its full cultural influence in the nineteenth century, at the same time 
that the paradigm of environmental self-fashioning also took a firm hold in British 
culture. The bildungsroman is, I contend, a generic symptom or manifestation of the 
environmental self-shaping with which this dissertation is concerned as such narratives 
are constructed around the physical and psychological development of the a singular or 
several key characters as they travel through a variety of locations, each of which offer a 
series of experiences that shape the character(s). Beginning in the late eighteenth century, 
the urban sphere becomes the critical nexus through which the subjects of these 
narratives had to pass, allowing them the opportunity to adapt to a modern world in 
which they can then thrive.  But of course, this literature also had to explore how these 
characters psychologically adapted to this experience, how they acquired an 
environmental literacy that allowed them to read structures of influence, to adapt to those 
structures, and / or to adapt their own psycho-physiological responses. In this way, these 
narratives chart a sophisticated negotiation between the subject and external influences in 
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the narrative arc towards a desirable selfhood -- not a transcendent self but rather one that 
is ideal for modern environmental conditions.   In short, the bildungsroman proves the 
necessary medium for this study as it provides the long-view of urban engagement, 
allowing the reader and critic to interrogate and track the characters’ process of 






The first section of the dissertation will consist of two chapters, one on the early 
Gothic novel and one on the Romantic epic. Ann Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho 
and William Wordsworth’s The Prelude are both exemplary of their respective genres, 
and, despite this distinction, both are bildungsroman narratives that reveal the necessity 
of urban experience to the ideal but malleable self they champion. The first chapter 
focuses on Radcliffe’s Gothic novel, resituating its place within a psycho-physiological 
discourse of the self and within an increasingly complex sense of urban influence. 
Through a project of aesthetic appreciation much in line with that of David Hume’s own 
sense of taste and passions, Radcliffe’s heroine, Emily St. Aubert, develops her 
sensibility into a tool that utilizes structures of influence for psychological cultivation and 
maintenance. Through this project, ultimately, Radcliffe situates urban experience as a 
catalyst for the subjectivity she champions – one defined by mental distemper, flights of 
fancy, and acute sensitivity to external stimulus, all of which engenders a stronger 
affinity for rural aesthetics, simple and tame passions, and domestic pleasure. 
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Though William Wordsworth’s “Poet of Nature” moniker would seem to make 
him a likely champion of a rural self-fashioning, in the second chapter I will argue that it 
is the influence of the urban sphere that Wordsworth simultaneously embraces and 
attempts to obfuscate under a rhetoric of transcendence. Of particular interest in this 
chapter is how the urban structures of influence are echoed in key scenes of sublime 
transcendence in The Prelude, which more often take place in remote localities. This 
mapping of urban experience onto rural locality reveals, I argue, the ways in which 
Wordsworth’s urban experience has shaped his conception of the sublime experience and 
mental engagement with the external world. The urban sphere acts as an epistemic 
playground for Wordsworth, teaching him many of the tropes he will use throughout The 
Prelude to articulate the power of the mind: the power and ever-presence of motion; the 
manner in which stimuli must necessarily become an “under-presence” as the conscious 
mind focuses on other objects; the dramatic shifts of psychological state of being induced 
by different urban structures of feeling; and the new, imaginative connections fostered by 
the confusion of walls and posters, theatrical performance spilling into streets, and the 
general blurring of interior and exterior spaces. In many ways, then, Wordsworth’s epic 
poem on the growth of the mind proves as much an espousal of the urban influence as it 
is a testament to “nature” or Wordsworth’s superior imagination. 
 The second half of this dissertation explores the paradigm of environmental self-
fashioning within the context of the Victorian novel. The Victorian novel reveals, I argue, 
a more conscious and confident implementation of environmental self-fashioning, while 
at that same time focusing more explicitly on the urban sphere as a site of extreme 
influence and, resultantly, a site of extraordinary potential to refashion how one thinks, 
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feels, and behaves.  The first chapter of this section, which deals with North and South, 
argues that Elizabeth Gaskell diffuses the tensions between free-will and determinism 
within Unitarian discourse and Victorian culture at large, a tension that has long vexed 
criticism on the industrial novel and the psychology of this era. Following Joseph 
Priestley’s sense of the human subject as an active agent within the chain of determining 
(but not deterministic) forces, Gaskell depicts her heroine’s education amid 
environmental influence, those affecting herself and others. This growing consciousness 
affords her a degree of control in her subjective state of being and her self-formation.  
Also, important to my argument in this chapter and section are the spatial 
practices exhibited by Gaskell’s heroine, practices which reveal a growing sense of 
cognitive engagement with external space as part of daily life. The final chapter on 
Charles Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend, significantly expands on this cognitive 
engagement, as it utilizes a rather profound sense of subjectivity’s ecological 
contextualization. In accord with associationist and evolutionary psychology, Dickens’s 
novel offers a progressive formulation of psychological correspondence with and 
adaption to external conditions and influences. Here, the urban illegibility and alienation 
that preoccupies poststructuralist approaches to the city in literature becomes a symptom 
of initial experience or poor acclimation; however, by portraying the adaptive behaviors 
to locality and the use of external elements to supplement and augment the ways in which 
subjects think and develop, Dickens not only shows how human subjects can create a 
productive correspondence with the urban sphere but also how human psychology proves 
a system of integration with the world rather than a system enclosed in the brain or 
encapsulated in the body.  In emphasizing Dickens’s own prioritization of psychological 
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externality rather than internality, I work to undermine the common critical view that sees 
Dickens’s characters as lacking the psychological complexity of real organisms. 
In summation, this dissertation presents a new understanding of the self that 
emerged in nineteenth-century literature, one that recognized individual will and the 
environmental influence not as mutually exclusive but rather as dialectical forces in the 
formation of selfhood. Such an understanding was made possible by the increased 
complexity and variation of the human milieu – the chaotic metropolis and industrial 
towns, quieter suburbs, the soothing countryside and coasts, and advances in 
transportation increasing access to them all – which affirmed the psycho-physiological 
influence unique to each locality. With a reflexive emphasis on human adaptability and 
agency, nineteenth-century narratives of personal development reveal the potential for 
individuals to exclude or incorporate external influence into the economy of the self via 
the practices of travel, habituation, and adaptation, allowing them to negotiate desired 
forms of subjectivity. The type of subject formation proposed in this study helps resolve 
the polarized conceptions of self that nineteenth-century scholarship has identified, a self 
often seen either as autonomous, deep, and essential or as permeable, superficial, and 
externally shaped. Ultimately, I work toward a sense of the externality of mental life, 
analyzing how these narratives and their modes of representation promote a pre-Freudian 
conception of psychological development as something that happens around individuals 
as much as within them, which proves a more dynamic, sophisticated, and 














As her first narrative gesture in The Mysteries of Udolpho: A Romance (1794),1 
Ann Radcliffe introduces Monsieur St. Aubert – a recovering urbanite and father of the 
novel’s protagonist, Emily. Having “mingled in gay and in the busy scenes” of Paris, St. 
Aubert soon “retired from the multitude ‘more in pity than in anger,’ to scenes of simple 
nature, to the pure delights of literature, and to the exercise of domestic virtues” (1). In 
this gesture, Radcliffe invokes two themes that pervaded British literature of the late 
eighteenth century: the rural retreat from the city and the culture of sensibility with its 
interrelated components of psycho-physiological health, aesthetic taste, and moral 
bearing. Through these two tropes, Radcliffe explores throughout The Mysteries the 
physical and mental influences of the urban sphere. In one key scene – after Emily’s 
love-interest, Valancourt, has been introduced – St. Aubert acknowledges that the urban 
“world” poses many threats to the love “it seldom feels”:  
its scenes, and its interests, distract the mind, deprave the taste, corrupt 
the heart, and love cannot exist in a heart that has lost the meek dignity of 
innocence. Virtue and taste are nearly the same, for virtue is little more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Citations for The Mysteries of Udolpho come from the Oxford World’s Classics edition (2008), ed. 
Bonamy Dobrée. Hereafter, I refer to the novel as The Mysteries. Much of the chapter focuses on the events 
in and around	  the	  castle	  Udolpho;	  thus,	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  break	  from	  the	  traditional	  shorthand	  of	  
Udolpho	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  confusion.	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than active taste, and the most delicate affections of each combine in real 
love. How then are we to look for love in great cities, where selfishness, 
dissipation, and insincerity supply the place of tenderness, simplicity, and 
truth?   (49-50; emphasis added) 
The over-arching plot of this gothic romance is the union of Emily and Valancourt, and 
here Radcliffe identifies the city as a potential antagonist – one that threatens the 
interconnected mind, taste, and moral feeling of the subject. Valancourt proves a worthy 
love interest precisely because he “has never been to Paris” (36). Yet, Emily and 
Valancourt will soon be subjected to their own trials in different cities that will alter them 
physiologically and psychologically, threatening to deprave their senses and disorder 
their interiorities. In this light, St. Aubert’s proclamation becomes a thesis question for 
Radcliffe’s novel; in other words, how does one maintain a healthy psyche, defined 
largely by a capacity to feel, in the face of urban influence? The answer, it would seem, 
has much to do with virtue, and as M. St. Aubert indicates virtue has much to do with an 
“active” form of taste. 
Given his own experience and his paternal role, St. Aubert educates Emily about 
the psycho-physiological influence of urban life and helps her to cultivate tastes that 
prove a psycho-physiological form of control. One significant eighteenth-century 
assumption about the relationship between the city and taste is indicated in M. St. 
Aubert’s frequent references to “dissipation.” A popular watchword of the late eighteenth 
century for the city’s negative influences, dissipation signified the unproductive 
scattering of physical and mental energy that resulted from immoral indulgence and that 
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led, potentially, to the distempering of the passions.2 Eighteenth-century physician 
William Buchan points out that people are endued “with various passions, for the 
propagation of the species, the preservation of the individual, &c. Intemperance is the 
abuse of these passions; and moderation consists in the proper regulation of them” (101). 
According to Buchan, passions could become distempered through over-indulgence of 
luxury and the abuse of debauchery. Intemperance, leading to greater stages of vice and 
violence, can lead to consumption (which pervades the “great towns,” Buchan suggests). 
In concert with Buchan, a pattern emerges in late eighteenth-century print culture, 
particularly in the London Magazine, where the “city” is recognized as “the dominion of 
luxury and dissipation” (“Lively Portrait” 68).3  While it could be found outside the 
cityscape, luxury was strongly associated with the urban aristocracy, the rise of 
international trade, the increase of factories and commercial spaces, the proliferation of 
professions and consumer products, and, of course, the masses of consumers that the 
urban sphere harbored.4 In The Frauds of London Detected (1779), Richard King laments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In accord with my own thinking, Robert Miles points to concerns over urban luxury and its aesthetic 
contrast with pastoral simplicity, though he does not explore The Mysteries in light of this contrast; see 
Gothic Writing 1750-1820 (2002), 41-42. The relationship between luxury and sensibility (and thus 
including aesthetics, taste, morality, etc.) has received ample attention. G. J. Barker-Benfield makes clear in 
The Culture of Sensibility (1992) that “the ‘luxury’ of feeling . . . was at the heart of the culture of 
sensibility, and it was basic to the consumer psychology the polite commercial economy required” (xxvi). 
While certain kinds of luxury are often seen as prerequisites to fine feeling, many scholars have recognized 
the eighteenth-century concern that luxury deadens the senses and taste; see Anne Vila Enlightenment and 
Pathology (1998), 232-234; and Maxine Berg and Elizabeth Eger “The Rise and Fall of the Luxury 
Debates,” 19-22. Berg and Eger’s collection Luxury in the Eighteenth Century (2003) proves an invaluable 
source on luxury and the rise of commercial culture. 
3 See also “Letters on the Progress of Luxury and Dissipation in Edinburgh, During the Last Twenty 
Years,” London Magazine. Vol 2 (1784), p. 469-475.  
4 Leonard Schwarz’s “London 1700-1840” provides an overview of many aspects of London, including its 
characterization as a site of decadence and economic growth. Also, see Sharpe, “Population & Society 
1700-1840,” and Robert Shoemaker, London Mob (2004) 1-26. It is also worth noting that, as Barker-
Benfield suggests, all classes of the eighteenth-century urban sphere participated in the consumption of 
consumer products in their “aspiration for ‘respectability’ and ‘gentility’” (99), thus, all classes indulged in 
luxury, rather than necessary, goods.  
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that London contains so many “depredations, frauds, thefts and whoredoms . . . . London 
is become luxurious, and . . . luxury begets dissipation, and consequently the evils we 
complain of” (v).5 The kind of cause-and-effect chain that King identifies is precisely the 
concern of St. Aubert, who understands the potential of urban stimulation, particularly for 
the affluent, to become a degrading influence if not properly managed or offset by well-
cultivated taste. But this cultivation highlights a wrinkle in the geographical, social, and 
psycho-physiological dynamic established so far – the urban sphere was itself the main 
purveyor of cultivation as it afforded greater access to education and the arts. 
Thus, we return to a slightly revised form of Radcliffe’s prior question: how does 
one resolve the urban sphere’s dual role as a source for cultivation and the seat of 
dissipation?  This is the central question of Radcliffe’s novel, and in arguing this much, I 
work against three key tendencies in Radcliffe criticism that will be engaged throughout 
the chapter: the tendency to largely ignore the role of the urban sphere in Radcliffe’s 
work and first-wave Gothic literature in general6; to prioritize the gendering of sensibility 
as opposed to its potential as an environmental paradigm for psycho-physiological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 King’s cause-and-effect chain beginning with the urban environment closely mirrors Cicero’s “Oration 
for Roscius of America,” which was rather popular in the latter half of the eighteenth century, being quoted 
by English physician William Falconer (366); associationist philosopher Joseph Priestley in A Course of 
Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, 276; and generally echoed in William Cowper’s The Task. Cicero 
states: “The City creates Luxury; Rapaciousness is the necessary Consequence of Luxury; Audaciousness 
breaks out from Rapaciousness; and thence springs all Manner of Guild and Misdeeds; but this Country 
life, which you call savage, is the Directress of Frugality, Industry, and Justice” (trans. Gutherie 54-55).  
6 According to Linda Dryden and Robert Mighall, the urban Gothic emerges in the mid nineteenth-century 
and proves more than “a mere transplanting of the Radcliffian tale of terror in a modern urban context. This 
is not just a Gothic in the city, it is a Gothic of the city. Its terrors derive from situations peculiar to, and 
firmly located within, the urban experience” (Mighall A Geography 30; see also Dryden). In “Gothic 
Cities,” Mighall goes so far as to claim that “The term ‘urban Gothic’ should be a contradiction in terms” 
given the first wave of Gothic literature and its typically remote and rural localities (54). A handful of 
scholars have briefly acknowledged the urban sphere as contributing Gothicism’s modern concerns; see 
William Patrick Day, In the Circles of Fear and Desire (1985); Kate Ellis, The Contested Castle (1989); 
Diane Hoeveler, Gothic Feminism (1998); and David Punter,  The Literature of Terror (1980). In their 
discussions, these concerns are quickly glossed, not part of an extended analysis of Radcliffe’s work, and 
thus not seen as integral to Radcliffe’s sense of subject-formation.  
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control7; and to read Radcliffe’s portrayal of aesthetic engagement as part of a psycho-
physiological paradigm rather than the rhetorical mirroring or symbolic projection of an 
otherwise autonomous interiority.8  The Mysteries affirms the paradigm of an 
environmentally fashioned self and recognizes active taste and aesthetic theory as 
components of a larger discourse in the eighteenth century regarding the integration of 
self and society with the environment.9 While I grant that gender must be acknowledged 
as a variable within this influence, given the common assumption that the female body 
and mind were more impressionable, I argue that Radcliffe’s ideal subjectivity proves 
gender neutral – indeed, Emily St. Aubert follows her father’s model. Both characters 
achieve their selfhood through the cultivation of taste via an engagement with rural and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Kate Ellis and Diane Hoeveler; see also Eugenia DeLamotte, Perils of the Night: A Feminist Study of 
Nineteenth-Century Gothic (1990); Miles, Robert. Ann Radcliffe: The Great Enchantress (1995); Adela 
Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (1996); Markman Ellis, The 
History of Gothic Fiction; Donna Heiland, Gothic and Gender: An Introduction (2004); David Punter and 
Glennis Byron, The Gothic (2004); and Stephen Ahern, Affected Sensibilities: Romantic Excess and the 
Genealogy of the Novel 1680-1810 (2007). 
8 As with nineteenth-century literary criticism in general, scholars of Radcliffe have frequently read the 
correlation between aesthetic scenery and character psychology as symbolically rather than causally linked. 
For instance,  Daniel Cottom suggests that Radcliffe’s landscapes are simply a space “over which [her 
characters’] various psychological states may be displayed on a larger scale” (The Civilized Imagination 
[1985]). Similar references to psychic projection, pathetic fallacy, or affective fallacy in Radcliffe’s work 
are found in Markman Ellis The History of the Gothic (2000) 9, 124; DeLamotte 48; Poovey 320, Punter 
68-69. Robert Miles comes nearer to my own sense of a self that “is shown to be constituted in and through 
nature,” yet for Miles this process is merely symbolic and rhetorical; Miles ultimately aligns his view with 
the “pathetic fallacy,” a concept I am eager to overturn (Ann Radcliffe  [1995] 12). Terry Castle also 
regards the affective connection between landscape and viewer as a symbolic relationship, one steeped in 
psychoanalytic principles of repression and return (The Female Themometer [1995] 17), and such a 
psychoanalytic prioritization of internality (as opposed to causality or reciprocity) informs much of the 
readings of Radcliffe’s sublime aesthetics as well, a trend initiated by David Morris in his seminal article 
“Gothic Sublimity” (1985), which initiated a critical shift from a Burkean (and more empiricist) reading of 
the sublime to a Freudian one. This shift will be explored at greater length later in the chapter. 
9 Two significant, though in some ways conflicting, texts that address eighteenth-century theory on 
environment are Dror Wahrman’s The Making of the Modern Self (2004) 86-120 and Alan Bewell 
Wordsworth and the Enlightenment (1989). While Wahrman suggests that the conception of a malleable 
self that is implicit in the eighteenth-century discourse on climatic influence is usurped by the inward turn 
to a more fixed and autonomous subject, Bewell and my own study provide evidence to the contrary. 
Bewell’s discussion of eighteenth-century environmentalism and its influence on Wordsworth will be 
addressed in the next chapter, and later in the present chapter I will provide further evidence of the 
continuation of discussions on environmental influence on the human subject. 
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urban structures of influence; thus, Radcliffe presents a psycho-physiological form of 
external engagement rather than an inward mechanism of repression and projection. 
The first section of this chapter will establish the empiricist tenets that underwrite 
Radcliffe’s understanding of taste, sensibility, and ultimately her sense of self-formation, 
while the remainder will show how such self-formation becomes entangled with urban 
influence throughout The Mysteries. Central to this chapter’s urban discussion is my 
claim that the castle Udolpho functions as a thematic and aesthetic extension of the urban 
sphere, providing Radcliffe, her heroine, and the reader an opportunity to reflect on the 
urban experience as though viewing it through a glass darkly. Emily’s stay at Udolpho 
proves largely unpleasant, even terrorizing, but it also allows her to further cultivate her 
active taste by expanding her capacity to feel via aesthetic and spatial practices. The 
psycho-physiological condition the Emily garners from her urban experience proves 
beneficial and much like St. Aubert’s once Emily is resituated within the picturesque 
landscapes of France. My reading, then, revises Diane Hoeveler’s and David Punter’s 
sense that Radcliffe shows only “a deep disdain” for the social issues of the urban sphere 
or that it is “wholly destructive” of virtue, or taste for that matter  (Hoeveler 87; Punter 
1:78). Instead, Radcliffe portrays, I argue, a much more complex relationship with urban 
experience, one more in tune with the realities of urban existence in the eighteenth 
century.10 Furthermore, this complex relationship proves integral to the formation of the 
particular subjectivity Radcliffe champions, one defined by “mental distemper,” prone to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Several significant collections have appeared in the last decade, which have provided criticism with a 
more fully developed picture of eighteenth-century urban life. I have in mind Walking the Streets of 
Eighteenth-Century London: John Gay’s Trivia (2007); The City and the Senses: Urban Culture Since 1500 
(2007); and The Cambridge Urban History of England, Vol. 2, 1540-1840 (2000) – many of the chapters 
from these collections have been referenced in the introduction or will be referred to in this chapter. Also 
helpful is Robert Shoemaker’s London Mob: Violence & Disorder in Eighteenth-Century England (2004).  
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fancy yet acutely sensitive to external stimulus – in short, the kind of subjectivity widely 
promoted in the gothic and romantic literature that succeeds Radcliffe. Though 
narratively obscured and critically marginalized, the city proves central to Radcliffe’s 
gothic narrative and the modern self it fashions. 
 
 
Environmental Sensibility and Self-Cultivation 
 
 
Despite sensibility’s origination in empiricism and its continued engagement with 
medical treatises and theories of mind, literary and cultural criticism tends to view 
sensibility as a social rather than environmental paradigm. In other words, they focus on 
sympathy, sentimentality, and the emotional aspect of sensibility. Most often, it recounts 
the following narrative: empiricist philosophy engenders sensibility, sensibility rises 
within the medical discourse of George Cheyne or the aesthetic theories of Hume and 
Priestly, and it arrives at its apex in sentimental fiction and fashionable culture. What 
then? A quick sea change in the late eighteenth-century, as sensibility becomes a 
ridiculous affect, a vocabulary of fainting, blushing, and crying to be satirized.11 It would 
seem that sensibility becomes something different altogether, now silly and artificial, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Todd suggests: “’Sentimentality’ came in as a pejorative term in the 1770s when the idea of sensibility 
was losing ground. It suggested and still suggests debased and affected feeling, and indulgence in and 
display of emotion for its own sake beyond the stimulus and beyond propriety” (8). Stephen Ahern 
similarly argues that, across the eighteenth century, sensibility “gradually changes form denoting a 
primarily sensual to an increasingly ethical category of experience that becomes subsumed by 
sentimentalism as a literary-cultural ethos” (12). While in varied forms, an analogous version of this 
narrative (a shift from sensibility to sentimentality) is stated, as in Wahrman (39) and M. Ellis (7), or is 
reflected in the larger argument, as it is in Van Sant. By and large, these texts prioritize the gendering of 
sensibility, the man and woman of feeling, within the sentimental novel, as does Claudia Johnson’s 
Equivocal Beings	  (1995).	  This	  is	  not	  to	  discount	  scholarship	  that	  focuses	  more	  on	  nineteenth-­‐century	  
culture	  and	  acknowledges	  how	  the nerve paradigm continues in the nineteenth-century, see, for example, 
Peter Logan’s Nerves and Narratives (1997); Alan Richardson’s British Romanticism and the Science of 
the Mind (2001); Rick Rylance’s Victorian Psychology and British Culture (2000); and Thomas Dixon’s 
From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (2003), to name a few.	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certainly something “not easily located within the enlightenment rationality of the 
philosophers and scientists” (M. Ellis, Politics of Sensibility 7). The recounting of this 
shift from sensibility as environmental effect to sentimentality as cultural affect is, 
perhaps, an accurate reflection of the eighteenth-century discourse at large. Yet, it is in 
many ways misleading as it suggests that at some point in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century the empiricist and environmental undercurrent in this discourse was lost.   
Of course, it was not. The understanding of sensibility as tied up in the functions 
of the nervous system and as affected by the environment was readily found in 
Radcliffe’s day, and it would continue well into the nineteenth century.12 Such a 
distinction is crucial to my larger argument regarding the paradigm of environmental self-
fashioning in Radcliffe’s novel. That Radcliffe understood sensibility within this psycho-
physiological bearing is beyond doubt, as other critics have illustrated; even so, the 
environmental orientation of Radcliffe’s understanding has often gone overlooked as 
critics predominantly focus on the variability of the nervous system – across gender, 
class, nationality – rather than focusing on the variability of the environment and the kind 
of states of being it engendered.13 In The Mysteries, Radcliffe makes constant references 
to the nervous system and the capacity of external stimuli to “impress the mind” (31).14 
Also consider that St. Aubert is “prescribed the air of Languedoc and Provence” to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, for example, James Johnson, in The Influence of Tropical Climates on European Constitutions 
(1813); Thomas Trotter, A View of the Nervous Temperament (1807); James Forbes’ Oriental Memoirs 
(1813): I:35, 138; James Martin’s The Influence of Tropical Climates on European Constitutions (1856). 
13 Robert Miles, in Ann Radcliffe: The Great Enchantress (1995), provides a concise discussion of 
empiricism, associationism, and sensibility in regards to the late eighteenth century and focuses briefly on 
the difference in nervous fibers between classes; Miles goes on to discuss the picturesque and sublime, but 
more as a form of ideological expression than an environmental form of self-fashioning (49-52).  
14 Barker-Benfield argues that “‘Impressions’ was one of the most frequently used nerve referents” and 
correlates it to Locke’s nerve paradigm (18). Van Sant points to the part metaphorical, part indexical 




ameliorate a sickness that had “seized upon his nerves,” a medical practice (air cures) and 
terminology (nerves) common to the eighteenth-century medical treatises.15  
In addition, one can easily find the frequent echoes of associationism in aesthetic  
treatises of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as well as its literature. In the 
case of Radcliffe, we see in The Mysteries how sublime scenery “dilated [the] mind” or 
how “terror” similarly “occupies and expands the mind” (163, 248)16 – a description 
highly reminiscent of Joseph Priestley’s belief that the mind “perceives, and is conscious 
of nothing, but the ideas that are present to it”; thus, “it must, as it were, conform itself to 
them” and “must enlarge or contrast with its field of view” (126-7).17  That Radcliffe 
would borrow from Priestley makes sense given that the latter was close friends with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The word “nerves” already had a lengthy history by 1584. Also, the importance of respiration had long 
been established, such as in the work of Galen in the second century. Yet, a humoral system of the body, 
like that used by Galen, would continue to be the dominant physiological model until theories on the 
nervous system and brain began to challenge it in the middle of the seventeenth century and became the 
dominant perspective in the eighteenth century (see Austin 36). Furthermore, medical attempts “to change 
the nature of patient’s temperament, or to alleviate cases of madness . . . were rarely even attempted until 
the mid-eighteenth century” (Still 30).  
16 Radcliffe offers a similar definition for terror and horror in “On the Supernatural in Poetry”: “Terror and 
horror are so far opposite, that the first expands the soul, and awakens the faculties to a high degree of life; 
the other contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates them” (149). The correlation between sublime stimulus 
and the expansion of the psyche goes back to John Baillie’s 1747 “An Essay on the Sublime”: “The 
Sublime dilates and elevates the Soul, Fear sinks and contracts it” (97). Similar descriptions can be found in 
Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s "On the Pleasure Derived from Objects of Terror," Miscellaneous Pieces in 
Prose, by J. and A. L. (London: J. Johnson, 1773), which was also influential to Radcliffe, and, in predating 
Priestley’s own text, reinforces the presence of empiricist conceptions of the mind in the latter parts of the 
eighteenth century. While the correlation between soul and psyche might seem problematic, the soul was 
often seen as synonymous with consciousness, especially within empirical psychology. Gilpin also points 
out how the imagination can dilate itself in vast ideas of space” (Three Essays 56), and, while such a 
sentiment seems to aggrandize the power of the imagination more the influence of the environment, we 
must keep in mind that within empiricism ideas are all determined by environment – that this is Gilpin’s 
thinking too is evident in a passage to be discussed later in which Gilpin refers to external objects of the 
cityscape as already “ideas” (Observations (1786): II: 267-268. Wordsworth and Byron will also refer to 
the dilation or enlargement of the mind in a manner that echoes Priestley: for example in Childe Harold’s 
Pilgrimage that “we thus dilate / Our spirits to the size of that they contemplate” (ll.1421-22); see also 
Wordsworth The Prelude, XIII: 20-60. For more on the influence of associationism on Romanticist 
thought, see M. H. Abrams 177-183. 
17 This description comes from Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777), though Priestley’s own 
associationist belief’s were largely drawn from David Hartley and were published in Priestley’s abridged 
account of Hartley’s theories, Hartley’s Theory of the Mind, on the Principles of the Association of Ideas 
(1775).         
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Thomas Bentley, an uncle of Radcliffe’s with whom she frequently resided. Radcliffe 
knew Priestley personally and likely read his A Course of Lectures, which was in her 
uncle’s library.18  Sensibility, for Radcliffe, worked to encapsulate the numerous ways in 
which the psycho-physiology of the subject was influenced by external world – that is in 
terms of health, in terms of aesthetic tastes, and in terms of the shape of the mind and 
self.  In what follows, I will explore these aspects in greater depth.  
Sensibility referred to the receptivity of the sensory system and mind to the 
external stimulus, a “psychoperceptual scheme explained and systematized by Newton 
and Locke” (Barker-Benfield xvii).19 John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690) outlines how, through physical sensation, external stimuli 
engender ideas and provide the materials through which mental functions are developed. 
Locke conceived of the mind as a tabula rasa, or “empty cabinet” void of innate ideas, 
which suggested a self that was profoundly shaped by external experience. The mind, 
according to Locke, begins as a “white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas”; 
our sensations, caused by external stimulus, “at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the 
yet empty cabinet . . . . [T]he mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the 
materials about which to exercise the discursive faculty,” that discursive faculty being 
tied to the act of reflection (I: 2.15). Within an empiricist view, consciousness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For more on Radcliffe’s relationship with Priestly and his theories, see Norton’s recent biography of 
Radcliffe, The Mistress of Udolpho, particularly 27, 67-69. 
19 Stephen Cox similarly sees sensibility as arising from Lockean notions of self and as referring to “the 
medium of nervous ‘feeling’ through which the self is affected by the outside world” (25). More recently, 
Susan Whyman defines sensibility as building from Locke, and recognizing thus “an externally constituted 
self” (186). The following studies also refer to empiricism in general or Locke in particular as foundational 
to sensibility: Todd 24-30, Van Sant 90, M. Ellis 10, Pinch 17-18, Ahern 12. However, when it comes to 




subjectivity, and self become largely synonymous terms,20 and all ideas, even the idea of 
the self, are derived directly or indirectly from the environment.21  
Most importantly, though, eighteenth-century physicians and philosophers 
received from Locke’s theory a conception of a self that was highly malleable and 
consistently shaped by the environment. Starting with George Cheyne’s The English 
Malady; or, a Treatise of Nervous Disease of All Kinds (1735), the empiricist conception 
of self gained a more physiological aspect and become intertwined with the capacity of 
the sensory organs, nerves, and brain to feel external stimuli. Cheyne’s text, a touchstone 
for discussions on sensibility both in the eighteenth century and today, establishes how 
the climate as well as elements of the built environment can lead to psycho-physiological 
“Distempers” (ii). Climatic influence on physical and psychological formation can also 
be seen in John Arbuthnot’s An Essay Concerning the Effects of Air on Human Bodies 
(1733), and in David Hume’s popular “Of National Characters” (1742). Physicians 
Robert Whyte, William Buchan, and William Falconer all wrote in the later part of the 
eighteenth century about environmental influence as well, the latter suggesting that 
human beings are “liable to be considerably affected, both in his body and mind, by 
external circumstances, such as climate, situation, etc.” (Falconer 2). It is important to 
note here that Falconer first offers “circumstances” as the larger, environmental sphere of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I: 2.15. It is important to note that Locke 
regards self, consciousness, and personal identity as largely synonymous. Locke writes: “Person, as I take 
it, is the name for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is 
the same person” (II: 27.26).  Locke also explains that personal identity, or self, as being attributed to “that 
conscious thinking thing, . . . which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or 
misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends” (II: 27.17). 
21	  As	  with	  his	  definition	  of	  personal	  identity,	  Locke	  refers	  to	  the	  “Self”	  as	  “that	  conscious	  thinking	  
thing”	  (II:	  27.17).	  Later,	  he	  writes:	  “Person,	  as	  I	  take	  it,	  is	  the	  name	  for	  this	  self.	  Wherever	  a	  man	  finds	  
what	  he	  calls	  himself,	  there,	  I	  think,	  another	  may	  say	  is	  the	  same	  person”	  (II:	  27.26).	  	  The	  present	  
discussion	  mainly	  draws	  from	  Book	  II,	  chapter	  27,	  sections	  3,	  9,	  and	  17.	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the subject, a sphere that then includes situation, diet, labor afforded, housing, social 
conditions, etc., in addition to climate. 
As I noted above, many commentators have read sensibility in Radcliffe’s text 
less as part of environmental engagement and more as a feminine flaw, a dangerous 
quality that leads women to social or mental ruin. This, I find, is not entirely accurate. St. 
Aubert does teach Emily to “restrain her sensibility” as “[a]ll excess is vicious,” even 
when it comes to fine feeling (19-20), a sentiment he repeats from his death bed: he tells 
Emily she must “not indulge in the pride of fine feeling,” as “sensibility” proves “a 
dangerous quality” to those who truly possess it (80). Such directives appear, at first, 
conflicting, and seem even more so when St. Aubert looks fondly upon Valancourt, who 
is “full of ardour” and “highly susceptible to whatever is grand and beautiful” (41). It 
could be argued that St. Aubert’s valuation of Valancourt’s fine feeling, in relief to his 
anxieties about Emily’s, points to the gender politics at stake in the discourse of 
sensibility.22 Building from Mary Poovey’s seminal “Ideology and The Mysteries of 
Udolpho” (1979), studies typically focus on the gendered valuations of sensibility or fine 
feeling, often recognizing it as a feminine flaw; they might also see these gender 
valuations as problematically overlapping, such as when Poovey points to “the 
paradoxical role sensibility plays in simultaneously restricting women and providing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For instance of this critical approach, see Kate Ellis; Eugenia DeLamotte, Perils of the Night: A Feminist 
Study of Nineteenth-Century Gothic (1990); Miles, Robert. Anne Radcliffe: The Great Enchantress (1995); 
Adela Pinch, Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (1996); Diane Hoeveler, 
Gothic Feminism: The Professionalization of Gender from Charlotte Smith to the Brontës (1998); 
Markman Ellis, The History of Gothic Fiction; Donna Heiland, Gothic and Gender: An Introduction 
(2004); and David Punter & Glennis Byron, The Gothic (2004); and Stephen Ahern, Affected Sensibilities: 
Romantic Excess and the Genealogy of the Novel 1680-1810 (2007).	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them power” (Poovey 311).23 This approach to sensibility in The Mysteries reinforces the 
pervasive trend to read the novel as feminine Gothic vis-a-vis Lewis’ masculine The 
Monk.24   
Radcliffe’s novel is concerned with gender politics – I do not mean to suggest 
otherwise. Yet, in both instances where St. Aubert warns Emily against indulging in “fine 
feeling,” he also qualifies the imperative: he merely warns her against the dangers 
attendant to sensibility, not sensibility in total. He implores that Emily avoid becoming 
apathetic, “for whatever may be the evils resulting from a too susceptible heart . . . 
nothing can be hoped from an insensible one” (20). At the heart of St. Aubert’s advice is 
the sense that “we become the victims of our feelings, unless we can in some degree 
command them” (80). The question, then, becomes how such control can be effected.  
With gender being so heavily prioritized in the relevant criticism, Radcliffe’s 
attitudes about the urban environment and its influence on sensibility and subjectivity 
have received little attention; St. Aubert’s warnings are more geographical than gender 
specific, especially since his language is particularly gender neutral. Such is the case 
when he tells Emily how mental aptitude and the cultivation of taste are important to both 
“a country and a city life; in the first, they prevent the uneasy sensations of indolence, 
and afford a sublime pleasure in the taste they create for the beautiful, and the grand; in 
the latter, they make dissipation less an object of necessity, and consequently of interest” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For other discussions of conflicting sensibility see also Pinch 123, M. Ellis 55.  For those who discuss 
sensibility as predominantly a feminine flaw, see Miles Ann Radcliffe, 130; Punter 66-68; Hoeveler 74; 
Ahern 155. DeLamotte as well as Punter and Byron see Emily’s excessive feeling as leading to visionary 
moments, though DeLamotte sees this as a positive development (43-44), while Punter and Byron see this 
“female accomplishment” as “no real salvation” (187-88).  
24 For a summation of this trend, see Allen W. Grove, “Sexual Chaos: The Gothic ‘Formula’ and the 
Politics of Complexity” (2000). 
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(6). Once again, St. Aubert correlates the city with dissipation – a term he also uses when 
discussing how the urban scenes “distract the mind, deprave the taste, corrupt the heart.” 
Yet, a strong mind and cultivated sense of taste will keep one from dissipation, i.e. 
indulging in the vices and corrupting stimulus (aesthetic or otherwise) of the city. In the 
country, such qualities will endear one to healthful stimuli encoded in the aesthetics of 
beauty and grandness.  
St. Aubert’s precepts bear strong similarities to those espoused by David Hume in 
“On the Delicacy of Taste and Passion” (1742), another seminal text within the discourse 
of sensibility. Here, Hume breaks down sensibility into the categories of passion and 
taste, suggesting that “cultivation of that higher and more refined taste” will help “to cure 
us of this delicacy of passion” (92). A cultivated taste “improves our sensibility for all the 
tender and agreeable passions,” while at the same time rendering “the mind incapable of 
the rougher and more boisterous emotions” (92). Thus, Hume outlines a program for the 
maintenance of psychological processes – i.e. passions – via aesthetic training, a program 
founded on empiricist conceptions of self that places great importance on the kind of 
stimuli that “strike the senses” (93).  The physiological basis of Hume’s study leads to a 
causal relationship between the external object and the sensations it affords. This causal 
relationship will be further articulated in his 1757 essay “Of the Standard of Taste” as 
well as in Edmund Burke’s 1759 “Introduction on Taste,” which was added to his 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757).25 
I stress Hume’s “On the Delicacy of Taste and Passion,” however, because it offers a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For more on the interconnections between Hume’s and Burke’s essays on standards of taste, see Dario 
Perinetti, “Between Knowledge and Sentiment: Burke and Hume on Taste” (2012). 
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clearer sense of one’s own agency in the development of his or her sensibility and thus 
his or her psychological state of being.  St. Aubert’s function in The Mysteries is to 
indoctrinate Emily into such a program, one that recognizes a malleable self: malleable, 
but not passive, as this aesthetic program recognizes the role of self-cultivation and 
geographic relocation in what proves an environmental form of self-fashioning.  
Before moving to discuss Radcliffe’s portrayal of urbanites and urban experience, 
I want say a few more words on the aesthetic program St. Aubert teaches Emily, 
particularly its incorporation of the sublime. A great deal has been said in Gothic 
criticism about the sublime, and rather than outline that discourse in full, a more efficient 
method would be to point out that while most critics acknowledge Radcliffe’s debt to 
Burke, and some proceed to note Burke’s debt to empiricist psychology, few deliberate 
on how Radcliffe depicts the sublime aesthetic as physiological tool for the cultivation of 
a proper sensibility.26 Radcliffe’s physiological depiction of the sublime is complicated 
by the transcendent sense of holism Emily receives when “her mind arose to the 
adoration of the Deity” upon viewing His sublime “works,” but even her description of 
how the soul “seems to expand . . .into a nobler nature” takes on the associationist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In scholarship of the last three decades or so, the most dominant trends in the discussion of the Gothic 
sublime have been either a feminist or Freudian perspective, though these are not mutually exclusive 
perspectives by any means. The Freudian trend was initiated by David Morris regards the sublime, 
particularly the supernatural sublime, as a form of repression and rerun; see Miles Gothic Writing, 67; 
Castle 132-33; Jack Voller 36; Botting “Introduction,” 8. Noting the transgressive and subjugating aspect 
of sublime experience, particular its threat to self-preservation, critiques have read the sublime as 
masculine or patriarchal and the subject-position as inherently feminine; see Miles Gothic Writing, 67; 
Anne Mellor 95; Elizabeth Bohls 209–29; Heiland 60-71. Offering a counterpoint, Charlie Bondhus (16) 
and Allison Milbank (xviii) have also provided feminist readings of the sublime in Radcliffe’s work but 
have rather found the sublime as an empowering experience. Like Bondhus, Vijay Mishray provides a 
Kantian view of the Gothic sublime that, like the Freudian readings, shifts away from the environmental 
and physiological basis of sublime experience and towards an autonomous subject. Vanessa Ryan has 
recently, and effectively, argued against the reading of the sublime in correlation with Kantian autonomy 
and has reemphasized the physiological and empiricist orientation of the Burkean sublime and its influence 
on eighteenth-century literature; see also Milbank viii-ix and Miles Ann Radcliffe 46-50. 
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language of mental expansion already seen in Priestley and evident elsewhere in The 
Mysteries and “On the Supernatural in Poetry.”27  The mind-expanding capacity of the 
sublime and terrible will prove of significant value to Radcliffe’s environmental aesthetic 
and its correlation to self-formation, but equally important is how Radcliffe consistently 
places the sublime in proximity with the beautiful and picturesque, a proximity which 
suggests, I argue, the necessity of positive pleasure after the negative pleasure of terror so 
as to affirm the value of the latter. 
This aesthetic system of psycho-physiological agitation and soothing is most 
apparent during Emily’s and St. Aubert’s trip toward Rousillon through the Pyrenees. 
Having witnessed the sublime mountains, which evoke a “solemn” state of mind, they 
begin to descend towards a valley and its “features of beauty [that] then mingled with the 
scene”; and though they “look back” upon the “sublime objects they had quitted” with 
regret at leaving them, their eye’s prove “fatigued with the extensions of [their] powers” 
and were “glad to repose on the verdure of woods and pastures” (43). Thus, upon evoking 
the spiritual sense of solemnity, Radcliffe then points to the physiological (and 
psychological) strain that afforded it. The mingling of the sublime and beautiful thus 
becomes a softening of the extreme psychological force of the sublime experience, and 
Valancourt points to this mollification while reaffirming its condition as an external 
influence: such scenes “soften the heart, like the notes of sweet music, and inspire that 
delicious melancholy . . . . They waken our best and purest feelings, disposing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For more on how the natural sublime leads Radcliffe to a sense of holism, see Milbank xii- xvii. Miles 
provides a rather succinct discussion of the interconnections between the associationist implications of 
Burke’s, Ann Laetitia Aikin’s, and Radcliffe’s own discussion on taste and the sublime; Miles particularly 
singles out Aikin’s phrase, “a ‘strange and unexpected event awakens the mind, and keeps it on the 
stretch’” as evocative of associationist models of mental functioning (49).	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benevolence, pity, and friendship” (46).28  In combining these natural aesthetics, 
Radcliffe exemplifies how the mingling of different aesthetic registers causally produce a 
diverse range of emotional states. Thus, to have a keener taste for these aesthetics allows 
one to more readily access the potential feelings they afford. It is at this point that St. 
Aubert provides the warning with which this chapter opened concerning the urban 
influence on taste, and he reiterates that message soon after when he claims that rural 
poverty “cannot deaden our taste for the grand, and the beautiful, or deny us the means of 
indulging it; for the scenes of nature—those sublime spectacles, so infinitely superior to 
all artificial luxuries! Are open for the enjoyment of the poor, as well as the right” (60). 
Indeed, such enjoyments take on a rather democratic meaning, and still implicit is the 
sense that such enjoyment is available to all through the proper cultivation.  
Yet, while St. Aubert warns against the “artificial luxuries” of urban life and the 
dissipation to which it can lead, the aesthetic project outlined above offers a means in 
which the shock or terror of urban experience might be mitigated, so that one could 
access the mental expansion of terror or the “refined perception through heightened 
sensitivity” that it engenders (Thomas 132). We must recall that St. Aubert’s own 
sensibility has undergone a form of sublime urban shock and rural mollification. The 
urban sphere, then, is in some ways responsible for St. Aubert’s subjectivity, one that 
Radcliffe clearly champions. Through Emily’s own experience, Radcliffe depicts what 
role the urban sphere plays in cultivating such a selfhood. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Both Miles and Jayne Elizabeth Lewis have noted the shift from sublime to picturesque as an oft repeated 
strophe in Radcliffe’s fiction that gives the narrative “emotional depth as well as thematic meaning” (Miles 
Ann Radcliffe 80; see also Lewis “ ‘No Colour of Language’: Radcliffe’s Aesthetic Unbound,” 379). 
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Sensibility and the City 
 
 
 While the first volume of The Mysteries of Udolpho is set in rural France, 
anxieties over city life frequently disturb the pastoral calm of its pages. Radcliffe relates 
these concerns through St. Aubert as well as through characters indicative of urban 
conditioning.  Offsetting the “pure taste, simplicity, and moderated wishes” of St. Aubert, 
Monsieur Quesnel, his Parisian brother-in-law, proves calculating and cold, determined 
to become a person of “consequence,” and whose taste was defined by “splendor” (11). 
Mmes. St. Aubert and Quesnel are also contrasted: the latter expresses an affected 
astonishment that the former could live “in this remote corner,” preferring instead “the 
splendor of the balls, banquets, and processions” (12).  Of course, Emily’s aunt, Mme. 
Cheron of the French city Tholouse, and her eventual uncle-in-law, Signor Montoni of 
Venice, also exhibit urban subjectivities, noted in particular for their “talents of 
dissimulation” (123, 143). Mme. Cheron is defined by her “ostentatious style” that is 
“more shew than taste,” her “avarice,” “ambition,” and an “unfeeling manner” (118, 140, 
144). While Signor Montoni remains mysterious at first, we do see the “quickness of his 
perceptions,” suggestive of his enervation as both a southerner and an urbanite (122). 
After the death of St. Aubert, Emily goes to live with her aunt, where she witnesses Mme. 
Cheron’s lavish parities and the “the immoderate and feverish animation” of the people 
who attend, exhibiting their own “insensibility” (122-23). Such parties continue in 
Venice, to which Emily is taken after Mme. Cheron marries Montoni.29 It is in Venice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Mme. Cheron’s name is changed to Mme. Montoni once they are married, but I will continue to refer to 
her as Mme. Cheron, or simply Cheron, for the sake of clarity. 
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where Emily truly experiences the duplicitous nature of the city, as she is enthralled by its 
splendor while also acknowledging its dissipating influence.  
The eighteenth-century discourse regarding the urban sphere and its influence 
offered a similar sense of urban duality, a discourse I will touch upon here so as to 
historically contextualize Radcliffe’s portrayal of urban experience. Even those who 
seemed largely opposed to the urban sphere, like Radcliffe does thus far, recognized its 
importance to cultural progression. William Cowper, as we saw in the introduction, 
admits that the urban centers are “nurseries of the arts” and that London in particular is 
“by taste and wealth proclaimed / the fairest capital of all the world” (693, 697-99). The 
city’s positive influence on the mind is exemplified further in the aesthetic discussion of 
John Gwynn. Gwynn’s London and Westminster Improved offers an empiricist notion of 
how “Publick magnificence” could “stimulate invention,” outlining a cause-and-effect 
relationship that he reinforces by exemplifying the Greeks and Romans (xiv).30 The 
magnificence and splendor of the city, Gwynn claims, results in “the advancement of 
grandeur and elegance” as well as  “increase among all ranks and degrees of people . . . 
that refinement of taste” (xv, 1). Gwynn’s discussion, then, reinforces the potential for 
urban grandeur to have a positive effect on the mind, but it also affirms the increasingly 
democratic sense of taste and cultivation at the end of the eighteenth-century. Not only 
was the cityscape itself a potential aesthetic boon, but it was also the primary arena for art 
and culture in England. Art was most often exhibited in London, Leonard Schwarz 
argues, because that is where the patrons lived; furthermore, the “great national festivals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gwynn goes on to suggest that the advances of these civilizations “were not actuated by supernatural 
cause, or any innate principles in their original formation; the mind is a mere blank, but capable of 
receiving such impressions as custom, education, or any other relative cause shall make upon it” (xiv-xv). 
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and artistic events almost invariably took place in the capital” (655). Radcliffe, as a 
London resident, was herself a beneficiary of this phenomenon: she attended the theater 
frequently (at least before she was famous) and she probably attended the performances 
that were a part of the famous Handel season of 1791 – allusions to which can be found 
in The Mysteries (Norton 62-64). 
Of course, commerce also contributed to the cultivation of taste and refinement by 
increasing the availability of goods to numerous demographics. Susan Whyman’s 
research on letters written by urban dwellers of the eighteenth century reveals that the 
commercial activity associated with fashion, and clothing in particular, led to the 
common perception of London as a “women’s haven,” though she stresses that London’s 
draw on “elite and middling-sorts of women” went beyond “[f]ashion” and “shopping” 
(45). Such interests were not exclusive to women, of course, as men also engaged in the 
buying of fashionable wares. Nor was the interest in fashion exclusive to the social elites, 
as Shoemaker acknowledges.31 Mary Robinson’s discussion of metropolitan manners 
exemplifies the recognition of how all classes, at times problematically, invested in 
London’s fashions: “The public promenades . . . are thronged with pedestrians of all 
classes, and the different ranks of people are scarcely distinguishable either by their dress 
or their manners” (Robinson 198). Robinson explains later that the “exterior ornaments of 
all ranks of people” made visible that multiple classes had adopted the air of 
“Refinement” (206). Furthermore, the sedentary lifestyle found in the city (as opposed to 
the labor and climatic exposure commensurate with agrarian life) was productive of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In London Mob, Shoemaker points to the strong relationship between commerce, clothing, and class 
lines, suggesting that “the use of clothes for social advancement fuelled the consumer revolution of the 
eighteenth century” (15).  
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refinement, according to Falconer: these urban conditions led to weaker nervous fibers, 
which were believed to be “necessary for nicety of sensation and apprehension,” both of 
which “are necessary to form an elegant taste” (Falconer 408, 378-9).  
 While the magnificence of the city could itself cause awe and induce refinement, 
such prosperity had other, less favorable effects that were quite shocking to one’s nervous 
system. The excessive waste was, of course, one result of affluence and excess,32 
especially as the healthy economy of the city attracted droves of immigrants looking for a 
better life only to find squalor. Recognizing from an empiricist perspective the ill effects 
of the urban waste, William Gilpin provides a critique of the city’s sensory pollution that 
echoes St. Aubert’s own and proves an antithesis to Gwynn’s. Gilpin finds himself 
“distracted by a multiplicity of objects” and the “succession of noisome objects which did 
violence to all the senses by turn.”33 Its streets abounding in pollution, proliferation, and 
“rapid motion,” London is full of “disgusting ideas” for Gilpin, a phrasing that evokes the 
empiricist correlation between the external world and consciousness.  
Invoking an empiricist sensibility at either end of the eighteenth-century, 
physicians George Cheyne and William Falconer similarly point to the urban pollution 
associated with the coal fires, lamps, cemeteries, waste, cattle, not to mention the “large 
bodies of people, particularly those who are shut up in large towns and close streets.”34 
And both identify a psychological impact, what Cheyne calls “the Humour of living in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This connection seems fairly prominent – one well known example, discussed by Barker-Benfield, is 
Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees, in which he sees “London’s filthy streets” as a “healthy sign of ‘the 
Plenty, great Traffick and Opulence of that mighty City’” (Barker-Benfield 120).  
33 William Gilpin. Observations (1786): II: 267-268. 
34 Falconer 167; also see Cheyne 54-55. Urban pollution is also mentioned by physician William Buchan 
(Domestic Medicine 443). John Gwynn’s treatise was, of course, a suggestion for what the city could 
become rather then what it already was; thus, he too recognizes, and suggests ways to resolve, the poor 
quality of urban air (3-4).  
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great, populous and consequently unhealthy Towns,” i.e. the nervous distemper or 
diminished “energy of the brain and nerves.”35  The concern over the health of the urban 
environment, particularly the air, was pervasive: we even see it mentioned in 
commentaries on social manners, such as Mary Robinson’s 1800 “Present State of the 
Manners, Society, etc., etc., of the Metropolis of England” (199). Radcliffe would have 
been well aware of these concerns, not only because of their pervasiveness but also 
because of trouble closer to home: the uncle with whom she frequently lived had taken up 
residence on Greek street in Soho in 1774 to overlook his factory, though his health soon 
failed and “in order to get change of air and scene” he took up residence away from the 
city at Turnham Green, as noted in the Dictionary of National Biography (Stephen 318). 
The potentially corrupting influence of commerce and luxury on the mind and 
nervous system was also of concern, as we have already seen.  The refinement of the 
nerves that they engendered was itself a weakening of the physiology that could cause 
more harm than good. Commercial life, comprised largely of “sedentary employments” 
and time spent indoors, would “diminish the strength, and render the body less robust, 
and more subject to the action of external impressions” (Falconer 408). Furthermore, 
“[t]his effect upon the body influences the mind, and reduces it” to a state similar to those 
who live in warm climates. Such people have an increased faculty of sensation, a 
sensibility of the body that is “by sympathy,” i.e. causally, “communicated to the mind” 
(406). “From this sensibility,” Falconer continues, “arises the passionate temper,” a 
quickness of sensation, and ultimately a violent and vindictive” temper.  People of warm 
climes, which Falconer has correlated with those who participate in commercial life, are 
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“kept in a perpetual state of irritation from the high degree of sensibility that prevails, 
which causes a great multiplication of crimes, by multiplying the objects of temptation” 
(Falconer 25). The proliferated objects of temptation, we might reason, are another 
corrupting aspect of the urban sphere, as is the necessity to contend with a massive 
population, which induces people to be “tricking and knavish” (Falconer 206). When St. 
Aubert invokes the term dissipation, then, more is at stake than just an anxiety about 
indulgence in unproductive appetites; rather, implied is a more profound anxiety about a 
slippery slope of two interrelated corruptions: one being psycho-physiological, the other 
social. The urban sphere, with its polluting and corrupting aspects, not only challenged 
one’s physical constitution but also the integrity of one’s mind and virtue.  
 Radcliffe’s portrayal of Emily’s urban experience aptly reflects this cultural 
discourse, taking into consideration both the sense that the city could cultivate taste while 
at the same time threatening one’s psycho-physiological state of being. In her portrayal of 
Venice, Radcliffe tends to prioritize the aesthetic splendor and culture of the place and its 
people, though she does also indicate troubling implications of and results from urban 
experience, particularly luxury. In this, Radcliffe maintains a high degree of fidelity to 
her model, Hester Lynch Piozzi’s Observations and Reflections Made in the Course of a 
Journey through France, Italy, and Germany (1789).36 While Venice would be known as 
the prototypical, Gothic space of magnificent decay to later Romantic and Victorian 
writers,37 Venice was by and large magnificent in Piozzi’s account. Upon arriving in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Radcliffe never saw Venice herself and was inspired by Hester Lynch Piozzi’s Observations and 
Reflections Made in the Course of a Journey through France, Italy, and Germany (1789), which focuses on 
many of the urban ills and resulting human vices outlined in the pervious discussion. 
37 Warren Adelson provides a nice summary of Venice’s cultural cachet in French and English literature of 
the nineteenth-century in Sargent’s Venice (2006), 14-17. 
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Venice, she stresses that the city “exceeded expectation: such a cluster of excellence, 
such constellation of artificial beauties, my mind had never ventured to excite the idea of 
within herself [sic.]” (151). Piozzi does note, however, that Venetians exhibit the 
temperaments associated with urban luxury, indulgence, and other vices. The women are 
“sensualists” and “injure their health too irreparably” as they “follow unrestrained where 
passion, appetite, or imagination lead them” (181-82). So too do the behaviors of 
commoners convey “loose living and licentious dissoluteness” (185). Venice proves an 
urban paragon of indulgence, according to Piozzi: “Never was locality so subservient to 
purposes of pleasure as in this city” (187).  Even so, Piozzi’s Venice and the people she 
details provide Radcliffe with a truly “magnificent city” (200, 204).  
Radcliffe makes her own Venice even more magnificent that Piozzi’s by having 
Emily arrive during the Carnival season. The city appears to be made of fantasy, as 
though “called up from the ocean by the wand of an enchanter,” and it induces further 
flights of fancy, filling Emily’s mind with unreal ideas (171, 175). Like Piozzi, Radcliffe 
repeatedly points to the city’s magnificence, but she also encodes a nervous aspect to its 
excessive aesthetic. When Emily views Venice in the water’s reflection, she sees a 
“tremulous picture,” suggesting not only the movement of the image but also the nervous 
stimulation that the scenes induce. Emily gazes on them with “anxious enquiry” (175). 
The denizens of Radcliffe’s Venice bear their urban conditioning in typical ways, 
as per the duality in the discourse on urban influence. Montoni, more completely in his 
element now, fulfills St. Aubert’s characterization of the urbanized subject as defined by 
“selfishness, dissipation, and insincerity.” His attempts to marry off Emily for his own 
financial gain reaffirm his insensibility, avariciousness, and maniacal ambition. He has a 
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proclivity for excessive parties and gambling – urban vices both. He “delighted in the 
energies of the passions”; he is “roused” by the pains of others; and he has replaced “real 
interest” with “artificial ones” (182). His usual company also exhibits vices associated 
with urban life and a degraded sensibility: they are defined by “strong passions,” 
“dissipat[ion],” “unbounded extravagance,” “cunning” and “a cruel and suspicious 
temper” (183).  Like Mmes. Quesnel and Cheron, the Venetian women have a proclivity 
for splendor and excess; yet, their own “excessive refinement,” while suggestive of a 
weakened nervous system, conveys a certain “beauty” and “sweetness” to Emily (188). 
These women, then, reveal that urban cultivation could be largely beneficial to one’s 
subjectivity, regardless of its ill influence on others. As the eighteenth-century discourse 
shows, the urban refinement of the nerves could lead to various psycho-physiological 
outcomes.  
During her time in Venice, Emily gives in to the same environment as Montoni 
and his cohorts, returning again and again to the bustling carnival and its “fantastic 
diversity,” and we begin see typical consequence in regards to her sensibility (174). The 
“gay and busy scene” often awakens Emily from reverie or melancholic longing for home 
(176), and such mental diversion speaks to St. Aubert’s concerns over urban distraction 
and dissipation. Emily appears to give in to the artificial grandeur, as she “gazed, and 
listened, and thought herself in a fairy scene” (176).  The “fantastic splendor” of Venice 
awakens “fanciful images” in Emily’s mind – an echo of her experience in the Alps. But 
here, artifice rather than nature lingers, causing her to have “indulged herself” in her own 
fantasies until “she almost wished to throw off the habit of mortality” (178). Emily, in 
other words, chooses to ignore her physiological condition as she indulges in “fanciful 
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ideas,” a notion that is symbolically rendered in a poem she then composes about a sea-
nymph. The sea nymph’s underwater world of “cool arcades and glassy halls” proves a 
fantastic mirroring of magnificent Venice. Yet, the watery world also indicates the 
physical insensibility attendant to unconsciousness. Whereas Radcliffe’s earlier reference 
to “tremulous” water suggested the nervous stimulation of the body, affirming the 
connection between the sensual surface of the body and the surfaces of the water, here the 
water is described in terms of “surges” and restlessness, suggesting that the external 
stimulation has an increasingly violent influence. Yet, the sea-nymph sinks below this on-
going agitation and takes recourse to psychological depths that allow for the sensory or 
physiological violence to be ignored.   
Ultimately, in following her own fancies, Emily begins to resemble Piozzi’s 
Venetian women, who “follow unrestrained where passion, appetite, or imagination lead 
them” (Piozzi 182). While Emily becomes increasingly uneasy in her dealings with 
Montoni and his cohorts, Radcliffe affirms that “if anything could have dissipated 
Emily’s uneasiness, it would have been the grandeur, gaiety, and novelty of the 
surrounding scene, adorned with Palladio’s palaces, and busy with parties of 
masqueraders” (187; emphasis added). The psycho-sensual experience of Venice, then, 
proves exemplary of the eighteenth-century concerns about the urban sphere and its 
dissipating impact on the self, and, while it exposes Emily to grandeur and further 








The Urbanism of Udolpho 
 
 
 When Emily travels to Venice through the Alps, her psycho-physiological 
response to the sublime scene reveals her pitch-perfect sensibility: “with her fears were 
mingled such various emotions of delight, such admiration, astonishment, and awe” 
(166). The already urbanized Madame Cheron “only shuddered” and instead 
contemplates “the splendor of palaces” to be seen in Venice (166). Upon leaving Venice, 
and travelling through the sublime Apennines, Emily’s senses “were now dead to the 
beautiful country, through which she travelled” (224). Early in her stay at Udolpho, 
Emily talks of “the regattas of Venice” to divert herself from “idle terrors,” revealing an 
acquired taste for artificial pleasures nearer to Mme. Cheron’s rather than the taste for 
simpler pleasures promoted by St. Aubert (255). The city has changed Emily, and in 
moving to Udolpho, she does not quit the urban sphere but rather finds a darker version 
of it. In this way, the castle Udolpho mimics the role of the Gothic tale at large, that of a 
dark mirror to reflect the unsavory and often less visible aspects of modern life at the end 
of the eighteenth century.38  
Returning for a moment to the eighteenth-century discourse on the city 
experience, it is necessary to explore further how urban luxury, violence, and 
psychological trauma become causally linked. Echoing Hume, Falconer claims that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 For Fred Botting, the Gothic as a whole “functions as the mirror of eighteenth-century mores and values: 
a reconstruction of the past as the inverted, mirror image of the present, its darkness allows the reason and 
virtue of the present a brighter reflection” (“Gothic Darkly” 5). I believe that this mirroring in The 
Mysteries also frames the dark side of the contemporary world, such as urban experience, and recasts its 
psycho-physiological influence within the supernatural. Kate Ellis uniquely observes a correlation between 
the castle in Gothic literature and the urban sphere – though Cynthia Wall does correlate the approach to 
Udolpho’s gatehouse with other portrayals of urban arrival and furthermore suggests the gatehouse itself to 
be part of an urban aesthetic (994, 991). More often, scholars have read Udolpho as a prop-locale for 
supernatural happenings, an arena for Freudian repressions and returns, or a figure for “a kind of outlaw 
masculinity” (M. Ellis 57). 
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constant strain of luxurious indulgence would ruin “taste and learning” as it weakened the 
nerves, and by extension the mind, until they were rendered too callous or too inelastic to 
function properly.39 The result was a distemper or disorder of one’s psychophysiology, 
which for Cheyne includes such symptoms as a “deep and fixed Melancholy,” “Horror,” 
and “wandering and delusory Images on the Brain” (199; emphasis in original). For 
Falconer, the insensibility of urbanites led to selfishness, an “abject submission” to their 
appetites, “multiplied inhumanities,” even violence and rioting.40 The ultimate urban ill – 
mob violence – was connected with many of the other aspects of urban experience: the 
influence of example, commercial life, the violent passions attendant to weakened nerves, 
and the indifference to the wellbeing of others.41  In addition to resulting from urban 
degradation, rioting was seen as further terrorizing and shocking one’s mind and nervous 
system. 
As an extension of the urban sphere, Udolpho offers an anachronistic frame for 
modern urban experience and Radcliffe’s concerns about its effect on the subject.42  As a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Falconer 519; Cheyne 66. 
40 See Falconer 509, 510. Vila similarly acknowledges how certain urban “excesses” and “debaucher[y]” 
led to “violent passions”; see Vila, 233. 
41 See Falconer 538. 
42 Here, I am building on the “creative anachronism” Markman Ellis identifies between the modernity of 
Radcliffe’s concerns and “the exotic location in deep history” of her novel (History of Gothic Fiction 52). 
This position is in accord with a well-established critical view of gothic and romance literature at large. 
Dino Franco Felluga discusses of the romance form as inviting “the reader to participate in a program of 
psychic projection, either to a place where or a time when social antagonisms may be reconciled” has been 
particularly generative to my present discussion; see The Perversity of Poetry (2006), 51-54, especially 75. 
Like Felluga, I am also indebted to Frederic Jameson’s sense of the romance (and, we might add, Gothic) 
genre as figuring “a transitional moment in which two distinct modes of production, or moments of 
socioeconomic development coexist” (148). Other recent criticism that locates particular aesthetics of 
Radcliffe’s day in the past spaces of her fiction; see Cynthia Wall, “The Impress of the Invisible: Lodges 
and Cottages” (2012); Jennie MacDonald Lewis, “The House as Aesthetic Object in Ann Radcliffe's The 
Mysteries of Udolpho” (2012); Katarina Gephardt, "Hybrid Gardens: Travel and the Nationalization of 
Taste in Ann Radcliffe's Continental Landscapes" (2010); and Jayne Elizabeth Lewis, “’No Colour of 




Gothic mirror, Udolpho reflects the perils of urban experience, those that are obfuscated 
by luxury and splendor even as they are induced by them. Udolpho proves a construction 
of destabilized boundaries and thus exemplifies the urban space itself. But also, Udolpho 
stands as a symbol for the destabilized boundaries of the self; indeed, Emily’s own 
fortitude has been compromised by Venice and will be further threatened by the terrors 
and horrors of Udolpho, which becomes, then, the external emblem of the psycho-
physiological state it causally induces. For Emily, such social and personal boundaries 
never stabilize while in this Gothic castle; yet, in placing Emily in an environment where 
urban terror is set within view of mountain sublimity and natural beauty, Radcliffe 
creates a context in which the project of aesthetic, and thus environmental, self-
fashioning can be further actuated. At Udolpho, Emily is able to use the precepts of taste 
that St. Aubert taught her to ameliorate, to control, and even to make beneficial the 
traumas imposed upon her.  
The use of the castle by Radcliffe as a darker and more Gothic version of the 
modern cityscape is predicated, I argue, on the historical, linguistic, and aesthetic 
parallels between these two built spaces. The major eighteenth-century cities of England 
and the continent that preoccupied social commentators and appeared with greatest 
frequency in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century British literature  – Rome, 
Venice, Paris, London – all grew out of much smaller, stone-walled fortifications.43 
Consider, for example, the fortified burg in the background of Albrecht Dürer’s 1519 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Peter Clark points out that the walls of the city were “so vital for continental visions of urban identity”; 
see introduction to The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, 2:2. Clark does not mention whether the 
English shared this vision, though Hume, for instance, twice mentions the “fortifications” of a city when 
discussing the tendency of objects to engender a positive emotional response, i.e. “esteemed beautiful.” If 
they are not quintessential to the urban sphere for Hume, they are at least an exemplary feature; see A 
Treatise of Human Nature 450, 586. 
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engraving “St. Anthony Reading” (see Fig. 1), which emphasizes the similarities between 
the castle and early urban centers in the sixteenth-century, the same century in which The 
Mysteries is set. When depicting Udolpho, Radcliffe constantly reminds the reader of the 
castle’s built environment of  “towers,” “massy walls,” and “edifices” (226, 227, 251, 
287), along with its dim “arcades,” “avenues,” and “corridor[s]” (245, 300, 320, 326). In 
these spaces, we see lamps amidst these stone avenues, their light glimmering “on the 
walls of the corridor” (338, 231); we also witness “noisy bustle” and commotions, and 
intimidating strangers (301). Such descriptions seem as appropriate for older parts of 
Radcliffe’s London as for this Gothic castle.   
Along with these visual similarities are linguistic ones. The word castle comes 
from the Latin castellan, meaning a fortress or protected village; castellan is the 
diminutive form of castrum – a fortified town (“Castle”).  It is also worth noting that the 
family Emily stays with after she escapes form Udolpho, a family who generally resides 
in Paris, bears the name Villefort. The correlation of a sixteenth-century urban family 
with a fortified village suggests that Radcliffe was aware of the variability of castles, 
fortified villages, and walled towns. Indeed, as the etymology bears out, castles and early 
urban spaces were not conceived of as distinct spaces but as varying degrees of a similar, 
constructed environment. I do not mean to suggest that the modern city and the ancient 
castle were synonymous or close to it, only that Radcliffe’s allegorical use of the castle 
and the spatial / aesthetic similarities she emphasizes are founded on a common ancestry 




















Radcliffe’s use of Udolpho as a horrifying reflection of urban life also has a 
literary precedent in James Thomson’s own temporally distancing Castle of Indolence 
(1748), a source of inspiration that Radcliffe cites on several occasions in the novel. In 
Thomson’s Gothic poem, the titular Castle of Indolence functions as a mirror, and thus 
extension, of the urban sphere and its ills: “Loose Life, unruly Passions, and Diseases 
Pale” (I:i.9). In the poem, an “enchanting wizard” lures pilgrims to his castle, set amidst 
the “listless climate” of a pastoral landscape, where they can experience the indulgence of 
indolence and luxury (I:ii.3, 8). The “Freshness” of this valley seems greatly to affect the 
lungs and eyes of the pilgrims, many of whom are urban denizens (I:vii.4; see also I:xiii). 
Within the castle, the pilgrims find “a huge crystal magic Globe to spy” called “Of Vanity 
the Mirror” (I:xlix.1-2, l.1).  Upon viewing the luxuriant behavior of “a gaudy spendthrift 
Heir,” we see “a splendid City rise to View, / with Carts, and Cars, and Coaches roaring 
all” (I: li.1-3, 6). Across several stanzas, Thomson presents the chaos of this city and its 
masses, who appear exceedingly impassioned if not excited to violence. The most sinister 
are the politicians’ sons; connected with “Lucifer,” they are seen “In dark Cabals and 
night Juntos,” and “as if to get / New Light, their twinkling Eyes were inward set” 
(I:liv.2, 4-6). In these glowing-eyed devils, we might recognize attributes of Radcliffe’s 
own Gothic villain – Montoni’s eyes appeared “to gleam with fire” when he arrives in 
Venice (171). In Thomson’s poem, the difference between the world within the mirror 
and the one outside it soon blurs; the castle scenes begin to echo the urban images of vice 
and violence as its inhabitants are swayed by the “Pleasure of Excess,” are driven into “a 
gay Uproar,” and are subsequently “madden’d” (I:lxiii.1, 7-9).   
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Reinforcing the correlation between the castle and the city, Radcliffe makes 
evident the parallels between Montoni’s mansion in Venice and Udolpho via Emily’s 
initial encounter with each. In both scenes, the same Venetian servant meets the party at 
the gates and leads them into a hall with a marble staircase. While hanging “silver 
tripods” light the house in Venice, Udolpho offers a single “tripod lamp.” The luxuriant 
“lattices” of the former become the “rich fret-work” of the latter. In both, Emily is led 
into an open or spacious “apartment” decorated either with “paintings” or a “painted 
window.” While the overall aspect of the Venice interior is luxuriant, darkness and 
desolation define Udolpho, the latter a dim reflection that is punctuated by the description 
of “a large Venetian mirror” that “duskily reflected the scene” (176, 228-29). Thus 
harkening back to Thomson’s poem, its castle, and the mirror of the city that castle 
contained, Radcliffe situates Udolpho metaphorically as a mirror that extends the urban 
experience of Venice, reflecting it in a more Gothic light for our consideration. 
 The transference from Venice to Udolpho is also evident in the continuance of 
characters.  Montoni, Mme. Cheron, Count Morano, and other members of Montoni’s 
unsavory entourage populate Udolpho just as they had Venice. Montoni continues to 
throw parties to which he invites the same cavaliers and ladies Emily saw in Venice, 
parties to which Emily is asked to wear her same Venetian clothing (311). Well into her 
stay, Emily sees “three ladies, dressed in the gala habit of Venice” accompanied by “two 
Signors from Venice” entering Udolpho (382).44 When officers come to capture Montoni, 
who has fled debts made and crimes committed in the city, he is not surprised to see “all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 While their appearance seems “shocking” to Emily, it has more to do with the fact that one of those 
ladies, Signora Livona, had been so kind to her and this place so cruel (382). That the “gaiety of her air” 
seems out of place points rather to the duskiness of Udolpho’s reflection of the city, than to questions about 
whether it is a reflection at all (382) 
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those terrible-looking fellows one used to see at Venice” (397).  Even characters 
introduced at Udolpho are holdovers from Venice, as is the case with Ludovico, who was 
not seen but heard singing the verses of Ariosto from a gondola (177, 247).45  In 
Udolpho, however, Ludovico does not sing; instead he frequently demands silence from 
Annette, Emily’s babbling servant (257, 297), and he is now stern rather than exuberant, 
as Annette complains, “he is always knitting his brows” (298).  In this way, Ludovico 
becomes a microcosm of the larger reflection at stake: Udolpho as a darker and sterner 
version of Venice.  
Ludovico also exemplifies that while the geographical shift in Radcliffe’s novel 
does not afford new characters, what does change is their sensibility and temper; in each 
one, we see not recuperation from urban conditioning but rather its continuation, its more 
extreme degradation of the body and mind. As noted above, the continued indulgence in 
vices, intense passion, and dissimulation leads to an insensibility towards others and, 
eventually, violent behavior. Such an exacerbation of ill temper can be seen in Montoni, 
Count Morano, and other members of Montoni’s crew, who frequently break out in 
“irascible anger” with little instigation (288). Of course, Montoni is himself increasingly 
seen as “insensible” or animated with “passions so fierce and so various” (288, 296). 
Throughout their stay at Udolpho, Montoni and Mme. Cheron become ever more 
combative, creating “scenes of terrible contention” (296). Under the medical discourse of 
sensibility, these distempers, while a far cry from the luxuriousness and quickness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Rictor Norton points out that Ludovico functions as a satiric version of the heroes depicted in the verses 
of Ludivicio Ariosto, and while I don’t see Udolpho as satiric, per se, I do find that this acknowledgement 
is in line with my own thinking about how Udolpho proves a critique of romantic Venice; see 99. 
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sensation we initially saw in Cheron and Montoni respectively, are the inevitable results 
of urban life where taste and prudence are wanting. 
This “terrible contention” between Montoni and Cheron “exhausted [Emily’s] 
spirits” as much as anything that had occurred since “her departure from Tholouse,” this 
last part a reaffirmation of the unity in her Venice and Udolpho experience. Emily can’t 
help but contrast her present guardians with the gentleness of her parents, nor those 
pastoral scenes of her earlier and happier life with her “present life,” which appears as 
though “the dream of a distempered imagination” (296). This distemper is very much 
Emily’s own, as her Venetian indulgence into fantasy has now turned to darker “terrors 
of fancy” (254). Rather frequently, and typically following some shock or horror, Emily 
is betrayed by her destabilized mind, such as when, in the dim lamp-light of her room, 
“she almost fancied she saw shapes flit past her curtains” or when the lamp’s “faint 
flashes . . . upon the walls called up all the terrors of fancy” (241, 254), descriptions 
reminiscent of Cheyne’s “wandering and delusory Images on the Brain.”  In several other 
instances, we see Emily’s agitated mind lead her to misrecognize people or objects.   
In this light, the common critique that the Gothic genre confuses reality with the 
imaginary or supernatural misses the point. Within the contentious space of Udolpho, 
being unable to discern what is real from what is not seems to be highly problematic. 
Certainly Radcliffe intends for the reader to see a potential danger in this slippage 
between real and imaginary. But the point, here, is that this slippage is not merely Gothic 
convention but rather a medical understanding of mental distemper. While such moments 
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have led critics, like Markman Ellis and others,46 to suggest that Radcliffe’s novel largely 
“proposes that the mind has unlimited power over external reality” (Ellis 68), such 
visionary experience is rather the result of environmental conditions. More specifically, 
they are the result of a psycho-physiological system over-taxed by the extreme aesthetics 
and experience of the urban sphere. 
Emily repeatedly acknowledges how the castle’s scenes of “vice and violence” 
appear to her as though “the visions of a distempered imagination” (329), which suggests 
that, in addition to echoing the urban sphere, Udolpho’s confines also reflect an 
urbanized subjectivity. Indeed, Udolpho’s crumbling and deranged aspect signifies well 
the depredated physiological fortification of the urban-conditioned body. Just as Venice’s 
trembling water suggested the physiological influence of its sensory stimulation, so too 
does the weakened body of Udolpho signify its psycho-physiological influence. Radcliffe 
suggests the correlation between Udolpho’s walls and Emily’s sensibility immediately 
upon Emily’s arrival, as “she anxiously surveyed the edifice” of the castle with hits 
“pierced and embattled” features (227). The aesthetic of the castle extends to the 
mountain walls around it, which are similarly “shattered” and tell of “the ravages of war” 
(227). The aesthetic flux between castle and mountain becomes a common theme in 
Radcliffe’s depictions of the external Udolpho, but also at stake is the flux between the 
construction and Emily’s own weakened fortitude, which is indicated through her anxiety 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 While critics have long emphasized how the supernatural moments of The Mysteries are eventually 
explained away through reason, critics have conversely accepted Emily’s supernatural visions as 
imagination run amuck with acknowledging a logical or physiological basis for it. For instance, Ahern 
suggests that Radcliffe challenges “empiricist epistemology” in such moments when the sense become 
untrustworthy and thus misses the empiricist psychology that explains why the sense have become 
deranged or impaired (152). Punter does suggest a correlation between “sensibility and distorted 
perception,” but, as I will reaffirm later, he ignores the physiological basis for aesthetic experience (68). 
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and insensibility towards the stimulus her body still receives. Thus, Udolpho, a model for 
the permeated boundaries of the self, continues to depict the urban threats first observed 
in Venice, but more clearly indicates these threats in regards to the permeable boundaries 
of self. 
This symbolic correlation between self and castle is predicated on causal 
connections – for example, the permeable boundaries of Emily’s new home, particularly 
her own bedchamber, will allow for terrifying events that further degrade the elasticity of 
her nerves. Additionally, then, Udolpho reflects concerns about the uncertain boundaries 
of private and public spheres in urban settings,47 concerns that would become a focal 
point of middle-class morality as well as architectural trends in the city.48 Indeed, Emily’s 
experience in Udolpho is more indicative of uncertainty and violence than Venice. 
Udolpho proves “a strange, rambling place” in which Emily and her servant Annette are 
frequently lost (231). For Emily, the distress that Udolpho presents is, like in the city, not 
simply its spatial complexity but the real possibility of finding some vice or violence 
around every corner. After stumbling upon a veiled recess in a wall that holds what 
appears to be rotting corpse (and turns out to be an anatomical wax figure), Emily 
continues to navigate “the intricacies of the castle,” but now she is afraid that she will 
“again be shocked by some mysterious spectacle” that might reside behind “one of the 
many doors (258).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 My thinking in this correlation between castle and urban experience builds on The Contested Castle by 
Kate Ellis, who recognizes similar parallels though does not apply them to The Mysteries. Ellis touches on 
how the middle classes of the late eighteenth century saw the home as a site of refuge from “the growing 
urban centers [that were] filled with uncertainty and violence” (xi).  
48 Michael Reed discusses how the spaces within houses became more insulating through their 
construction, particularly the inclusion of entry rooms and the increasingly privatized bedrooms (617-8). 
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 For the time being, Udolpho is Emily’s home, but it is one that presents new 
terrors from within and little protection from threats posed without. We have already seen 
the threats posed by Montoni and even Madame Cheron, affirming Kate Ellis’ sense that 
the Gothic novel in general “foregrounded the home as fortress, while at the same time 
exposing its contradictions” (xi). While Udolpho houses familial dysfunction, it also 
exhibits the close proximity of “unfamiliar neighbors” and the desire for “a private place” 
as refuge (K. Ellis 9).49  Of course, the constant threat posed by strangers, particularly to 
women, is a pervasive urban theme, one that Raymond Williams defines via a dichotomy 
between the knowable communities of the village, which fostered “natural country ease,” 
and the unknowable urban masses, which in turn led to “an unnatural urban unrest” (180). 
Emily’s experience of Udolpho captures this unrest well, as she anxiously retreats from 
the sounds of steps, the indexical signs of the strangers who might do her harm. In an 
exemplary moment, Emily is on the walkway of a rampart and must pass “three 
strangers,” one of whom has an expression of “dark watchful villainy” written on his face 
(287). Though she draws her veil, the men look at her “earnestly” and continue to gaze 
after her. In this scene, Emily is overcome with fear and timidity, just as she is later when 
Montoni commands that she join him and his cohorts at dinner – she shrinks “from the 
thought of being exposed to the gaze of strangers” (311).  Even within the domestic event 
of dinner, Emily must confront unknown persons. Nor is Emily legally or physically safe 
from Montoni – the stand-in patriarch. The contradiction of the unsafe refuge is 
exemplified by Emily’s chamber at Udolpho, which has two doorways, one that locks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ellis’s point about the urban context evincing a greater need for privacy accords well with the discussion 
in the introduction regarding the architectural changes happening in home construction in London and 
Patricia Meyer Spacks’s claim that “the evidence indicates a new level of attention” to privacy in the 
eighteenth century (6). 
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from the outside and another that does not lock at all. Thus, Emily is ever exposed to 
potential transgressions from the outside world, a condition representative of the threat 
posed to women who, even in the refuge of the urban home, had little control.   
The lack of refuge within the bedroom, the site par excellence of private life, is 
both causally and symbolically related to the transgressions on Emily’s psyche – the 
room’s open reception of external elements frequently lead to Emily’s internal agitation, 
even to her “terror” and “sudden shock” (240-41, 260, 262, 264). Both within her room 
and in the corridors of the castle, Emily is exposed to increasing violence, until it seems 
as though the whole castle is mad with rioting: “Every where, as she passed, she heard, 
from a distance, the uproar of contention, and the figures and faces, which she met, 
hurrying along the passages struck her mind with dismay. . . . [E]very avenue seemed to 
be beset by ruffians” (317). Again and again, Emily’s psyche is struck and shocked by 
what she comes across in the avenues of Udolpho, and like the castle itself, Emily proves 
incapable of keeping without herself the violence of the external world. 
The terrors and horrors of Udolpho are, of course, tied up in the aesthetic 
discourse of Radcliffe’s day. When Emily experiences terror, “it occupies and expands 
[her] mind, and elevates it to high expectation, [and] is purely sublime” (248) – language 
reminiscent of Priestley as well as Radcliffe’s own “On the Supernatural in Poetry.” In 
that Udolpho reflects the negative side of the urban aesthetic of splendor, it also reflects 
the potential for urban sublimity to break bad. Within Udolpho, beneficial terror often 
shifts to “horror,” which paralyzes Emily physically and mentally until she “dropped 
senseless” (249). Yet, by incorporating the urban within the mountain-situated Udolpho, 
Radcliffe places urban sublimity in a productive tension with the natural spaces beyond 
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the castle walls.  These external spaces allow Emily to engage with natural aesthetics that 
produce an ameliorating effect, affording Emily the means to control her emotions in 
moments of terror and thereby allowing them to expand her mind without inducing 
psycho-physiological harm.  
In one exemplary instance, which occurs the morning after her fear first leads to 
her distempered imagination, Emily observes the scenery outside. We watch Emily’s 
attention move from the crumbling ramparts, to the sublime surrounding of mountain 
cliffs, which then blends into more picturesque imagery of mists and forests amidst rocky 
crags, and finally to the pastoral beauty of green valleys in the distance (242). Beginning 
first with sublimity, Radcliffe reveals a wide spectrum of possible aesthetics as well as 
the psychological valences associated with them. But these scenes are more than pathetic 
fallacy – they have a causal relationship with Emily’s psychological state, as “her mind 
recovered its strength” by taking in the aesthetic stimulus of this scene (242). By moving 
down the aesthetic scale from urban space to rural valley, Emily can effect her own 
psychological shift from terror to natural sublimity and finally to mental repose. Emily, 
following her father’s precepts, keeps herself from becoming insensible – the ultimate 
danger of urban experience. And by remaining sensible, she can continue to access the 
beneficent influence of the rural world outside her window.  
In resolving psychological distress, then, Emily does not simply turn to reason or 
virtue – that is, she does not rely only on inward faculties to effect psychological stability 
– rather she turns to external influence. In a scene that soon follows the one above, Emily 
walks out on the ramparts of the castle and again observes the aesthetic migration from 
the “grandeur of the broad ramparts, and the changing scenery they overlooked” (245). 
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Her psycho-visual experience proves remarkably similar to the one described in the 
Pyrenees with Valancourt and St. Aubert, but here, the effect not only softens the 
sublimity of the mountains but also the terrors she has experienced. In this moment, she 
is able to look upon and even “examine the gothic magnificence of Udolpho” (245). It is, 
I argue, no coincidence that while Emily fortifies herself via these aesthetics, Montoni is 
seen “pointing to the ramparts” to instruct the workmen on what foundational weaknesses 
require reinforcement (245). While the exterior grandeur buttresses Emily, her position 
outside Udolpho also allows her to gain a visual and psychological perspective over it. 
However, her movement back inside reacquaints her with its internal dangers: she sees a 
group of strangers that she wishes to avoid “at the extremities of the arcades” and her 
fears cause her to imagine that Count Morano is amongst them (245).  Left “agitated with 
apprehensions,” Emily’s shift to the interior and then to her own interiority quells the 
psychological strengthening afforded by her turns around the rampart. 
While at Udolpho, Emily will repeat the aesthetic engagement I have just outlined 
– particularly her focus on the shifting aesthetics from castle, to mountain sublime, to 
verdant picturesque. And each repetition occurs soon after some terror, affirming these 
moments as aesthetic mitigations of her urban trauma. Shifting from her psychological 
engagement with the urban sublime within Udolpho to the natural sublime without, 
Radcliffe portrays not an erasure of Emily’s distress but rather a method for its positive 
incorporation, which is enacted through a process of aesthetic and thus psychological 
naturalization. Sensibility, then, is not a form of weakness in Emily, as many scholars 
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have suggested50; it is rather an economy of exchange between her subjectivity and the 
external world that she learns to negotiate.  The following section will explore the 
aftermath of Emily’s urban experience, assessing the lasting influence this experience has 
on Emily’s subjectivity and how it proves necessary to the subjectivity formation 
Radcliffe ultimately champions. 
 
Rural Redux and the Import of Urban Experience 
 
 
As Emily flees Udolpho into the surrounding mountains and woods, her “terrible 
apprehensions” and “all the busy scenes of the past” continue to plague “her anxious 
mind” (409, 412). Emily’s psychological state, still reflective of urban Udolpho, is only 
ameliorated when her travels lead her out of the Apennines, where the scenery “softened 
into the beauty of sylvan and pastoral landscape” (462). In this journey, Radcliffe 
provides a graduated aesthetic shift, a narrative version of Emily’s experience at the 
casement. Much of the third and fourth volumes depict Emily amidst the rural sea-side of 
the Chateau-le-Blanc (where her father died on the journey meant to restore his health) 
and the idyllic La Valleé. While these natural environments “gradually restored her 
spirits to their natural tone” (495), the novel also suggests that returning to a former 
subjectivity is not as easy as re-inhabiting the places of one’s past. 
Emily’s altered subjectivity is suggested in various ways. First, it is suggested in 
the heterogeneous, aesthetic template afforded by Chateau-le-Blanc and its environs. The 
surrounding landscapes reveal pastoral beauty, picturesque variety, and sublimity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See footnote 23. 
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mountains and oceanic types (469). The chateau itself is built in the Gothic style, 
resembling Udolpho, but with newer additions having a more “modern architecture” 
(471); it also contains, like Udolpho, traces of the urban in the form of splendid parties 
attended by Parisians or in the décor of some of the apartments – one in particular 
contains “grand furniture” that “came from Paris” as well as “large Venetian mirrors” 
(532, 539, 547). The accumulation of aesthetic tones reminds the reader of the various, 
aesthetic experiences of Emily’s journey and thus the expansion of her mind, as per 
empiricist and associationist tenets. In other words, the multiple aesthetics of Chateau-le-
Blanc become anoter model for Emily’s consciousness, which cannot return to a blank 
sheet but is by this point a cabinet well-stocked.  Emily’s psyche, then, gains from her 
urban experience so long as it is not debilitated by that experience, allowing her to 
expand the horizons of her consciousness. In fact, it is through her urban experience that 
she develops a more sophisticated aesthetic palate and comes to face to face with the 
capacity of different environments to help cultivate different psychological 
characteristics. 
 While Radcliffe has consistently shown the real dangers of the city, she also 
suggests that a virtuous, rural, domestic life cannot fully be appreciated without the urban 
experience. The physician William Falconer, who largely praises rural life, admits to its 
inability to cultivate refinement.  The city afforded a wide range of stimulus and 
influences, both good and bad, with which to cultivate both good and bad tastes. But even 
the shocks experienced in urban life – assuming they are of the terrible and not horrible 
variety – were seen to cultivate a desirable sensitivity. Even that champion of the rural 
retreat William Cowper admits his “sensibilities” were “wonderfully enhanced by a long 
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series of shocks, given to a frame of nerves that was never very athletic” (Life and Letters 
285). Like the Gothic itself, the urban sphere cultivates refinement as much through 
shock as through providing an arena of culture. In dilating the mind, shock allows for 
subsequent experiences to be more readily taken in and more deeply felt, so long as the 
mind is not dilated to the extent of dissolution, so long as the nerves are not stretched to 
the point of inelasticity. Such qualifiers, then, reaffirm the value of aesthetic and 
environmental variation. 
 Radcliffe also uses the three family members who inhabit the Chateau-le-Blanc to 
recall previous subjectivities in the novel and to triangulate Emily’s own.  Like other 
urbanites in The Mysteries, the Parisian Countess De Villefort exhibits a sensibility that 
has “long since decayed under the corruptions of luxury” – her resultant insensibility to 
nature and other people is strongly emphasized (466, 468). Blanche, the Count’s daughter 
from a previous marriage, is rather innocent, frequently awed by the natural landscapes, 
and completely befuddled that anyone could prefer the “black walls and dirty streets” of 
Paris “when, in the country, they might gaze on the blue heavens, and all the green 
earth!” (472). The Count prefers nature over the “false taste” he sees in Paris; yet, having 
spent many years there, his psycho-physiological response to the environs of the Chateau 
are no longer the same as Blanche’s, like they once had been. Still, these scenes do 
awaken fond remembrances and pleasurable, if measured, feelings (597, 465). All of 
these characters speak to Emily’s own subjectivity: Blanche is a double of Emily before 
her father’s death and her urban trials; while very different from the Countess, Emily had 
proved just as insensible to the scenes of nature upon leaving Venice; but ultimately, 
Emily seems most akin to the Count. They share a mutual understanding of melancholy, 
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particularly the kind attendant to the retreat from the urban world to the rural scenes of 
one’s past. This triangulation of Emily’s selfhood suggests, then, that her moral and 
mental fortifications remain intact, but it also underscores that, after experiencing urban 
spaces, she is no longer what she once was. 
In portraying Emily in relief to the De Villeforts, Radcliffe reveals Emily’s 
progress toward a sensibility that has been strongly championed throughout the novel –
the sensibility of St. Aubert, the rural retreater par example. Though St. Aubert strongly 
encourages Emily to check her sensibility with reason, we see him regularly indulge in 
sensations derived from nature and domesticity. This is, of course, after his own urban 
trials, and after he chooses La Valleé for the sight of his retirement particularly because it 
was there he first indulged in the “pensive melancholy” that later became “a strong 
feature of his character” (2). Amidst this melancholy, subtler splendor is found, which 
brings “tears of pleasure” to St. Aubert’s eyes; his own urban experiences help him more 
fully to recognize the “sweet affections” attendant “to simplicity and nature” to which the 
“brilliant and tumultuous scenes” are juxtaposed (2). “The conscious of acting right,” i.e. 
the knowledge gained from his trials in Paris that rural living was the more righteous 
path, further “refined his sense of every surrounding blessing” (4). Again and again, 
Radcliffe emphasizes how distress leads to psychologically beneficial reprieves – a key 
concept within the discourse of sensibility.  
While the first example highlights the moral aspect, a few pages latter Radcliffe 
offers a more physiological instance as St. Aubert is “attacked with a fever” that “gave a 
severe shock to his constitution,” language highly evocative of the psycho-physiological 
conception of self (8). Even here, though, physiological degradation does wonders for 
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sensibility: “The refreshing pleasure from the first view of nature, after the pain of illness, 
and the confinement of a sick-chamber, is above the conceptions, as well as the 
descriptions, of those in health” (8).  Not only do the scenes of nature “revivify the soul” 
in such moments, but they also “make mere existence bliss” (8). Here, the enervation 
attendant to illness makes the subject more susceptible to the external stimulus, but the 
outcome is similar as that above: what was simple or mundane before is now readily seen 
as infused with profundity. Emily first becomes aware of this pattern of distress and 
reprieve symbolically, by seeing it in nature: “But hark!” she exclaims, “here comes the 
sweeping sound [of the wind] over the wood-tops;--now it dies away;--how solemn the 
stillness that succeeds!” (15). Note that the solemn stillness is felt only after the rush of 
wind – the agitation caused by some external element. This solemnity proves a seed that 
eventually grows into the more supernatural or more powerfully sublime feelings that 
follow from psychological shock later in the novel.  
Whether in the first moments and days after her father’s death, or the first months 
after escaping Udolpho, the environs of Chateau-le-Blanc and La Valleé prove the stage 
on which Emily exhibits the aftermath of trauma. And there is the sense that Emily’s 
new, urbanized subjectivity, though destabilized to the point of distemper, proves a 
desirable state of being. While bliss and awe often follow the agitations of one’s nerves 
and mind, in more extreme cases in Radcliffe’s novel what follows distress is 
melancholy, which eighteenth-century physicians understood as a mental distemper. St. 
Aubert, we saw, had long dabbled in melancholia, and Emily’s experiences with this state 
of mind first arise after her mother’s death and become more pronounced as St. Aubert’s 
own condition worsens. When St. Aubert faints and then recovers, Emily experiences 
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“terror” that is then “subsided into a gentle melancholy” (66). After his death, Emily 
again experiences the “shock of affliction” that will similarly “soften into melancholy” 
(99). Her continued state of anxiety, leading to “a melancholy imagination,” makes her 
all the more “sensible to every impression” (63).  
 After St. Aubert’s death, Emily indulges her melancholia in the manner that St. 
Aubert warned her against; yet, she also takes on a subjectivity more akin to St Aubert’s 
own in doing so. Upon returning to La Valleé, she haunts his favorite spots; she even has 
the “melancholy pleasure” of reciting poems he once recited – including one about bats 
and how melancholy “charms” the mind, making one feel a supernatural accord with 
nature (96). Emily’s own mind becomes somewhat “distempered,” causing her to invest 
the world around her with supernatural meaning, as when she thinks, for a moment, she 
sees St. Aubert sitting in his favorite chair (95).  In doing so, she is not unlike St. Aubert, 
who was also susceptible to “romantic images” and “the poet’s dream,” and who could 
also “send forward a transforming eye” and make his imagination visible before him (15). 
Emily’s psycho-physiological reaction to her father’s illness and death proves a 
foreshadowing of what later occurs in Venice and Udolpho, with the key difference being 
that her terror in the rural sphere typically fades to melancholy rather than first 
heightening to a state of horror. At Udolpho, Emily experiences more frequently and to a 
more dangerous degree the “dream of a distempered imagination” or the “frightful 
fictions, in which the wild genius of the poets sometimes delighted” (296). And while her 
return to Chateau-le-Blanc allows her terror finally to subside to melancholy, it never 
alleviates that melancholy. But, as Radcliffe has repeatedly suggested, Emily might not 
want it to. 
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Indeed, something significant of Emily’s urban experience at Venice and Udolpho 
lingers on, which is best understood in the symbol of the ruined watchtower – her favorite 
spot on the grounds of the Chateau-le-Blanc. Like Udolpho, and in keeping with 
Radcliffe’s ubiquitous use of the pathetic fallacy, the watchtower proves symbolic of the 
permeated boundaries of self, as suggested by its “broken walls” (540). Also, important 
to the symbol of the ruined tower is the “small chamber” at the top, which “was less 
decayed” than the rest of the structure; this not only delineates a mental space within the 
tower but also one that is in better condition than the rest of it (665). In this symbol, 
Radcliffe reaffirms the malleability of Emily’s self, and, in doubling the symbolism of 
Udolpho’s ruins, she recalls the enervation attendant to Emily’s urban experiences. That 
the tower is symbolic of a decidedly urban subjectivity is reinforced by the fact that 
Valancourt also spends much time here after his own urban trials, after his own 
dissipation and admitted loss of “fortitude” (517). Both characters morally and mentally 
withstand their urban trials even if their psycho-physiological constitutions are weakened 
in the process; in this, the permeated but still-standing tower proves an apt symbol for 
each.  
While the permeation of the self suggested by the tower points to the aftermath of 
urban shock, also at stake in this symbol is the increased susceptibility to external spaces. 
Thus, the tower stands for the condition exhibited earlier by St. Aubert, where affliction 
allows one to experience more readily the awe and bliss of simple nature. In her small 
chamber, Emily luxuriates in the “soft tranquility” of the surrounding scenes, scenes 
whose descriptions are often evocative of nervous stimulation, the “trembling radiance” 
of the water (665, 666).  She also composes two poems that bear strong similarities to the 
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one composed by her father that she recited earlier, suggesting her fuller realization of a 
subjectivity akin to his own. The first, “To the Bat,” depicts the same winged creatures 
from St. Aubert’s poem, but here they more explicitly embody some element of the 
poet’s interiority. As they fly in and out of “the ruins ivy’d tow’r” that proved a spatial 
symbol for Emily’s psycho-physiological being, they reinforce the permeability of her 
self and suggest a free interchange between interior and exterior spaces. The second 
poem, “To Melancholy,” refers to the “charmful pow’r” that melancholy can have on the 
mind, invoking “Fancy” and “wild romantic dream, / That meets the poet’s musing eye” 
(665). This one, again, echoes St. Aubert’s own as it reinforces Emily’s poetic sensibility 
and the sense that distempered imagination can lead to positive, if “wild” psychological 
experience.   
Both poems allude to psychic projection onto the external space, seemingly 
affirming the sense of spectrality and pathetic fallacy identified by many commentators 
on Radcliffe’s novel and on the Gothic and Romantic genres in total. Yet, while this 
poetic experience suggests an aggrandizement of the deep self – its inwardness, 
autonomy, and individual power – it ultimately results from the reality of the self as 
permeable and highly malleable. Contextualized within an ever-repeating cycle of 
distress and reprieve, which occurs both in local moments and across the larger narrative, 
these poems are rather reflective of the benefits of a well-distressed mind recollected in 
tranquility, so to speak.  By the novel’s end, both Emily and Valancourt have achieved a 
subjectivity like St. Aubert’s. As with St. Aubert, the urban stimuli that weakened the 
nerves and distempered the mind prove a necessary catalyst for a subjectivity that is 
strongly inclined toward rural domesticity, the solemnity of nature, and visionary 
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experience. If the city was the antagonist initially, it has also become, paradoxically, a 
requisite medium for their psychological development and happy union. 
Interestingly, all of Count de Villefort’s, St. Aubert’s, and Emily’s urban 
engendered subjectivities are explicitly correlated to poets or foreshadow Romantic 
sentiments to come. It would be inaccurate to call these subjectivities pre-Romantic, 
however. Charlotte Smith’s The Emigrants (1793), which also employs the rural retreat 
trope and more explicitly engages Cowper’s The Task, similarly portrays concerns about 
the urban-shaped sensibility. In the poem, Smith’s speaker compares herself to the 
emigrants, as one “who long / has dwelt amid the artificial scenes/ Of populous City” and 
loses “all taste / For Nature’s genuine beauty” (I. l.260-265).  Yet, the speaker’s language 
suggests not a total loss, like Countess De Villefort; rather, her stance towards the natural 
scenery is more melancholic – replete with the visionary qualities attendant to mental 
distemper – much like the Count, St. Aubert, and Emily. The Count’s nostalgic look at 
the natural haunts of his childhood also bears close similarities to William Wordsworth’s 
“Tintern Abbey,” in which Wordsworth views “forms of beauty” from which he has been 
“absent long” because caught for five long years “in lonely rooms, and mid the din / Of 
towns and cities”  (ll. 23-7). Like the Count and Emily, Wordsworth’s spot of time 
reveals him to be “changed, no doubt, from what I was, when first / I came among these 
hills” (67-8).  Indeed, time in the city changes the terms of the economy between self and 
place because it has changed aspects integral to the self – such as the physiological 
system of nerves, one’s taste, patterns of perception, patterns of cognition. The result is a 
melancholic appreciation of beauty accessed only through some loss – an experience of 
place that is part ode, part elegy. 
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In the next chapter, I want to explore in greater detail how the Romantic poetry 
that follows Radcliffe’s vastly influential novel takes up the trope of the urbanized 
subjectivity, and I will argue, as I have done here, that this urbanization is integral to the 
type of selfhood it champions. As with Radcliffe’s novel, it glorifies the self and the 
power of the imagination; yet, rather than espousing an autonomous and deep psyche, 
they reinforce the permeability and malleability of the self, a condition upon which the 






































CHAPTER 2 – “IN THE PRESENCE OF THAT VAST METROPOLIS”:  
 




	   In the 1805 version of The Prelude, William Wordsworth cultivates an extensive 
theory of self and psychological formation, one that expands upon the paradigm of 
environmental self-fashioning discussed in the last chapter. Wordsworth is as interested 
as Radcliffe in achieving a poetic state of being – that is, one highly sensible to external 
influence and able to utilize external influences to creative ends. Wordsworth first 
outlines his psychological theory of reception and creation in his 1802 “Preface” to the 
Lyrical Ballads and the “Prospectus” to The Recluse,1 written shortly thereafter, both 
texts proving an extension and progression of associationist theory and Locke’s 
empiricism.2 Perhaps the most famous articulation of Wordsworth’s theory of mind 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Recluse was to be a comprehensive philosophical poem of which The Prelude was the introductory 
part. Because The Prelude is part of this philosophical endeavor, I take Wordsworth’s depiction of 
psychological development in The Prelude as a theoretical expression of personal experience.  
2 Wordsworth’s connection to associationism has been well established, and certainly was so long before 
M. H. Abrams’ The Mirror and the Lamp (1953), though Abrams’ account proves an important starting 
point for the present conversation. Abrams argues for Wordsworth’s more expressive (and idealist) sense of 
creativity in his poetry while at the same time acknowledging the associationist debts of his critical prose 
(103-4). Cairns Craig and Gavin Budge have both recently argued against the tendency following Abrams 
to prioritize “an expressive system” and suggest “associationism’s necessarily inferior explanatory power” 
(Budge 54; see also Craig 85-87). Most scholarship on Wordsworth’s philosophy have suggested, in 
concert with Abrams, that Wordsworth, particularly during the first decade of the nineteenth century, was 
caught between empiricist and idealist theories; see, for instance, Simon Jarvis 4-5; John O. Hayden 10-13, 
18-22; Keith Thomas 18, and Robert Langbaum 18. See also Alan Grob’s The Philosophic Mind: A Study 
of Wordsworth’s Poetry and Thought 1797-1805 (1973). The empiricist theory of John Locke, as well as 
other Enlightenment luminaries, pervaded Cambridge during the time Wordsworth attended. Kenneth 
Johnston argues that Wordsworth “certainly read the Essay on Human Understanding, one of the great 
books of the age” (159). Hartley, Keith Thomas affirms, was on Wordsworth’s bookshelf (15). Wordsworth 
knew Godwin and admired Political Justice, though eventually found its atheism untenable. 	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comes from the “Prospectus,” where he proclaims, “How exquisitely the individual Mind 
. . . to the external World / Is fitted,” but also how “The external World is fitted to the 
Mind”; thus, the mind and external world make a “creation” through their “blended 
might” (63-68). The mutual influence of the engagement between mind and world is even 
more evident when Wordsworth claims in “The Preface”: “What then does the Poet? He 
considers man and the objects that surround him as acting and re-acting upon each 
other, so as to produce an infinite complexity of pain and pleasure” (605; emphasis 
added).3 Here, the subject and objects maintain a reciprocal influence, a continuing 
ability to act each on the other. While experience and habit prove necessary components 
of this mental engagement, Wordsworth singles out “pleasure” as the main principle on 
which knowledge is “built up,” as it positively reinforces the associative processes.4	  With 
this store of knowledge in place, the subject comes to look upon a world that is a 
“complex scene of ideas and sensation” (606). From these preludes to his poetical and 
theoretical endeavors, we see the confirmation of a Wordsworthian subject that is 
fundamentally empiricist but not, it is important to note, a passive receiver of sensations.5   
Equally important is the sense that the subject’s agency expands beyond the arena 
of the mind. This form of agency, one of environmental immersion and engagement, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Wordsworth’s description is in line with Priestley’s articulation of associationism:  “all our intellectual 
pleasures and pains [and] all the phenomena of memory, imagination, volition, reasoning, and every other 
mental affection and operation, are only different modes, or cases, of the association of ideas: so that 
nothing is requisite to make any man whatever he is, but a sentient principle, with this single property . . . 
and the influence of such circumstances as he has actually been exposed to”  (Hartley’s Theory xxiv). 
4 Rowan Boyson provides a compelling reading of Wordsworth’s depiction of pleasure as echoing “the 
neuro-physiological theories of David Hartley, John Brown, and Erasmus Darwin,” while offering his own 
sense of how the pleasure of “poetry and our enjoyment of nature are life-enhancing” (123-24). 
5 I emphasize mental agency here because of an incorrect assumption that materialist epistemologies 
portray a passive mind; even Thomas and Hayden, who both note the active mind explicit in the Locke’s 
theory and implicit in Hartley’s, suggest that Wordsworth turns to Idealism in order to accommodate his 
sense of the mind as an active agent; see Thomas 17 and Hayden 23. Abrams similarly suggests that 
Coleridge was concerned about the passivity inherent in mechanical theories of the mind (Mirror 169). 
	  
92	  	  
proves crucial to Wordsworth’s theory of psychological development in The Prelude, but 
it remains a theme that has gone underexplored in Wordsworth criticism due to critical 
assumptions about Romanticism’s inward turn (or its ideology, anyway). In Wordsworth 
and the Enlightenment :  Nature, Man, and Society in the Experimental Poetry (1989), 
Alan Bewell astutely claims that Wordsworth’s “enduring concern is not with the mind or 
nature in isolation, but with how human powers and responsibilities manifest (and have 
manifested) themselves over time in our active engagement with nature” (238).6  
Bewell’s contextualization of Wordsworth’s poetry within eighteenth-century 
environmental discourse proves not only helpful to my own study of Wordsworth’s 
environmental view of psychology but also offers a more culturally grounded sense of 
Wordsworthian nature than has been offered since.7 On this critical spot, I agree strongly 
with Bewell, though from here I diverge from his subsequent focus on “the geological 
agency of human beings” (239). Instead, I want to fold this sense of external agency back 
into a consideration of Wordsworth’s theory of psychological development, to consider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Along with Bewell, a few other scholars have emphasized, even if briefly, the relational or environmental 
aspects of the Wordsworthian self. In Literature and the Relational Self (1994), Barbara Ann Schapiro 
extrapolates the perspective of self in Stephen Mitchell’s Relational Concepts in Psychoanalysis to several 
authors, including Wordsworth, though she spends little time discussing the role of the external 
environment and does not address the city. Alan Richardson’s British Romanticism and the Science of Mind 
(2001) and Noel Jackson’s Science and Sensation in Romantic Poetry (2008) both offer a strong sense of 
sensationalist theory that informed Wordsworth’s understanding of mind and self. 
7 More recently, ecocritics such as Jonathan Bate, James McKusick, and Karl Kroeber have tried to recast 
Wordsworth’s attachment to nature as a political orientation that opposes industrial advances. Kroeber 
specifically posits an “individual imaginative subjectivity, and awareness of human interdependencies” that 
results from rural living as oppositional to the “pseudo-impersonality encouraged by industrialized 
imperialism” (7). Kroeber is correct to suggest that different localities can offer different cultural baselines; 
yet, in concert with Scott Hess, I find the definition of “‘nature’ in opposition to the modern social and 
economic world, especially the city” to be unproductive, though unlike Hess I see this opposition as a 
misreading rather than an accurate one (9). This ecocriticism, I find, limits its own potential efficacy by 
limiting its spectrum to an idealized “nature” that only recapitulates the theories of Romantic ideology they 
try to work against. Yet, Wordsworth engages with numerous types of environments in The Prelude and in 
his poetry as a whole, and each of these environments offers a sense of ecological interdependence and 
provides new experiences, new images, and thus more creative potential.	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the ways in which mental and physical forms of environmental engagement work in 
concert in The Prelude, engendering an external reaction upon the individual psyche. 
In The Prelude, Wordsworth frequently depicts this process of engagement and 
psychological development in the form of play, which highlights an epistemic process of 
physical interaction with the external world. In Book 5, which offers a consideration of 
educational methods, Wordsworth champions the “old Grandame Earth” and the 
“playthings” she affords for the cognitive exercise of the child (5.346-348). In other 
words, the objects of nature prove epistemic objects by which the developing child 
acquires knowledge about the external world and his or her own mental functions. The 
natural environment – one unshaped by humans – proves an invaluable educator in this 
manner, and Wordsworth reveals in The Prelude how this process originates in the affect-
rich interaction between infant and mother (the first ecological system experienced in 
life) and from there expands to include the external world and the objects in it. Cultural 
artifacts, particularly books, become increasingly important in this progress, and through 
these objects Wordsworth emphasizes the capacity of humans to enrich their environment 
in ways that induce greater psychological development. Along these lines, I argue that 
Books 7 and 8, which focus largely on Wordsworth’s urban experiences and his 
reflections on them, portray the city less as an impediment to psychological growth and 
more as an enrichment environment for it.8 Wordsworth spends far less time lamenting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Environmental enrichment refers to an environment that affords cognitive growth either because of its 
own structure or because of particular objects in it. My sense of this dynamic is informed by the work of 
cognitive scientists Andy Clark and David Chalmers as well as the work by anthropologist Stephen Mithen, 
who separately support a theory of how the mind is extended through engagement with external objects, 
particularly cultural artifacts. As discussed in the introduction, their work has been especially helpful in my 
thinking on epistemic engagement with the external world, an engagement that I argue is central to 
Wordsworth’s own theory on psychological development. 
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the city of “blank confusion,” which has received the bulk of critical attention concerning 
Wordsworth’s urban engagement,9 than he does playing with the various structures of 
influence that it affords him. Such experiences and structures prove integral to his 
understanding of cognitive processes and help advance his own imaginative efforts. It is 
in the city, I argue, that Wordsworth regards the full extent to which “man and the objects 
that surround him [are] acting and re-acting upon each other,” even if the total realization 
of this condition is not made until later reflections.  While the city will present both 
“blank confusion” and ideological complications for Wordsworth, it ultimately provides 
objects that “being / Themselves capacious, also found in me / Capaciousness and 
amplitude of mind—” (8.757-759). Such is the progress of mental expansion that the bulk 
of this chapter will outline. 
In the final section, I argue that the two moments most often addressed by 
criticism on The Prelude – Simplon Pass and Mount Snowdon – reveal the extent to 
which urban structures of influence inform Wordsworth’s perception of these remote 
localities and the knowledge they afford him about history and creative empowerment. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Alan Liu and Jonathan Wordsworth argue that Book Seventh, where London is most prominently figured, 
depicts a type of fall or epic descent into hell (Liu 398; J. Wordsworth, Companion 188). Most scholars 
have likewise read Wordsworth’s London as a hellish or chaotic space that impedes the imagination with 
its crude stimuli and threatens both epistemological and ontological security: see Geoffrey Hartman 
Wordsworth’s Poetry, 239; Raymond Williams 150; Mary Jacobus 629; Keith Thomas 130; Stephen C. 
Gill 73; Ross King 66; Markman Ellis 145; Tim Fulford 53-54. For readings of Book 7 as an anti-urban 
depiction within the satiric tradition, see C. R. Stokes 205; David Boyd 617; and Herbert Lindenberger 
237–239. More ambivalent views are taken by William Galperin, who suggests that “London for 
Wordsworth is a place where knowledge—a recognition of the subject’s place in time and space—is 
necessarily purchased with loss of power and individuation” (127), and Lucy Newlyn, who argues that the 
city is “polluting” and estranging but concedes that “Wordsworth is at his best when he is disturbed” and 
ultimately that the city proves a “formative experience” and is “as crucial as the country in moulding his 
imagination” (181). Stuart Allen acknowledges the city’s alienating aspect but also argues that Wordsworth 
evinces the city’s imaginative potential through allegory. James Chandler’s and Kevin Gilmartin’s 
“Introduction” to The Romantic Metropolis (2005) provides the most overtly positive account of the urban 
sphere on Wordsworth’s poetic imagination, though they do not speak to its role in psychological 
development, per se. 
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this way, I will show how Wordsworth’s environmental psychology undermines 
dominant mainstays of Romantic scholarship: the first being the essential, autonomous, 
and transcendent Romantic subject. The inwardness of Romantic subjectivity is perhaps 
best displayed by Andrea Henderson in Romantic Identities (1996), in part because she 
attempts to find alternatives to this critical commonplace only to reaffirm its 
pervasiveness in Romantic poetry and its centrality to Wordsworth’s own conception of 
self.10  The “resistant interiority” that Henderson associates with Wordsworth ultimately 
supports a false premise, that the selfhood promoted by Wordsworth was autonomous 
from the external environment rather than in a reciprocal dynamic relationship with it 
(Henderson 8). 
 The supposed gap that scholarship has seen between nature and modern socio-
political realities in Wordsworth’s writing is the second mainstay that I wish to 
interrogate. In many ways, this second commonplace builds from the first. New 
Historicist accounts have acknowledged the inwardness and transcendence of the 
Wordsworthian self – what Alan Liu calls Wordsworth’s “imperialism of the mind” (211) 
– but only to critique it, showing how it obfuscates historical influence on Wordsworth’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Henderson argues “that the canonical Romantic model of ‘deep’ subjectivity is of limited usefulness in 
helping us understand Romantic conceptions of the subject,” but she then largely reaffirms this model of 
subjectivity in the work of Byron and Wordsworth (3). In her chapter on Byron, she depicts how he 
explores a “context-based identity” in “The Prisoner of Chillon” only to adopt instead “a Wordsworthian 
notion of resistant interiority” – i.e. an inward self that is resistant to external influence (8).  The three 
works that proved most influential in establishing this still dominant view are: M. H. Abrams’ Natural 
Supernaturalism (1973), Geoffrey Hartman’s Wordsworth’s Poetry, and Harold Bloom’s “Internalization 
of the Quest Romance,” though Charles Rzepka significantly affirmed a Wordsworthian sense of the “true 
self”: an autonomous consciousness distinct from nature (25, 68-69). More recently Joel Faflak has 
presented a similarly inward aspect to Wordsworth’s theory of the self where interior forces regulate 
organic growth and where development is signified by “various traumas” (98, 76); for Faflak the Arab 
scene in Book 5 proves exemplary of the Wordsworthian self because it is there that “Wordsworth evolves 
the capacity to let the inner life stage itself on its own terms” (98). 
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mind or his underlying historical epistemology.11 For Liu, Jerome McGann, and 
Geraldine Friedman, history is embedded in Wordsworth’s poetic landscapes, landscapes 
which quite often bury that history beneath thick descriptions of nature or the projection 
of the self’s own consciousness. I argue instead that The Prelude portrays the struggle to 
read history and to contemplate cultural meaning via the environment, not a struggle to 
repress it. In short, my argument poses three primary claims: Wordsworth’s epistemology 
is environmental rather than historical; the Wordsworthian self is malleable and relational 
rather than autonomous and transcendent; and Wordsworth’s nature is very much 
unstable in meaning, culturally and historically enriched, and inclusive of the human 
actions that have shaped it. It is with these tenets in place that Wordsworth records the 
development of the individual mind. 
 
Infant Sensibility, Playthings, & Books 
 
 
To begin, I want to explore in more depth Wordsworth’s depiction of human 
sensibility as it develops from infancy into early childhood in order to concretize his 
views of psychological development.  The tenets established here will prove vital to the 
next section, which argues for the urban sphere as a form of enriched environment, a 
conception Wordsworth works up to by exploring first the mother, then the rural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 I will most frequently engage with Alan Liu’s own New Historicist tome Wordsworth: The Sense of 
History (1989), particularly in my effort to argue against Liu’s sense that Wordsworth’s poetry should be 
read from the perspective of a “historical epistemology” (40). Of course, work by Jerome McGann, 
Marjorie Levinson, and Geraldine Friedman has also been integral to the New Historicist project and have 
worked to critique the displacement of socio-historical realities or doctrinal commitments in Wordsworth’s 
poetry behind a sense of imagination and nature that are “stable and orderly” (McGann 69). While 
Levinson’s view is closer to McGann’s, Friedman’s is more in line with Liu’s, acknowledging that history 
is “originally absent” but also that it persistently “returns, equally phantom and revenant, to haunt the texts 
under consideration” (Friedman 3).  
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environment, and then objects of material culture as epistemic objects. At the root of 
Wordsworth’s psychological scheme is the reciprocal action and reaction between self 
and nature, and thus, the purpose of The Prelude’s early books is “to trace / How Nature 
by extrinsic passion first / Peopled my mind with beauteous forms or grand” as well as to 
show how “first-born affinities . . . fit / Our new existence to existing things” (1.571-74, 
582-83).12 Thus, Wordsworth launches his epic exploration of his psyche by reaffirming a 
mutual influence of extrinsic and intrinsic forces; that these forces operate under a similar 
natural law (as fitting an associationist schema) is apparent in the portrayal of external 
force as affect or “passion.”13 In what follows, I will show how Wordsworth develops an 
understanding of this affective link between subject and environment, its importance, and 
how it encourages the subject to undertake epistemic action through environmental 
engagement. Finally, I will emphasize Wordsworth’s repeated return to the issue of 
mental self-awareness, whether or not the diegetic subject perceives the associative 
processes at work in his or her psychological engagement with and development through 
the external world. Initially, Wordsworth likens the mental operations that fit the mind to 
nature as to musical principles of harmony, where an “Invisible workmanship . . . 
reconciles / Discordant elements and makes them move / In one society” (1.351-355). 
Both Wordsworth’s understanding of associative processes as “Invisible workmanship” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Langbaum argues that these “first-born affinities” represent innate ideas, and thus reveal some of the 
early glimpses of idealism in Wordsworth’s theory of psychology (22). While Locke strongly opposes 
innate ideas, he does not suggest that the “operations” of the mind are the result of experience – only that 
they can be noted or reflected upon only through experience. Similarly, Hartley’s sense of association as a 
natural force inherent to the human mind – just as gravity is inherent to matter – affirms his own sense that 
mental process (though not ideas themselves) may be inborn.	  
13 Fundamental to the associationist model outlined by Hartley was the sense that psychological behavior 
followed the same natural laws as those found external to the subject. Hartley took Newton’s theory of 
gravity as a model for his own discussion of the connective property of associations. See Observations on 
Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) 21. 
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and his emphasis on turning discord into harmony will prove key themes for The Prelude 
and important touchstones for my argument. 
Through much of the early part of The Prelude, Wordsworth explores how 
children grow through their cognitive engagement with the external world and how they 
acquire operations of reflection and self-awareness of their own mental agency.14 
Wordsworth’s discussion of “infant sensibility” incorporates many of Locke’s 
fundamental conceptions of the nascent mind at work. Wordsworth first focuses on the 
mother-child dynamic, and, though scholarship has been more inclined to read this 
dynamic via psychoanalysis,15 Wordsworth’s interest does not lie the role the mother 
plays in the child’s identity formation; instead, Wordsworth offers a unique conception of 
environmental epistemology in early mental development. Pointing to an initial 
connection between mother and child (“the babe who sleeps / Upon his mother’s breast”), 
Wordsworth notes how the child receives affective stimulus from interaction with the 
mother, “feelings” that pass into the child’s “torpid life / Like an awakening breeze” 
(2.239-40, 243-44). As a result, the infant’s mind, “[e]ven in the first trial of its powers,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For Locke, through experience and memory the mind comes to “be furnished with ideas and language, 
the materials about which to exercise the discursive faculty; and the use of reason becomes daily more 
visible, as these materials that give it employment, increase” (II.1.15; emphasis added). While Locke 
specifically refers to reason here, he also describes how the mind, working with these same “materials,” can 
actively conjoin and deconstruct them at will – a sense of mental activity quite similar to Hartley’s 
associationism. Through the repetition of and reflection on these activities, the mind becomes ever more 
aware of its own agency.  
15 Jonathan Wordsworth (80), Chris Jones and Li-Po Lee (par. 9), Joel Faflak, and Kerry McSweeney (42-
44) all offer a Freudian perspective, emphasizing the drama of ego formation even though nothing in the 
scene speaks directly to it. Jonathan Wordsworth even implies the poor fit of this reading: “In terms of 
child psychology Wordsworth makes the wrong guess: an infant’s problem is not with forming parts into 
wholes, but with perceiving differences, distinguishing between self and other” (80).	  Certainly, we should 
not condemn Wordsworth for failing to subscribe to a psychological theory that would not exist for another 
100 years. More productive readings have been offered by Jackson (71) and Langbaum (53), who both 
stress the sensationalist epistemology inherent to this scene – Boyson also points to the “developmental 
models of sensation throughout” The Prelude (128-29). My own effort is to explore how Wordsworth 
translates this sensationalist epistemology into an environmental epistemology.	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becomes aware of external influence (2.245). Offering an overtly associationist extension 
of this idea, Wordsworth suggests that the baby becomes “eager to combine / In one 
appearance all the elements / And parts of the same object, else detached / And loth to 
coalesce” (239-250). In other words, the mind of the child associates the various 
experiences of engagement with the mother, and the many influences she affords, into a 
conception of a singular object.16 The now singular object of the mother becomes the 
child’s first observed environment, one that is defined through affective influence and 
response. Furthermore, in emphasizing the mother as first environmental object, 
Wordsworth points to how the first ideas the child acquires from the external world result 
from an engagement that is equally environmental and social. 
The child’s process of engagement, reception, and association then extends from 
the mother to the external world. Because the child is “[s]ubjected to the discipline of 
Love” – that is, since the child acquires positive stimulus from the initial, external agent – 
“His organs and recipient faculties /Are quickened, are more vigorous; his mind spreads, 
/ Tenacious of the forms which it receives” (2.251-254). As the infant’s sensory organs 
and cognitive faculties are expanded or “quickened,” he or she begins to recognize an 
environment beyond the mother whose breast had been both a fond location for rest and 
source of nourishment.  Yet, the baby is not “bewildered and depressed” by this larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The mother proves a valuable example for how meaning exists extrinsically to the mind as well as for 
how the individual mind must do the work of adhering various elements and influences into a coherent 
whole. Thus, I disagree with Rzepka’s sense that “For the Romantics, order is no longer assumed to inhere 
in a physical universe of objects (the advance of the natural sciences notwithstanding); rather, it inheres in 
the organized mental universe of percepts” (10). Rather, I would suggest that Wordsworth sense of mind 
“fitting” to the external world indicates that order and meaning exist externally but require mental action to 
be recognized – but this is only one part of the process for Wordsworth, as the mind also fits the world to 
its own notions. Wordsworth recognizes, then, a reciprocal, mutually shaping engagement between external 
world and mind that bears similarities to Gibson’s sense of affordances, as discussed in the introduction, 
which will be further explored later in this chapter. 
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sphere because of the positive experience it has known thus far and because the infant 
still finds itself within the mother’s “beloved presence” (2.261, 258). Mixing both 
sentimental and physiological language, Wordsworth suggests: 
Along his infant veins are interfused  
The gravitation and the filial bond  
Of Nature that connect him with the world.  
Emphatically, such a being lives,  
An inmate of this active universe.  (II: 262-266; my emphasis). 
The bond with the mother, the infant’s first environmental object, thus spreads to the 
larger environment, which similarly nurtures growth through positive stimulus. Thus, the 
infant becomes a happy inmate of an environment that beneficently acts upon it through 
similarly affective forces – note the correlation between gravity and emotional bond. 
Subject to external influence, the child also has agency within its cognitive engagement: 
For feeling has to him imparted strength,  
And—powerful in all sentiments of grief,  
Of exultation, fear and joy—his mind,  
Even as an agent of the one great mind,  
Creates, creator and receiver both,  
Working but in alliance with the works  
Which it beholds. Such, verily, is the first  
Poetic spirit of our human life—.                 (269-276) 
Receiving sensations and subsequent ideas for his or her experience, the infant must 
necessarily do the cognitive work of association – of combining and linking simple ideas 
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in order to perceive and engage with the environment effectively. Such are the 
fundamental “affinities” of the infant: to begin the mental process of linking sensation 
and ideas, which proves vital to the child’s ability to engage with its mother and 
ultimately to engage with the world. The reciprocal acting and reacting of subject and 
world begins to emerge, as external influence quickens the sense and cognitive capacities, 
allowing them to interact better with (and become more sensible to) external influence. 
Thus, Wordsworth’s environmental epistemology is not only necessary for effective 
engagement with the world but also develops the capacity for psychological and poetic 
growth. This environmental epistemology proves, then, the basis for Wordsworth’s 
psychology and for his epic song.17 
  First the mother and then the immediate surroundings prove an enriching 
environment that fosters sensorial and cognitive development. As new objects and 
influences are experienced, the mind gains information, combining it into the subjective 
conception of the external world – that “Invisible workmanship” that makes sense of the 
external world and the meanings and influences it affords. Through this process of 
association and combination, the child begins to experience structures of influence that 
exist externally to itself – first the mother and then in specific localities. Because this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I offer this sense of environmental epistemology not only as a counter to psychoanalytic readings of this 
scene and The Prelude as a whole, but also as an alternative to Alan Liu’s sense of historical epistemology, 
which takes the “epistemological constructs” of culture as the determining form of knowledge. Certainly, I 
agree that cultural epistemes are at work in The Prelude, and my discussion on how material culture offers 
key epistemic artifacts will bear that out, but I want to emphasize how the these cultural constructs are 
always superadded to an environmental epistemology that is already in place. The cultural epistemes, like 
epistemic artifacts that are their concretized form, are a part of rather than a dominion over the engagement 
between subject and environment. In other words, both historical epistemology and environmental 
epistemology prove an “orbit of signification” that encapsulates the subject, but the environmental 
epistemology is ultimately the larger orbit, the only one a human being is necessarily born into and can 
never leave while living. The need to view culture and history through the perspective of environmental 
epistemology will be developed in the final section of this chapter. 
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capability is initially developed via engagement with the mother’s features, I argue, 
Wordsworth correlates topography to the lineaments or features of a face. For instance, 
he describes how the scenes of his youth “on my mind had stamped / The faces of the 
moving year” so to have “[r]emained, in their substantial lineaments / Depicted on the 
brain” (1.560-61, 600-01).  The mention of faces not only recalls the early influence of 
the mother but also points to how the engagement between child and environment bears 
an affective tone. In another instance, Wordsworth cites one particular evening that “soon 
brought on / A sober hour,” 
                                not winning or serene,  
For cold and raw the air was, and untuned;  
But as a face we love is sweetest then  
When sorrow damps it, or, whatever look  
It chance to wear.                                                    (4.133-137) 
Often, scholars have read such scenes as a humanization of the natural world that leads 
toward transcendence, a form of mental projection18; while there is a great deal of 
cognitive engagement at work, such moments would be better regarded, I find, as a sort 
of skeuomorph.19 The face metaphor emphasizes a fundamental schema of association, 
one predicated on habits developed from prior engagement with the mother, now applied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Raymond Williams (133-34), Geoffrey Hartman (xiii), and Onno Oerlemans (34) all point to this 
humanizing of the landscape as linked with the project of transcendence where the projection of personal 
feeling is either a self-conscious detachment from nature (Williams and Oerlemans) or a peroration for 
apocalyptic separation (Hartman). Hess’ argument about Wordsworth’s photographic subjectivity also 
reinforces a sense of how human framing of the landscape leads to a form of detachment (22-23). 
19 Skeuomorph refers to terminology or ornamentation on a derivative or advanced form of technology that 
represents older or original qualities of predating forms. For example, internet technology uses a variety of 
terms correlated with paper media (pages, scrolling, etc.); a plastic object might replicate stitching or rivets 
so as to appear like an older form of the object. Here, I am suggesting that the use of facial features to 
describe topography proves a similar extrapolation, one Wordsworth uses to signify the continued affective 
engagement with external objects.   
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to the external sphere so as to make sense of its features and their psycho-physiological 
effects. Like facial expressions, the features of the scene have an affective influence, 
making the connection between feeling and image indexical rather than symbolic: the 
dampened air effects a feeling of sorrow, thus Wordsworth codifies the external space 
with the emotions it is likely to produce. 
 Wordsworth’s sense of the external environment as a form of psychological 
enrichment is further expounded in his associationist discussion of education. Taking on 
a Priestleyan notion that “the most effectual discipline of the mind is that of experience” 
(Miscellaneous Observations 3-4), Wordsworth attacks the contemporaneous trend in 
British education to confine students and to subject them to rote learning, taking direct 
aim at teachers “who in their prescience would control / All accidents, and to the very 
road / Which they have fashioned would confine us down / Like engines” (5.380-383).20  
By controlling the educational environment to an outrageous extent, such teachers 
severely limit the experiences students can have and thus the knowledge they might gain. 
Through such methods, the child learns only abstracted information: “He knows the 
policies of foreign lands, / Can string you names of districts, cities, towns, / The whole 
world over” (5.332-336); and yet, the “old Grandame Earth is grieved to find / The 
playthings which her love designed for him / Unthought of” (5.346-348; emphasis 
added). Rather than a mechanical form of knowledge acquisition (making “engines” of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Given Wordsworth’s brief engagement with Unitarianism, it is likely he would have been influenced by 
Priestley and associationism in general in terms of his thought on education. Locke’s Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education (1693) and Rousseau’s Emile (1762) have also been identified as key influences on 
Wordsworth’s attitudes towards education, though neither proves a perfect match. For more on 
Wordsworth’s engagement with eighteenth-century theories on education, particularly Rousseau, see James 
Chandler’s Wordsworth’s Second Nature (1984), 93-199; and Alan Richardson’s Literature, Education, 
and Romanticism (1994), 33-43, 48-58. 	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the students), Wordsworth champions an education via organic experience, where the 
objects of the world become playthings from which to learn – a somewhat crude but 
remarkably prescient sense of epistemic activity. That Wordsworth refers to the material 
and objects of the world as “playthings” is particularly significant, for it correlates the 
affective quality of the natural world already emphasized by “old Grandame” and “her 
love designed” to the developmental component of play and psychological development. 
Antithetical to the mechanical students, children who learn via environmental 
engagement are able to generate epistemological gain within a beneficial, affective 
influence. Such a process of engaging the world, however, is not without pain: 
Though doing wrong and suffering, and full oft  
Bending beneath our life’s mysterious weight  
Of pain and fear, yet still in happiness  
Not yielding to the happiest upon earth.  
Simplicity in habit, truth in speech,  
Be these the daily strengtheners of their minds!  
May books and Nature be their early joy,  
And knowledge, rightly honored with that name— 
Knowledge not purchased with the loss of power!  (5.441-449). 
 
Allowed to make mistakes, allowed to suffer and delight in nature, children will learn, 
Wordsworth suggests, the correct habits to lead them through life. While knowledge 
might be gained via rote learning and book reading alone, a steady diet of both books and 
environmental engagement will allow for a knowledge that is fostered by and fortified in 
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the experience of the external world. Such knowledge is infused with power because it 
manifests through healthy physical engagement and maintains an affective component 
that Priestley and Hartley argue is essential to associative processes. For Wordsworth, the 
affective component not only underwrites the process of association but also encourages 
further forms of engagement and fosters a positive sense of one’s interrelations with 
one’s ecological system.  
Thus far, I have established Wordsworth’s sense (based on associationist theories) 
of the external world as an enrichment environment, one that begins with the mother and 
then expands as the child’s mind is quickened. I have also emphasized the sense of affect 
inherent in external objects and the feelings gendered by them in the subject. This 
affective quality, resulting in various forms of pleasure and pain, becomes the basis for 
the expansion and discipline of mental activity. From the discussion of education and 
environmental engagement, a significant component of Wordsworth’s psychological 
schema comes to the fore: the “invisible workings” of cognitive development are often 
sensed but not fully understood in the moment, causing the epistemic gain of the 
experience to remain latent. In the discussion on education, when referring to his 
Hawkshead playfellows, Wordsworth notes the experience of “a gentle shock of mild 
surprise,” which “Has carried far into his heart the voice / Of mountain torrents; or the 
visible scene / Would enter unawares into his mind” (5.407-413). While the subject 
seems to be aware of the gentle shock – the immediate physiological response to the 
external stimulus – the total structure of influence is not yet realized. In other words, the 
subject does not yet comprehend the full extent to which the external world works upon 
the psyche.  Yet, such influences can, according to Wordsworth, manifest years later, 
	  
106	  	  
replete with the epistemological and affective values inherent to the original experience. 
For instance, Wordsworth assures the reader that it is “not in vain / Nor profitless” if 
external objects or circumstances are “impressed” on the mind if only “doomed to sleep / 
Until mature seasons called them forth / To impregnate and to elevate the mind”  (1.619-
625). In the psychic economy outlined, not all assets received from the external sphere 
are immediately utilized – many cannot be utilized until the mind sufficiently matures.   
A key example of latent psychological value occurs in Book 1, when young 
Wordsworth steals a boat at night and then, while rowing into the lake, is frightened by 
the apparent ascension of Black Crag from behind a nearby hill. The experience makes an 
impression deep in his mind, as Wordsworth claims, “for many days my brain / Worked 
with dim and undetermined sense / Of unknown modes of being” (1.415-420). The scene 
continues to haunt Wordsworth, producing strange and “mighty forms” that “moved 
slowly through my mind / By day, and were the trouble of my dreams” (1.420-426). 
While aware that some unconscious workmanship is occurring, young Wordsworth does 
not fully grasp the process, its function, or its content. The scene and its import seem 
destined for a future day in which a riper mind will make better sense of it. Also 
significant in this scene is the “dim and undetermined sense / of unknown modes of 
being,” which speaks to a burgeoning awareness of the malleability of self and the 
potential of experience to engender new subjectivities. Each experience leads to new 
ideas, as do reflections on those experiences, and inevitably alters the self predicated on 
them – this is a fundamental tenet of the empiricist / associationist model from which 
Wordsworth draws.  
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While the Black Crag scene exemplifies the “Invisible workmanship” going on 
perpetually in the human mind, both in its wakeful and sleeping state, it also provides an 
example of how we might understand the developmental role of play or engagement with 
the environment. Wordsworth tests out new activities and from these activities gains new 
feelings, new thoughts, and even new modes of being. While he focuses by and large on 
the mental result of this play, we must also recognize that the psychological development 
at stake depends upon the embodied experience within the physical world. For 
Wordsworth, then, the mental realm is not discrete from but interfused with the 
materiality of body and environment. 
 In addition to the organic or natural playthings provided by the “Grandame 
Earth,” Wordsworth depicts the value of man-made playthings on several occasions, 
which establishes a precedent for playhouses, visual technologies, and the city itself.  In a 
subtle and likely unintentional echo, the first game Wordsworth depicts is noughts and 
crosses (or tic-tac-toe), a game brought to England by the same culture that brought the 
urban grid pattern to Western civilization: the Romans. With its “square divisions 
parceled out, and all / With crosses and with cyphers scribbled o’er” – that is with the 
grid pattern and signage – the game foreshadows the fundamental components of the 
urban scenes to come later (1.536-537). More important to the scene, the game offers a 
playful and adversarial pursuit, one that required Wordsworth and his sibling to have 
“schemed and puzzled, head opposed to head” (1.539). Similarly adversarial, 
Wordsworth describes the playing of a card game as a form of “combat” (1.543). The 
scene reinforces how games activate cognitive function, requiring one to scheme or 
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puzzle out strategies.21  An imaginative component exists as well, particularly in terms of 
the card game, which becomes an opportunity for the children to imagine in a detached 
manner the gains and losses of warfare. In short, these games provide more than simple 
pleasures; rather, they provide new experiences that exercise and develop a variety of 
mental functions. 
The most significant human-made objects for Wordsworth’s cognitive 
development, though, are his books, which help to reveal both the potential for thought to 
be externalized and shared and the potential for ideas to shape how one mentally engages 
with the external world. It could be said that Wordsworth’s discussion of literature often 
stresses the power of the mind to separate its activity from the immediate environment; 
certainly his discussion of literary experience poses some of the most solipsistic moments 
in The Prelude. For example, Wordsworth recalls repeating verses to himself and claims 
that one might “be glad, / Lifted above the ground by airy fancies / More bright than 
madness or the dreams of wine” (5.590-592); yet, even here, the reference to madness 
and drunkenness suggests not transcendence but mis-fitting between mind and world.  
Rather than escape from the world, books offer Wordsworth another form of 
environmental enrichment, a technological device that allows him to alter his associations 
and cognitive processes and thus play with his method of external engagement. In other 
words, books become an apt example of how “man and the objects that surround him” are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The significance of this sense of play as cognitive activation should not be overlooked. The two most 
important treatises on education in England up until this point, Locke’s Thoughts on Education and 
Edgeworth’s Practical Education, addressed play but said little about its value beyond attempts to turn 
more proper education into types of games. Certainly card games or typical household games were not seen 
as a mental boon but mere distraction. Wordsworth, of course, does not extensively elaborate on his 
educational theory of playthings, but given this description of household games in light of his reference to 
“playthings” in the Book 5 discussion of education, I feel there is sufficient evidence to make such a claim. 
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always “acting and re-acting upon each other,” and it is for this reason, I feel, that 
Wordsworth suggests in the section on education that “books and Nature” should be the 
child’s “early joy.” 
 By the end of Book 5, Wordsworth suggests that literature is more in correlation 
with nature than adversarial to it. The poet claims that one who has been “intimate” with 
rural nature, who has wandered “among the woods and fields” and developed his or her 
sensibility via external stimulus, will more likely “[r]eceive enduring touches of deep joy 
/ From the great Nature that exists in works / Of mighty poets” (5.611, 612, 616-618). 
This reception of joy, combined with the imaginative processes attendant to reading, 
recalls the discussion of infant sensibility and the initiation of the “poetic spirit,” where 
the child is both receiver and creator. The passive and active creation, or the “blended 
might” of mutual fitting, appears in Book 8 as well, where Wordsworth returns to the 
relationship of literature and nature. Here, Wordsworth points to the time when his 
“poetic faculty” first began “to have some promptings to put on / A visible shape,” a 
phrasing that recalls the prior conversations of associative inner-workings as an “invisible 
workmanship” (8.511, 515-516). Working on the visible shapes of the world – the 
material necessary for mental agency and for understanding cognitive operations22 – 
young Wordsworth’s imagination would mold “works of art” or “the images of books” 
(8.516-517). “Nature and her objects beautified” those stories and verses that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  In	  discussing how both sensation and reflection contribute to the mind’s store of ideas, Locke claims, “as 
the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, 
whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the others are framed” (II: 
12.1). Simple ideas are the result of the sensation, generally the sensation of external stimulus, and this 
material (a metaphoric material based on the sensation of actual material) proves necessary to mental 
operations and, ostensibly, the perception of them: “This	  shows	  man's	  power,	  and	  its	  way	  of	  operation,	  
to	  be	  much	  the	  same	  in	  the	  material	  and	  intellectual	  world;	  for	  the	  material	  in	  both	  being	  such	  as	  he	  
has	  no	  power	  over,	  either	  to	  make	  or	  destroy,	  all	  that	  man	  can	  do,	  is	  either	  to	  unite	  them	  together,	  or	  
to	  set	  them	  by	  one	  another,	  or	  wholly	  separate	  them”	  (II:	  12.1).	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Wordsworth had read, allowing the conceptions of the literature he read to take on a 
material presence (8.523-24). From this new form of mental play, Wordsworth admits, 
“Nothing was safe” – a well-known elder-tree takes on a “dismal look” while “the yew-
tree had its ghost / That took its station there for ornament” (8.525-29).  The mind plays 
with these objects in a more imaginative way, but the “poetic spirit” still points to a 
reciprocal creation and reception of affect and ideas. This activity does not obscure but 
rather plays with the given structure of influence, suggesting a reciprocal creation of 
meaning.  
The visibility of imagination and the associative processes on which it is based 
become clearer as Wordsworth ages within the poem. At Cambridge, when Wordsworth 
is most dedicated to literature, he acknowledges in true Lockean fashion how he 
“perused” the face “of earth and heaven, / And, turning the mind in upon itself, / Pored, 
watched, expected, listened, spread my thoughts” (3.110-115).23 In the quasi-urban space 
of Cambridge, Wordsworth begins to indulge in his sense of his own “visionary mind” 
(3.556). But even here, Wordsworth emphasizes how locality engenders his experience: 
he recalls waking “[f]rom street to street with loose and careless heart. / I was a dreamer, 
they the dream; I roamed / Delighted through the motley spectacle” (3.27-29). Much like 
his experience with books, Wordsworth’s urban experience initially appears as a mad or 
drunken dream, but, given reflection, Wordsworth will again recognize the role of the 
environment, and the epistemic artifacts within it, upon his psycho-physiological 
experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Compare this to Locke’s sense of reflection as occurring when one’s “understanding turns inward upon 
itself, reflects on its own operations, and makes them the objects of its own contemplation” (II: 1.8). 
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The Epistemic Artifact(s) of the City 
 
 
Wordsworth makes quite plain that his rural upbringing fostered in him the proper 
habits and sensibility; to be sure, he was “doubly fortunate” for living amongst “native 
man” and “objects that were great and fair,” as these provided “a sure safeguard and 
defense” against the “meanness” and “selfish cares” of “the ordinary world / In which we 
traffic” (8.447, 451, 453-457). No doubt Wordsworth has in mind Cambridge, London, or 
Paris – the places where he most clearly identifies such negative threats and attitudes. As 
a result, scholarship has by and large rendered Wordsworth’s view of the city as entirely 
or primarily a critical one.24  However, the urban spaces of The Prelude, particularly 
London, do much more than expose Wordsworth to “wretchedness and vice” (8.66). “In 
presence of that vast metropolis,” that place of “strong sensations teeming,” Wordsworth 
is “pleased” more than he is alienated or overwhelmed (8.741, 752, 754). London, 
through its various structures of influence, enriches his imagination rather than impeding 
it, leading him to forms of mental empowerment and epistemological gain that are only 
partially realized by the end of Book 7.25   
Reflecting on his experience in the city, Wordsworth writes that he “sought” and 
“craved for power—and power I found / In all things” (8.752-756). The power he finds 
externally becomes a power within; just as Wordsworth takes in and gains from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See footnote 9 above. 
25 Boyson provides a compelling reading of Wordsworth’s depictions of pleasure as echoing “the neuro-
physiological theories of David Hartley, John Brown, and Erasmus Darwin,” while offering his own sense 
of how the pleasure of “poetry and our enjoyment of nature are life-enhancing” (123-24). I certainly agree 
with Boyson’s sense of pleasure as life enhancing, and I have already suggested a further sense of how 
pleasure was a necessary reinforcement to the “first-born affinities” that draw the subject to the 
environment in playful and thus psychologically beneficial forms of engagement. In this section, I want to 




beauty of nature, so too does he open his mind to the influence of the urban sphere and 
the objects in it. Reflecting in Book 8 on “the presence of that vast metropolis,” 
Wordsworth notes how his “imagination also found . . .” 
An element that pleased her, tried her strength  
Among new objects, simplified, arranged,  
Impregnated my knowledge, made it live—  
And the result was elevating thoughts  
Of human nature.                             (8.794, 797-802). 
Each object affords Wordsworth the potential for epistemic action, allows him the 
opportunity to make connections he could not have made in other localities. This is quite 
the opposite of Raymond Williams’ sense that the cities of The Prelude ultimately 
engender “strangeness, loss of connection” (150). Rather, Wordsworth makes a myriad of 
new connections amongst a world of objects more various then he had engaged before. In 
London, Wordsworth not only gains in imaginative potential, he also more fully 
recognizes the capacity of the urban sphere to enrich the mind. 
 Among the other critics noted above, Keith Thomas suggests that Wordsworth felt 
the need to write Book 7 a month after completing Book 8 so as to “elaborate the 
problem” of London’s “disturbing reality,” a reality that supposedly obstructed his 
psychological development towards a transcendent poetic spirit (125). However, given 
Wordsworth’s reflections in Book 8, I would argue that the narrative of Book 7 means to 
show the continued progression of Wordsworth’s education amid the pleasures and pains 
of urban life. In his biographical study, Kenneth Johnston provides a most succinct 
articulation of Wordsworth’s attitude towards the metropolis: “Wordsworth loved 
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London, but he also feared its temptations” (133). The narrative of Book 7 focuses on a 
four-month period that Wordsworth spent in London beginning in early February of 
1791. Over these months, Wordsworth’s life was an extended, urban tour; he was 
“cheerfully abroad / With fancy on the stir from day to day,” with all his “young 
affections out of doors” (7.78-80). Johnston also suggests that Wordsworth’s London was 
“very specifically the political and cultural London of spring 1791 that affected his 
development with a vigor that shines through—‘deconstructively’ —his own efforts to 
control it for different purposes in the poem on the growth of his mind” (241). I agree that 
Wordsworth’s fondness for the urban experience manifests itself within The Prelude, 
even as the poem also points to concerns about the effects of urban life. I would take 
Johnston’s sense of poetic “control” a step further and suggest that Wordsworth’s 
narrative decisions, such as ending Book 7 with the hellish scene of Bartholomew Fair, 
reflect an effort to undermine, and thus an anxiety over, the urban sphere’s influence. 
Yet, even Wordsworth’s remembrances of his youth in the country are intermixed with 
pleasure, pain, confusion, and realization. Wordsworth’s urban experience is very much a 
continuation of his own natural form of education.26 
We might also consider that while Wordsworth presents the urban milieu he 
experienced while living in London over the course of 700 lines, he resided in the city for 
four months in 1791, had been there several times prior, and would frequently return 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter in Wordsworth’s “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads, pain is as 
much part of the process of psychological growth. The psychological spur of suffering or pain is also 
articulated on a few occasions in The Prelude. In addition to the passage from Book 5 explored above 
(5.443), Wordsworth writes in Book 8 that the images of “Man suffering among awful powers and forms” 
from his youth “took deepest hold of me” and made “The imagination restless” (8.213-16). 
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again before writing Book 7 and 8 in the fall of 1804.27  Over his four-month stay in 
London in 1791, a longer duration than his European tour depicted in Book 6, 
Wordsworth had no employment or significant obligations; rather, he spent much of his 
time walking, and the area of London he regularly traversed could be easily covered in a 
day. In fact, “the greatest number of Wordsworth’s urban references fall within the 
compass of less than a square mile around” the location of his residence (Johnston 241).28  
And while Wordsworth at times portrays the city for the reader as through a first viewing, 
he establishes prior to such depictions that he “looked upon the real scene, / Familiarly 
perused it day by day” (7.139-140). In short, Wordsworth had plenty of time to acquire 
an intimate awareness of the London he describes, to regularly and fully take in its many 
sights, plays, and cognitive playthings.  
Wordsworth’s articulation of the city as an enriched environment occurs most 
clearly in Book 7: after a 400-line litany of various, confusing, delightful localities, 
objects, and people, Wordsworth finds himself a spectator in a theater. Here, the sensorial 
stimulations teem, overflowing the basin of psychological depth and spreading across his 
conscious mind: 
                         Through the night, 
Between the show, and many-headed mass 
Of the spectators, and each little nook 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 While much of Book Seventh and the urban sections of Book Eighth maintain historical accuracy to 
1791, some of the particulars would have only been seen by Wordsworth before or after; for instance, 
Johnston points out that The Beauty of Buttermere, a play Wordsworth claims to see in 1791, was about an 
event that occurred in 1799 and was not depicted on stage until 1803. 
28 In The Hidden Wordsworth (1998), Kenneth Johnston provides a remarkable discussion of Wordsworth’s 
London walks, charting to courses in particular that Wordsworth could have likely followed based on the 
details provided in Book 7 (247-255). 
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That had its fray or brawl, how eagerly 
And with what flashes, as it were, the mind 
Turned this way, that way—sportive and alert                       
And watchful, as a kitten when at play,                                
While winds are blowing round her among grass 
And rustling leaves. Enchanting age and sweet— 
Romantic almost, looked at through a space, 
How small, of intervening years! For then, 
Though surely no mean progress had been made 
In meditations holy and sublime, 
Yet something of a girlish childlike gloss 
Of novelty survived for scenes like these—.  (7.466-488; emphasis added) 
Like the “many-headed mass” of spectators, this scene provides a singular structure of 
influence that yields an assortment of associations and effects. Sublimity mixes with a 
girlish gloss of novelty, and all the while Wordsworth surveys vulgar crowds, brawls, and 
a show of low production. Like a small animal among blowing leaves, Wordsworth’s 
mind pounces in various directions, his sight turning to various objects, his consciousness 
to the variety of ideas attendant to each.  
The metaphor of the kitten highlights important aspects of Wordsworth’s urban 
experience. Here, Wordsworth brings to the city a sense of environmental enrichment that 
had been cultivated in his rural life – the kitten’s playthings are not of the urban sphere 
but rather objects of nature. This is but one of many examples where Wordsworth turns to 
prior rural scenes – functioning in his memory as an index for the influence or idea 
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elicited from that prior experience – to make sense of the present moment. Of course, 
cognitive engagement with a particular environment engenders modes of thinking that 
will be carried over and utilized in other spaces so long as their association is applicable 
and/or valuable. Thus, Wordsworth brings his sense of environmental engagement as a 
form of cognitive play to the theaters and streets of London, where his experiences 
maintain a certain youthful luster. Even in the city, the “old Grandame Earth” provides 
playthings from which the mind can learn. 
In the discussion of the blessed babe, Wordsworth notes how, as a result of the 
child’s continued exposure to external stimulus, “His organs and recipient faculties /Are 
quickened, are more vigorous; his mind spreads, / Tenacious of the forms which it 
receives” (2.251-254). Such a Priestleyan sense of the mind dilated by external stimulus 
becomes a key component of Wordsworth’s urban narrative. Amid the “strong sensations 
teeming” in London, Wordsworth cultivates for himself  “Capaciousness and amplitude 
of mind” (8.752, 759). Such teeming sensations are perfectly evident in the following 
passage, which emphasizes the unique physiological and psychological experiences 
created by the urban sphere: 
And first, the look and aspect of the place— 
The broad highway appearance, as it strikes          
On strangers of all ages, the quick dance 
Of colours, lights and forms, the Babel din,            
The endless stream of men and moving things . . .    
Wordsworth proceeds to describe the general “bustle” and the numerous “Stalls, borrows, 
porters” in the middle of the street. We also find the “rash speed” of coaches with their 
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blowing horns and the “punctual skill” of horses “striking right across the crowded 
Strand”; furthermore:      
Here, there, and everywhere, a weary throng, 
The comers and the goers face to face— 
Face after face—the string of dazzling wares, 
Shop after shop, with symbols, blazoned names,                 
And all the tradesman’s honours overhead 
Here, fronts of houses like a title-page 
With letters huge inscribed from top to toe.      (7.154-177) 
The complexity and chaos produces a uniquely urban experience: a keen awareness of the 
fragmentary nature of sensory stimuli, a persistent sense of the motion and fluidity of 
objects and subjects in space and time, and ultimately the highly phatic quality of the 
urban sphere.29 These aspects of the urban experience, more so than the one afforded by 
the country, stress the semiotic and epistemological engagement between external 
environment and perceiving subject. 
 In such moments, the “material substrate of urban perception and signification” 
described by C. R. Stokes takes full possession of Wordsworth’s mind (206), but, as we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Each of these elements constitutes what Stokes refers to as “the material substrate of urban perception 
and signification” (206). In addition to Stokes’ emphasis on the purely physiological engagement with the 
city, I want to emphasize how these substrates – components of the structure of influence – establish new 
lineaments for cognitive processes.  Stokes, I find, makes a similar misstep as Gabrielle and Keith Thomas 
in their assessment of Wordsworth’s cognitive processes in London. For each of these scholars, an 
emphasis is placed on the overtly empiricist aspect of atomic or fragmentary stimulus that Wordsworth 
records in his urban experience, and for each scholar, Wordsworth’s efforts to process and assemble this 
information via the imagination is regarded as move away from empiricism, as “Romantic organicism” 
(Stokes 220), “idealized intuition” (Gabrielle 369), or “autonomous inward meanings” (Thomas 127).  
Such a dualistic reading ignores the role of the associative account of imagination as organizing and 
combining sensations and ideas, which Wordsworth initiates in the discussion of “infant sensibility” and 
reinforces throughout The Prelude.  
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have already seen in the example of the kitten, such preoccupation with external stimulus 
does not negate the potential for cognitive exercise and enrichment.30 As Wordsworth 
suggests in Book 1, direct or unselfconscious experiences are not necessarily “profitless” 
because often the influence or potential meaning of external “objects and appearances” 
are “doomed to sleep / Until mature season called them forth / To impregnate and to 
elevate the mind” (1.619-625). In Book 7, he reaffirms this sentiment: London offers 
Wordsworth a “motley imagery” that proves “[a] vivid pleasure of my youth” and, in his 
later years, becomes “[a] frequent daydream for my riper mind” (7.148, 150, 151, 153).  
Cambridge again foreshadows this aspect of London. Referring to its small town and 
college buildings, Wordsworth describes himself “roving as through a cabinet  / Or wide 
museum, thronged with fishes, gems / Birds, crocodiles, shells, where little can be seen”; 
as in London, at Cambridge,  
does every step bring something forth  
That quickens, pleases, stings—and here and there  
A casual rarity is singled out  
And has its brief perusal, then gives way   
To others, all supplanted in their turn.  
Meanwhile, amid this gaudy congress framed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Going against the general criticism, which sees such stimulus as an impediment to the imagination, 
Stokes and Gabriele view such depictions of intense stimulus as essential to Wordsworth’s poetic project, 
suggesting a boon rather than a detriment to Wordsworth’s overall growth as a poet. Stokes refers to this as 
confronting “rhythm, pitch, intensity, tone, velocity, density and pattern: the material substrate of 
urban perception and signification” (206); Gabriele similarly works against the critical tendency to 
prioritize the organization of visual content, particularly in moments of stasis or leisure, focusing 
instead on “the semiotic inscription of movement in time,” which, in the case of Book 7, leads to a 
disjointed and fragmentary accumulation of subjective experiences that is rendered in similarly 
disjointed and fragmentary lines of poetry (366-367). 
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Of things by nature most unneighbourly,   
The head turns round, and cannot right itself;  
And though an aching and a barren sense  
Of gay confusion still be uppermost,  
With few wise longings and but little love, 
Yet something to the memory sticks at last  
Whence profit may be drawn in times to come.  (2.651- 669) 
 
It is worth noting that Locke refers to the mind as a cabinet in An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, a book Wordsworth undoubtedly read at Cambridge.  Here, the 
external cabinet becomes a mental construct, though one seemingly out of sorts as its 
rarities and various objects seem “unneighbourly” or poorly associated. The physical 
proximity of the objects in the cabinet symbolize a mental association that Wordsworth 
cannot quite grasp, though the perception of this disjunction is a “gay confusion” rather 
than one of consternation. While Wordsworth’s head turns in all directions within this 
enrichment environment, his confusion is accepted because he trusts, apparently, that 
some later profit will be had from these objects and experiences now part of his own 
mental cabinet. 
 Indeed, London is just such a construction: an assortment of various experiences 
and shows, a crowd with “all specimens of man” that can be seen “haply,” a series of 
spectacles of “wild beasts” to be viewed “at leisure” (7.234-236, 244-248). While the 
hubbub can overwhelm, Wordsworth shows the potential to take the crowds and 
spectacles in stride, which is, I argue, his predominant mode of being in Book 7. Within 
this urban cabinet, various experiences and structures of influence occur that prove highly 
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profitable to Wordsworth’s psychological growth, even if this profit is not immediately 
recognized. In many cases, these urban experiences become the under-presences or 
informing structures of Wordsworth’s riper mind, reappearing in localities away from the 
city. In highlighting these experiences, I want to show how the fluid experience of the 
city brings together several structures of influence in succession, which work together as 
a syntagmatic sequence to create ever more complex meanings for Wordsworth to take in 
and take with him.  
The first experience of note occurs subsequent to Wordsworth’s walk down the 
broad thoroughfare of the Strand, which is described above. As “the roar continues,” he, 
or rather “we,” turn “[a]bruptly into some sequestered nook, / Still as a sheltered place 
when winds blow hard” (7.185-187). Moving through “[p]rivate courts” and the 
“labyrinths” of the inns of court (7.196, 201), we are eventually expelled or exhaled 
“back into the throng, until we reach— / Following the tide that slackens by degrees— / 
Some half-frequented scene” (7.205-207). The shifts from various localities – from open 
but crowded streets, to courts, to maze-like alleys, and then back to a slackening tide of 
people in the “wider streets” – reveals both a varying spatial compression but also various 
physiological and psychological flows (7.207). Emerging into a widening avenue, we feel 
some “straggling breezes,” the sign of creative influence in Book 1, and see: 
Here fliers of ballads dangle from dead walls;                              
Advertisements of giant size, from high 
Press forward in all colours on the sight— 
These, bold in conscious merit—lower down, 
That, fronted with a most imposing word, 
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Is peradventure one in masquerade.    (7.209-214) 
The posters of various plays and romances seem to require little imaginative assistance as 
they “Press forward” their imagery on the eyes and mind of the observer. Yet, as with the 
Cambridge cabinet, Wordsworth finds a variety of disparate scenes – motley images of 
other imaginations but similar in kind to the romances he read and dreamt of as a child.  
Gazing on these scenes, Wordsworth can take them in and cognitively associate and 
manipulate them as he chooses. Thus, the scene suggests both the potential of the external 
world to offer new structures of influence as well as new models for the mind and its 
cognitive processes. In this latter sense, the dead wall proves an epistemic artifact by 
which Wordsworth learns about and/or shares with his reader a model for mental life. In 
the diegetic moment, it is unclear to what degree the space around Wordsworth, plastered 
as it is with romances and imaginary scenes, affects his psyche, but the street itself 
becomes a “broadening causeway” on which “we advance,” which seems to suggest a 
similar broadening of the mind (7.215).  Wordsworth says nothing more about this scene, 
but its underlying structure seems to stay with the poet, as it will reappear in the Book 8 
“caverns” discussed in the next section. 
Wordsworth proceeds from here to offer several forms of visual technology that 
were popular at the time and were being exhibited in London in 1791. Like the wall of 
advertisements, these visual technologies become epistemic objects through which 
Wordsworth learns about his own epistemological and ontological relationship with the 
world. In fact, the panorama in particular becomes an apt synecdoche for the city’s role at 
large, as well as for criticism’s approach to it. It may be unsurprising that many critics 
have seen the panorama as a negative influence, noting its “mimic sights” and suggesting 
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that Wordsworth identifies this mode of perception as “delusive” or even as an “enemy to 
imaginative power” (7.248; Ellis 145; Wood 109). Liu, to provide a counterexample, sees 
the panorama as symbolizing for Wordsworth “the imperialism of Mind” and thus 
proving quite antithetic to Galperin’s sense that the panorama represented for 
Wordsworth a loss of control in the activity of perception (Liu 211-12; Galperin 55). Yet, 
Galperin does make the cogent point that the “visible order” of the panorama, by 
challenging the cinematic subject-position that he finds more akin to Romantic vision, 
reveals “competing orders of culture” (71).  J. Jennifer Jones, who in the wake of the 
above criticism acknowledges a middle ground of ambivalence in Wordsworth’s attitude 
toward the panorama, comes closest to my own thinking on this issue when she argues: 
“Rather than defining his aesthetic resolutely against mimetic representation and new 
media, then, Wordsworth is thinking through the new technologies” (375). Wordsworth 
often stresses the more active use of imagination in The Prelude and even in the city, but 
it seems short sighted, I find, to assume Wordsworth gained no sensorial pleasure or 
intellectual gain from experiencing this new mode of vision.  
Jones, in describing her approach to the panorama, states that she places the two 
“aesthetic idioms” of virtuality and the sublime into “a feedback loop, a genuinely 
reciprocal, mutually illuminating means of studying” the cultural meanings invested in 
both idioms (363). Such a conception equally applies, I would think, to Wordsworth’s 
own project, as cultural artifacts of experience and his own direct experiences enter into a 
reciprocally informing cycle of meaning. What seems of particular import to 
Wordsworth, and is largely missed in the above readings, is how the panorama 
exemplifies mental fitness to the external world, offering “mimic sights that ape / The 
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absolute presence of reality” (7.248-249; emphasis added). The panorama offers, I argue, 
a figure for the mind’s perception of the external world, its attempts at fitting or 
“fashioning a work / To Nature’s circumambient scenery” (7.256-257). And even this 
activity, passive as it may seem, becomes a form of agency or work, but one that the 
viewer can casually enjoy as though pacing the theater of his or her own mind. Such 
opportunity for enjoyment and reflection is itself a form of empowerment, symbolized by 
the elevated platform on which the viewer stands within the panorama and the elevated 
position of the panorama’s perspective: “with power / Like that of angels or 
commissioned spirits / Plant us upon some lofty pinnacle” (7.259-260). In the panorama, 
which exhibited in 1791 a prospective image of London, Wordsworth is able to look over 
the city he has previously walked through, and the ability to conflate both modes of 
experience conceptually will become integral to Wordsworth’s articulation of the sublime 
experience at Mount Snowdon. But for the moment, I want only to affirm how such 
technological experiences like the panorama offer Wordsworth new methods for viewing 
that can be incorporated into his growing conceptualization of the city, his experience of 
it, and in turn his sense of self. Providing an artifact of visuality, these technologies 
concretize the ways humans can experience the world around them, and this 
concretization then allows for a self-awareness of modes of viewing not previously 
realized, whether in the culture at large or particularly in The Prelude.  
In addition to the panorama, Wordsworth views miniatures and visual apparatuses 
like the Eidophusikon, each of which affords him a new understanding of his own ocular 
and subjective orientation to the world. Chandler and Gilmartin provide a succinct 
description of the latter apparatus, which utilized “layers of display, some transparent and 
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some not, some two-dimensional and some three-dimensional” along with natural and 
artificial lighting to create realistic representations but also alterations in scene, such as 
changes from day to night (9). Such layered effects can be observed in the following lines 
from Book 7, which follow upon the heels of Wordsworth’s panorama discussion: 
And to these exhibitions mute and still  
Others of wider scope, where living men,  
Music, and shifting pantomimic scenes,  
Together joined their multifarious aid  
To heighten the allurement.          (7.281-285). 
Chandler and Gilmartin provide a convincing discussion of the importance of the 
Eidophusikon as a symbol for “a kind of mutual projection” between the city and country, 
which results in both an “image of nature projected from the metropolis” as well as 
“naturalized image of the metropolis” (3, 12). But rather than seeing this visual 
technology as a model of projection between different environments – that is, rather than 
concern ourselves with the content itself – I want to highlight the form or action of the 
visual technology. While the panorama signified the fitness of mind to external world, the 
scene above – with its emphasis on a wider scope, shifting scenes, and “multifarious” 
components – highlights a more dynamic process of perceptual engagement. In other 
words, the visual technology again externalizes mental processes while at the same time 
symbolizing those processes. The diorama portrays the associative nature of the mind and 
its very necessary ability to combine multiple layers of scene, action, and abstraction, 
emphasizing the psycho-physiological depth in such layering. And such depth works to 
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“heighten the allurement,” invoking again a sense of pleasure connected with the 
cognitive engagement with external objects.  
 The structure of influence of a given locality, a “multifarious” arena of numerous 
layers – material, mnemonic, imaginative, cultural – is well exemplified by the 
Eidophusikon, and Wordsworth extrapolates this model not only to the city at large but 
also to his depictions of the theater. That is, with this model already in place, the reader is 
primed for the type of layering Wordsworth subsequently explores. Shifting fluidly from 
“living men” as “multifarious aid” to scenes depicting “the dramas of living men,” 
Wordsworth not only blurs visual technology with theater but also theater with real life 
(7.313). The first play Wordsworth describes, “The Maid of Buttermere,” follows the 
story of Mary Robinson, whom Wordsworth knew from the Lake District and who was 
mislead into a bigamous relationship. The structure of influence before Wordsworth in 
this moment is vastly complex, and his sense of “sundry forms / mingled” echoes the 
“multifarious” quality of the Eidophusikon, emphasizing how structures of influence 
might be layered onto one another (7.348-349). Wordsworth is both engaging his 
memory of Robinson and watching a play about her: both memory and stage are set in the 
same “spot” where he and she were “born and reared,” those “same mountains” on which 
they both “were nursed” (7.352). The “spot,” like the other spots of time, holds 
Wordsworth in a temporal duality of past and present, and the reference to nursing recalls 
the physiological and affective link to the external world established in the discussion of 
infant sensibility. Thus, two structures of influence are at stake, the one afforded by the 
mountains of his youth and the one afforded by the playhouse, so that their respective 
meanings begin to play upon each other. This scene, then, establishes a kind of feedback 
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loop between multiple scenes, which becomes in and of itself a form of epistemic play. 
This looping proves a key model, I argue, for the dialectic of urban and rural scenes to be 
discussed in the last section. 
 The theater scenes also perpetuate and thus build upon the experience of the dead 
wall. As opposed to his childhood days when the fancies he took from literature occupied 
his mind and were read into his external world, here the romances are concretized within 
the frame of the stage before him. Such externalization of mental content does not 
impede mental activity but rather provides new constructs that the mind can better 
manipulate, critique, dismantle, and/or conjoin, evoking Andy Clark’s and David 
Chalmers’s sense of epistemic action explored in the introduction.  Indeed, this scene 
exemplifies what the poet does: “He considers man and the objects that surround him as 
acting and re-acting upon each other” (“Preface” 605). 
But more than just considering a new mental construct for young Wordsworth to 
absorb and mold for his own creative purposes, we might also consider what Wordsworth 
realizes about the functioning of the mind through this epistemic action. The first 
recognition Wordsworth makes has to do with the power of contrast. Wordsworth, 
recalling his attention from his remembrances of childhood to his 1791 context, begins to 
describe a particular scene amongst the “numerous scenes” from those days, one that 
proves the “foremost” of his “remembrance” (7.365-366). Wordsworth goes on to 
describe a baby of twelve months sitting on a bar with his dissolute mother nearby. The 
child in particular sticks out to Wordsworth, “A sort of alien scattered from the clouds” 
(7.388). The child appears not of this place, an “unneighborly” being within the cabinet 
of city life. Atop the bar, the innocent child “sate environed within a ring / Of chance 
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spectators, chiefly dissolute men / And shameless women” (7.386-88). Wordsworth 
reinforces the disparity of the scene by describing the “lovely boy . . . among the 
wretched and the falsely gay” as “one of those who walked with hair unsinged / Amid the 
fiery furnace” (7.396-99). Here, in this hellish context – made hellish in contradistinction 
to the perceived divinity of the child – Wordsworth finds an idea of great significance to 
his progression: the necessity of contrast to make beauty approach the sublime.31 The 
child is not harmonized with his surroundings but rather becomes adorned with “beauty 
in such excess” in contradistinction to his context (406). The moment seems to suggest a 
semiotic autonomy: the child’s ability to symbolize innocence even in hell. And perhaps 
this could affirm the sense that “The mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a 
heaven of hell, a hell of heaven” (Paradise Lost 1.254-55); however, the power of the 
scene results from the relational meanings of child and environment, each requiring the 
presence of the other. The scene is not a terror to Wordsworth but a further recognition of 
reciprocity and the potential of epistemic gain from the association of discordant 
elements. From this moment, Wordsworth proceeds to the kitten metaphor discussed at 
the opening of this section, suggesting how the associative work occurring in the theater 
scenes reveal the mind at play with its external context, not an inmate of its own 
interiority.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For more on the tension between the sublime and beauty, see Theresa Kelly’s Wordsworth’s Revisionary 
Aesthetics (1988). For Kelly, London represents the monstrous sublime Wordsworth will come to associate 
with revolutionary Paris; in this way, she supports the typical reading of London as a detriment to 
Wordsworth’s poetic project, which is for her the usurpation of the beautiful over the sublime. While 
certainly Wordsworth finds the sublime in London, and a particularly frightening version of it at 
Bartholomew Fair, I would argue that London overall puts the aesthetics of the beautiful and sublime in 
near relation, even layering them at times. In London, and particularly in this scene, Wordsworth 




 Critics often point to Wordsworth’s claim a few lines later that, even during the 
excitement of his theater-going experience, his “imaginative power . . . slept (7.499-
500)32; yet, this languishing of the creative faculty occurs only when the scene he 
watches causes him to be “passionately moved” as well as to be “yielded to the changes 
of the scene / With most obsequious feeling” (7.504-506). Though clearly moved, 
Wordsworth argues that “all this  / Passed not beyond the suburbs of the mind” (7.506-
07). This moment reflects an anxiety over urban influence that critics have sensed and 
have generally overemphasized to the detriment of their readings of Wordsworth’s urban 
experience. Wordsworth both claims that this particularly urban experience does not 
reach the true depths of his psyche; yet, at the same time, the fact that Wordsworth has 
chosen an urban metaphor for the self does belie the degree to which his sense of self has 
been altered.  
 Wordsworth himself capitulates his resistance to the influence of city and theater. 
“If aught there were a real grandeur here,” he admits, “‘Twas only then when gross 
realities” of the performance of Shakespeare’s play on stage “called forth / With 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In accord with the general emphasis of scholarship on the urban sphere, both Mark Bruhn and David 
Francis Taylor emphasize Wordsworth’s mention of imaginative powers languishing while watching the 
theater and then suggest the theater as a microcosm of the urban experience at large: for Taylor London 
proves “an illegitimately theatrical space” that “evokes a rough and sometimes dystopian landscape of 
spectacles” (82); for Bruhn, in the theater Wordsworth is “passively obedient to its mimetic demands” 
(168-169). Bruhn, however, goes on to make a point that accords with my own sense of the city and theater 
as epistemic playground; he argues that the theater scenes in Book 7 prove “a study and illustration of 
different orders of mimesis and their cognitive effects” that then “teaches with considerable clarity how to 
discriminate and value genuinely imaginative forms of representation” (180). I disagree that any of the 
forms of mimesis engaged in the city are necessarily less valuable, and would revise this statement to say 
that these different modes of visuality bring Wordsworth to a greater awareness of multiple perspectives 
that can be adopted given the context or the desired mode of feeling they create. I am also partial to 
Taylor’s sense that controlled theatricality “becomes part of the poetic economy” in other parts of The 
Prelude as “its spectacles of aestheticized suffering, centering on feelings of delight and rejuvenation, serve 
to organize the narrative and direct the imagination” (90). Taylor only mentions the “spots of time” 
passages, and I would suggest that this sense of urban visuality as a means of “organizing” the perceptions 
relayed in other scenes of The Prelude deserves greater exploration. 
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distinctness” the “contrast” with his own reading of the scene (7.509-12). The “grandeur” 
of this moment results from the fact that it causes Wordsworth “to recognize / As by a 
glimpse, the things which I had shaped / And yet not shaped” (7.513-15). Again, the city 
produces a moment of clarity through its “sundry forms,” which in turn produces a 
feeling of grandeur. Here, Wordsworth provides the clearest articulation within The 
Prelude of how the mind, a more mature version of the child’s mind described in Book 2, 
“[e]ven as an agent of the one great mind, / Creates, creator and receiver both, / Working 
but in alliance with the works / Which it beholds” (2.272-75).33 Through contrast, 
through the moments of slippage between what Wordsworth sees on stage and what he 
had expected to see based on his own reading, he experiences the mind’s dual role as 
creator and receiver in context. While Wordsworth elsewhere describes this duality from 
his authorial vantage point, Book 7 offers the first example where the diegetic 
Wordsworth recognizes this condition for himself, which is evident via the past tense of 
“made me recognize.”  
 The last sequence of urban experiences to be explored in this section is one that 
proves uniquely urban, as it produces a “feeling” that “belonged / To this great city by 
exclusive right” (7.593-594). But equally important to this conversation, the scene of the 
urban masses set in contradistinction to the Blind Beggar incorporates the technological 
and theatrical forms of layering, particular of contrasting registers or tones, and applies it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 This scene provides, in fact, a much clearer articulation of Wordsworth’s experience at Simplon Pass, 
where his expectation of what the Alpine pass would look and feel like proves contrary to the actual scene 
before him. In that scene, Wordsworth famously exclaims the power of imagination but never actually 
explains why the moment produces this realization. Here, however, the scene much more clearly describes 
the disjunction between internal expectation and external reality, and how such disjunction allows 
Wordsworth to see the otherwise invisible workings of the creative mind. We will return to the Simplon 
Pass scene in the last section. 
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to an experience that is not prefabricated. Returning to the experience of moving through 
the urban crowd, Wordsworth recalls thinking, “The face of every one / That passes by 
me is a mystery”; as he tries to scan each, he becomes “oppressed” by his 
contemplations, unable to take them all in (7.597-98). As a result, these “shapes before 
my eyes become / A second-sight procession, such as glides / Over still mountains, or 
appears in dreams” (7.601-603). In other words, Wordsworth’s effort to catch each face 
that blows by him – like a kitten pawing at passing leaves – leads to the ocular 
phenomenon known today as railway nystagmus – the rhythmic, oscillating motions of 
the eye such as that which occurs while watching passing scenery from a train.34 The 
oscillating eye movement creates a sort of trance effect, causing the scene of passing 
faces to take on an illusory aspect – significantly, Wordsworth’s first example also points 
to visual illusion.35 Furthermore, the sense of psycho-physiological disturbance is 
reinforced by Wordsworth’s resulting feeling, like the “ballast” to his usual ways of 
“acting” and “thinking” has been removed (7.604, 606). Wordsworth, then, establishes a 
strong external influence and its clear physiological and psychological effect upon him, 
and this is the context he establishes for the initial layer to his most transcendent image in 
Book 7. 
The faces continue to pass by Wordsworth in fluid mass, a “moving pageant,” 
when “[a]brutply” he is “smitten” by the view of the “blind beggar” (7.610-12). The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This form of ocular illusion is first experience by Wordsworth in a childhood recollection in Book 1 
where, after spinning on his ice skates for a time and then stopping, the surrounding cliffs seem to whirl 
about him. Alan Richardson connects this ice skating scene with Edmund Burke’s discussion of sublime 
visual illusions, where the mind repeats the idea of something long after the repeated sensation has ceased; 
see The Neural Sublime (2010) 31-32. 
35 W.]. B. Owen follows Z. S. Fink in correlating the reference to images gliding over a still mountain to a 
passage in An Evening Walk, which describes the images of ghostly soldiers ascending the side of a 
mountain (49-50). Both are supposedly based on an optical illusion caused by the descending sun and the 
interplay of ascending shadows on the mountains in the Lake District. 
	  
131	  	  
beggar stands “propped against a wall” with a sign on his chest that briefly explains his 
story. In this moment, Wordsworth describes his mind as being “turn[ed] round / As with 
the might of waters” – a description of his interiority based on the fluid crowd moving 
around him (7.616-17). The sign on the man’s chest, explaining his story, proves to 
Wordsworth an “emblem of the utmost that we know / Both of ourselves and of the 
universe”; on the motionless beggar with “fixed face and sightless eyes” Wordsworth 
looks “[a]s if admonished from another world” (7.619-23). Scholars have had a 
notoriously difficult time coming to any consensus on the import of this moment, their 
readings ranging from it being a key example of transcendence (particularly over the 
urban milieu) to the impossibility of knowing anything beyond our own bodily and 
earthly existence.36  Given the diversity of readings of this scene, we might question to 
what degree any concrete meaning is offered, though I am partial to Jonathan 
Wordsworth’s sense that the imagination is clearly at work, even if it works to recognize 
its own limits – that is, metaphorically constricted to the size of the beggar’s sign.  
The meaning of the Blind Beggar in this moment is not clear, nor is it clear that, 
beyond the feeling of sublimity, the import of the moment is fully realized by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Bruhn concurs with James Heffernan that Wordsworth is “admonished to close his eyes to all the sights 
of the city” and thereby become a “universal man” – an imperialist / idealist self (439). This reading, no 
doubt, follows from Rzepka’s and Hartman’s sense of the scene as exemplary of Wordsworth’s visionary 
solipsism (Rzepka 38-43; Hartman (241-2). Fulford (53) and Sharpe (440) see the beggar as indicating a 
threat to individuality. Keith Thomas and Mary Jacobus both read the scene as an instance of the negative 
sublime, where the mind reels at the infinitesimal quantity of its knowledge in relation to a more vast realm 
it can sense but never know; Thomas explicitly refers to this as “disingenuous, transcendental close” (145), 
while Jacobus sees this traumatic realization as par for the urban course. Jarvis also reads the beggar as 
microcosm for the city at large, as a spectacle sans any real activity of value (218). Stokes, moving 
purposefully away from emblematic readings, sees the beggar as restoring the values of the human to a 
dehumanized city” by restoring a sense of embodiment (205, 214). While I offer my own analysis in 
conjunction to others, I offer all these alternate readings to suggest that the scene is decidedly ambiguous, 
and all that is truly available to the reader is the structure of the signification based on the environmental 
elements, not the associations Wordsworth creates from them.	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Wordsworth. As with various other scenes in Wordsworth’s text – such as the Black Crag 
scene – the invisible workmanship of the mind has become more visible, but 
Wordsworth’s mind does not yet appear ripe enough to articulate the product of that 
work. While the meaning of the scene remains nebulous, I do want to counter what I 
believe, in concert with Keith Thomas, is a false sense of idealism. While Wordsworth 
emphasizes the dream-like, visionary quality of the moment, this quality is produced by 
an illusion based on a physiological response – the idealism is, in fact, sensationalism. 
While the un-ballasting of Wordsworth’s mind mimics the “abyss of idealism” 
Wordsworth had written about in the letter cited above, so too does the Beggar propped 
against a wall save Wordsworth from that abyss, providing him something legible and 
stable amidst the illegible faces of the oceanic crowd. Even if the beggar is read as 
emblematic of divine meaning that Wordsworth truly grasps, the phrase “As if 
admonished” undercuts such a reading, especially as it highlights “As if” by placing it at 
the beginning of the line. 
Ultimately, Wordsworth wants to convey an experience, and if we cannot grasp 
the import of it, we should come to understand the structure on which the meaning is 
predicated. Here, I find the readings offered by Geraldine Friedman and M. H. Abrams to 
be particularly helpful. Friedman and Abrams similarly describe the structure of the scene 
as a foreground figure set against or in relief to a background crowd, creating what 
Friedman calls “a sustainable monument . . . in the midst of flux” (48). Building from this 
reading, I would suggest that the monument of the beggar is not in the midst of flux but 
in a more reciprocal relationship with it. Wordsworth’s perception of the crowd is no 
longer of something around him or around the beggar but is now a part of his perception 
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– he sees the beggar immediately after he notes the nystagmus or ocular rhythm. Such 
ocular muscle movements do not immediately cease but continue even after the eye has 
begun to focus on a still object from a stationary position. Thus, Wordsworth continues to 
sense the crowd as a second sight even as he stands still to look upon the stationary 
beggar. Here, the “material substrate of urban perception,” as Stokes refers to it, overlaps 
the image (or emblem) of the beggar, their oppositional structures and meanings merging, 
reciprocating.  
 Immediately after this scene, Wordsworth writes not of idealism or transcendence 
but of the cognitive structures he has gained from his psycho-sensorial experiences in the 
city:  
Though reared upon the base of outward things,  
These chiefly are such structures as the mind   
Builds for itself.  Scenes different there are—  
Full-formed—which take, with small internal help,  
Possession of the faculties.                                 (7.624-628). 
 
In the city, the mind finds new objects and builds from them both meaning and systems 
for deriving meaning.37 At times, Wordsworth must build for himself the structure of 
associations that connect unneighborly things, but at other times, such as with the Blind 
Beggar, the scene appears “full-formed,” such that it strikes the conscious mind or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This articulation of structures derived in total or in accumulation from external objects seems inherently 
associationist; thus, it is rather surprising the Keith Thomas, who argues for the empiricist undertones of 
Book 7, refers to this passage as “Wordsworth's confident transcendental theory about structures that the 
mind builds for itself on the base of outward things” (145). Thomas, despite his well-reasoned argument for 
Wordsworth’s empiricism, seems ultimately to accede to the transcendentalism argued for by other scholars 
despite his own efforts.  
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unknowingly takes “possession of the faculties.” Much of what the urban sphere teaches 
Wordsworth has to do with the machinations of his own mental processes and by 
extension the workings of human nature. In the city, though, cognition, behavior, and 
physical structures prove extensions of each other, and this is central to Wordsworth’s 
realization; as he articulates more clearly in Book 8, “human nature” is seen as “not a 
punctual presence, but a spirit / Living in time and space, and far diffused” (8.761-764).  
Like the second-sight of faces, the presence of humanity in the material presence 
of the urban environment becomes exemplary of Wordsworth’s case that the poetic mind 
can see “among least things / An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts / As parts, but 
with a feeling of the whole” (7.711-713). As with the child whose affinities are first 
applying their power, the mind in the city must again learn the process of collating 
elements into whole presences, even while it still recognizes the disparate elements of 
that assemblage. The knowledge and power afforded to Wordsworth via the enrichment 
environment of the city – that structure he gains from the city’s disparate elements or its 
pre-formed structures of influence – have a lasting effect on the poet, informing how he 
views the world, for “not seldom” had his “remembrances” of the urban sphere and urban 
experience, 
By working on the shapes before my eyes,  
Became like vital functions of the soul;  
And out of what had been, what was, the place  
Was thronged with impregnations, like those wilds  




The cognitive structures that the urban sphere engenders not only possess Wordsworth’s 
faculties but seem almost grafted onto his very soul, enmeshed with the root structure of 
his psyche. Wordsworth’s shaping vision can no longer be seen as simply rural; 
Wordsworth’s poetic eye must be considered an urban eye as well. 
 
 
Sublime Feedback Loops 
 
 
So far I have argued that the urban experience was truly formative in 
Wordsworth’s psychological development; yet, in order for such a claim to be credible, I 
find it necessary to show how urban structures of perception and cognition inform 
Wordsworth’s engagement with the external world even after he has left the urban 
environment. That is, if the city only produces “floating visions” that have no lasting 
influence on Wordsworth’s psyche, then it cannot be said to have truly participated in his 
psychological development. In such a case, my argument would falter, leaving 
undisputed the sense of London as an impediment to psychological progress, as Liu, 
Hartman, and Thomas suggest; as a hell from which to ascend, like Jonathan Wordsworth 
claims; or as a form of representational self-critique, as Friedman suggests, among others. 
But perhaps this is a false dichotomy – one could point out that Wordsworth’s 
first departure from the urban sphere in Book 1 only proves that the city had a rather 
traumatic effect on the poet, given that he presents it as a “a house / Of bondage” from 
which he has escaped (1.1-2). Indeed, Wordsworth’s articulation of the “burthen of my 
own unnatural self,” ostensibly produced by his city life, does not seem an affirmation of 
positive psychological development, even if it does reinforce a sense of the malleable self 
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(1.22). Wordsworth even claims the city to be a habitation for “weary day / Not mine, 
and such as were not made for me” (1.23-24). And certainly he seems most glad to be 
suddenly “free, for months to come” now that he “May quit the tiresome sea and dwell on 
shore” (1.33,35).  Even so, even after bidding “A farewell to the city left behind,” 
Wordsworth refuses to detach his mind from urban influence (1.98). Wordsworth 
continues to point to the physiological and psychological aftermath of the city in Book 1, 
even if in indirect ways. He complains of an "over-anxious eye / That with a false activity 
beats off / Simplicity and self-presented truth” (1.249-251). He also metaphorically 
figures his mental activity in the form of a “mother dove” who “[s]its brooding” (1.150-
152), evoking a Miltonic reference to the Holy Spirit watching over chaos or “hubbub 
wild” – a phrasing Wordsworth twice uses in reference to the urban sphere (Paradise 
Lost 1.21-22; 2.951).38  
 I elaborate on this negative depiction of the urban aftermath because I find that, 
like Book 1, much of The Prelude provides a meditation over urban experience that 
ultimately recognizes its positive, if latent, influence. While chaos is vast and 
overwhelming, it is also the ultimate state of potentiality, truly the substrata from which 
meaningful forms can be created. Indeed, I do not find it a coincidence that by the end of 
Book 1 Wordsworth refers to the “ministry” of nature that has “impressed” upon all 
material forms their affordance to the viewing subject – “the characters / Of danger and 
desire” – and likens the earth’s semiotic-infused “surface” to a “sea,” invoking the same 
word used earlier for the city. Nor do I find it a coincidence that Wordsworth repeatedly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




returns to urban environments throughout The Prelude, acknowledging how they have 
changed him, if only to a degree: we have already seen Wordsworth’s mention of the 
“suburbs of [his] mind,” and when he moves to Cambridge, Wordsworth acknowledges, 
“I had made a change / In climate, and my nature’s outward coat / Changed also, slowly, 
and insensibly” (2.207-209). Yet, the alteration made to Wordsworth’s psyche is not 
superficial, I argue, and this is evident in the fact that the most climactic scenes in The 
Prelude – Simplon Pass and Mount Snowdon – both occurred in Wordsworth’s own life 
soon after he left the urban sphere and both reveal within the poem evidence of an urban 
“under-presence” in their representation.    
In discussing first the Simplon Pass scene and the complex of urban moments 
with which it is intertwined, my effort is to show how both the city and rural areas 
worked together as mutual epistemic objects, much like in Jones’ sense of the feedback 
loop.39 In other words, the experiences in London, Simplon Pass, and later in Paris are all 
part of an interconnected cognitive process through which Wordsworth contemplates his 
historical moment. In this way, I work to revise rather than overturn the relationship Liu 
identifies between history and the Simplon Pass scene. This landscape does not reflect a 
Wordsworthian self or mind beyond history, as Liu suggests. The scene is not a mirror 
but rather an extension of mental processes, processes working to understand their place 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Here I am building on Abrams’ sense of “the circular shape” of The Prelude’s narrative and how “[t]he 
circularity of its form, we now see, reflects the circularity of its subject matter” (Natural 79, 288). Yet, 
rather than see the whole as a circular narrative, I argue that there a number of circular constructs, of 
mutually informing moments within the narrative that function as feedback loops. While future moments 
echo a particular affective tone, phrasing, spatial structure, and/or psychological structure of a prior scene, 
both work to expound upon and inform the other. This process, as Abrams says, certainly reflects the 
subject matter, though rather than simply seeing this circle as the marriage union between mind and nature, 
I would suggest that these multiple feedback loops reflect the associative growth of the authorial poet who 
depicts the psychological growth of himself based on an associationist schema. 
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within the self / environment dynamic that involves the cultural events tied to the 
subject’s environment. 
To begin our discussion with Simplon Pass in Book 6, we must start with a 
moment that occurred before it in Wordsworth’s personal history but does not appear 
until Book 8. In the latter book, Wordsworth depicts his first arrival to London in terms 
that bear a remarkable similarity to crossing the Alps. “Never shall I forget the hour,” 
Wordsworth claims, “when having thridded [sic] / The labyrinth of suburban villages, / 
At length I did unto myself first seem / To enter the great city” (8.689-93). There, 
Wordsworth sees the “vulgar forms” of buildings, streets, and people all around him, and 
he recognizes that he has crossed “the threshold” to the city (8.695, 700). Two 
realizations occur to Wordsworth upon this occasion. First, he exclaims, “great God! / 
That aught external to the living mind / Should have such mighty sway, yet so it was” 
(8.700-02). The “mighty sway” would seem to be the immediate, psycho-physiological 
experience of urban stimulation, thus pointing to Wordsworth’s direct experience of 
external influence. To this structure of influence, though, Wordsworth adds a second 
meaning when he states: “A weight of ages did at once descend / Upon my heart” (8.703-
04).  Though Wordsworth reaffirms the “weight and power” of this feeling, “Power 
growing with the weight,” he claims that the feeling was momentary and that only in 
recollection does he see the moment as “a thing divine” (8.710). Even so, the import of 
the moment is reaffirmed soon after, as Wordsworth senses in the presence of the city “a 
spirit / Living in time and space and far diffused” (8.763-64). While “spirit” suggests a 
rather metaphysical tone, the meaning has more to do with concretization: the city proves 
a spatial index of its temporal construction, a palimpsest layered through ages and ages of 
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human cultivation. Thus, in the city Wordsworth can see how the human spirit has, 
through its agency, materialized within the environment. 
The city, then, becomes a critical epistemic artifact for Wordsworth’s discovery 
and contemplation of history, one that he subsequently correlates with geological activity. 
In his subsequent discussion of the Yordas cavern in the Craven Mountain, we see the 
feedback of another urban scene: the poster-covered wall from Book 7. Wordsworth 
describes entering the cavern (much like he enters the city) through a narrow passage that 
then widens “itself on all sides” (8.716). The roof is not quite visible at first and appears 
to “shift and vanish” as the eyes adjust and the walls first become visible, creating an 
uncanny echo of Wordsworth’s experience on the broadening Strand (8.723). This cavern 
scene, immediately following the story of Wordsworth’s first arrival into the city, 
becomes a type of allegory to consider the influence of humans on their environment over 
time, an influence likened to geological formation. In this activity, another structure of 
the city appears, one that points back to the accumulation of images envisioned by other 
people. The cavern wall offers its “projections,” its “surface, with all colours streaming, / 
Like a magician’s airy pageant” (8.732-34). Thus, similar to the city’s giant 
advertisements that depict scenes from the romance plays they promote, Wordsworth sees 
on these stony surfaces a series or “pageant” of “forests and lakes” (8.737). While the 
scene speaks to how Wordsworth’s imagination works upon these walls, creating from 
their forms images of his liking, it also ties together the “weight of ages” and the 
collective imagination of humanity. The three scenes thus become linked concepts; like 
the self, society, and history, they are irrevocably intertwined. 
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It is of no little significance that the lines depicting Yordas cavern in Book 8 were 
initially composed as part of the Simplon Pass sequence, appearing right after 
Wordsworth realizes that he and his fellow traveler had unknowingly crossed the 
threshold of the Alps. In many ways, my suggestion that Yordas cavern reveals 
significations of another time or scene not fully present mimics Liu’s own argument that 
the Simplon Pass scene reveals “no single piece of evidence” but rather a myriad of 
traces that show Wordsworth’s preoccupation with history, particularly Napoleon’s 
military campaigns. Liu asks us to take on a “second-sight” much like the one 
Wordsworth experiences when seeing the passing faces in the streets of London, which 
Wordsworth equates to the vision of a troop that “glides / Over still mountains” (6.602-
03). And this is only one of the two correlations in Book 7 between the effect of 
mountains or “ancient hills” and the effect of the city on “the prospect of the soul” 
(7.727, 725). Of course, Liu’s argument, which he bases not on a singular piece of 
evidence but series of suggestive details, is well made and has proven incredibly 
influential, but I find his assumption that the scene works to create a “historically free 
personality of ‘The mind’” to be a suspect conclusion (23).  
The strophe that begins upon Wordsworth’s recognition that he had already 
crossed the Alps offers, as both Liu and Hartman suggest, an image of the mind, or more 
specifically “Imagination!” (6.525). However, instead of offering a mirror of the self that 
blocks out nature or history, the scene reveals to Wordsworth how the mind, particularly 
the imagination, is always engaged in its reciprocal fitting with the external world. 
Except here, looking back on this scene in the moment of its composition, Wordsworth is 
only able to recognize the mind’s contribution when it is disjoined with the 
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environmental reality, i.e. his present location in regards to the pass. The invisible 
workmanship of the mind becomes visible in this failure. The recognition is powerful, but 
it also confuses the “progress” of Wordsworth’s “Song” of psychological development – 
the “Power” of the imagination is seen but only because, as Wordsworth acknowledges, it 
“came / Athwart me” (6.626-28). Wordsworth’s own ideal of mutual fitting, where both 
external world and imagination reveal their “blended might” is not realized in this 
moment (“Prospectus” 68). 
Wordsworth’s experience crossing the threshold of the city provides an original 
structure of experience, and thus a structure of meaning, on which the Simplon Pass 
scene builds. Both portray a particularly significant journey, both highlight the crossing 
of a threshold, and both show how the import of the environmental experience was only 
realized later via a riper mind. Given that Wordsworth’s urban experience occurred not 
long before the Alpine one, and given how the former was one he would “never” forget, 
it is reasonable to assume that it was in the back of his mind in 1790, just as Napoleon 
was in 1804. There are key differences between the urban and alpine scenes, though: in 
London, Wordsworth sees the threshold and feels the mighty “sway” of his locality; in 
the Alps, Wordsworth misses the threshold and feels the sublime influence of his own 
imagination. The scenes, I argue, work together as a feedback loop, offering in a shared 
cognitive construct the dual sides of the mind / world dynamic. 
Returning to Liu’s historical concerns, the military language in Wordsworth’s 
1804 reflection on the Simplon Pass scene certainly invokes, as Liu suggests, the military 
advances of Napoleon. Liu says little about the following strophe, however, claiming at 
first that it is merely the descending echo of Wordsworth’s confused ascension to the 
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pass. Yet, after the moment of cognitive disjunction, Wordsworth proceeds to work 
through his sense of history in the same fashion as his urban experience, even if the kind 
of history under consideration has changed. Descending down Gondo gorge, the poet sees 
not the ages of man but a deeper history: 
Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light, 
Were all the workings of one mind, the features 
Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree, 
Characters of the great apocalypse, 
The types and symbols of eternity, 
Of first, and last, and midst, and without end.  (6.567-572) 
It is here, rather than in the portrayal of “Imagination,” that Wordsworth's “Song” 
progresses. Not only does the scene continue to follow the structure outlined by the initial 
arrival to London, but Wordsworth reaches back even further, showing how the “first-
born affinities” that the child applies to the face of the mother and then to the lineaments 
of material environment have here developed into a deeper sight. The sense of eternity is 
grounded as the “characters” of “apocalypse” point not only to the eschatological but also 
to contemporaneous geological theories concerning the remnants of the apocalyptic flood 
– an event of both religious and environmental import.40 Here, Wordsworth links both, 
departing neither from nature nor history but seeing them in the same face.  
 Through the first two scenes – the entry into London, the crossing of the Alps – 
Wordsworth begins to recognize his capacity to gain a sense of history through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In the Norton Critical Edition of The Prelude, annotated by Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams, and 
Stephen Gill, the note to these lines emphasizes the geological theory of Wordsworth’s day, which  “held 
that all but the highest alpine peaks had been created by the retreating waters of the Flood. The features of 
the landscape would have been engraved, ‘charactered,’ by the first great apocalyptic event” (218). 
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environmental heuristics. This form of reading becomes most pronounced when 
Wordsworth returns to France in Book 9. After living for a time in Paris, initially feeling 
like a potted “parlour shrub” or a “greenhouse” flower, Wordsworth is only able to feel 
“the soil of common life” and its “earthquakes” once he has engaged with the public 
places and common people (9.89, 169, 182). It is then that Wordsworth says to himself, 
“Now do I feel how I have been deceived, / Reading of nations and their works in faith,” 
reading which he refers to as a “mockery . . . of history” (9.171-74).  Thus, in feeling the 
soil of the place, Wordsworth is able fully to engage its historical moment. 
Subsequently leaving for Orleans and returning to Paris after the September 
Massacre, Wordsworth can only experience the true import of that historical event once 
he crosses Carousel Square, the place where the bodies of the massacred were burned. 
Carousel Square becomes the third part of the feedback loop, building upon the under-
presence or mental structures already established in London and Simplon Pass.41 Whereas 
Liu argues that the scene figures a crisis of reference in Wordsworth’s project, arguing 
that “reference to history . . . is the only ‘power’ of Wordsworth’s Imagination,” a power 
that proves only more persistent in Wordsworth’s poetic attempts to deny its influence 
(35), I would argue that history is not the power of imagination but rather the product of 
imagination. The power derives instead from the associative structure that has been built 
up and has accrued meanings, both in regards to the manifestation of human spirit in 
place and the potential for apocalyptic signification. In each location, Wordsworth works 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Liu provides a compelling case for this scene as an echo of the Simplon Pass scene, and certainly the 
numerous parallels between them, not to mention the temporal proximity of their composition, affirms 
Liu’s argument (34); though, in establishing the London and Yordas cavern scenes that become the under-
presences of Simplon Pass, I have worked to show that Paris is yet another layer to a deeper structure of 
signification than Liu acknowledges. 
	  
144	  	  
to progress his psychological development and his song about it, the two being inevitably 
linked even if disjointed in the conflicts between narrative and biographical timelines. 
What is fundamental to each scene is how Wordsworth experiences a different state of 
being (understood within a different conception of history) that is ultimately located 
through his environmental engagement. History is not the underlying epistemological 
ground, as Liu suggest in his assertion of a historical epistemology (40-42); rather, it is 
the environment itself that provides a medium for history. In the environment, history, 
like the human spirit, is infused and through the environment it can be read. 
The prior feedback loops illuminate the Carousel Square scene, but still its 
meaning is not at first recognized. Initially, Wordsworth looks upon the blackened area of 
the square like “a man” who looks “Upon a volume whose contents he knows / Are 
memorable but from him locked up, / Being written in a tongue he cannot read” (10.49-
52). Only later, in his Paris hotel – which Liu rightly correlates to the Alpine House 
where Wordsworth restlessly struggled with the meaning behind Simplon Pass (34) – 
does Wordsworth finally take in the message and meaning of the square: the sense that 
the Revolution is no longer something to praise but to fear. Significantly, Wordsworth’s 
realization comes not in the form of a divine idea but rather in something “felt and 
touched” (10.66); thus does history become yoked in the affective tones of environmental 
engagement. Wordsworth feels the mighty sway of the place, but also adds meaning that 
is “conjured up from tragic fictions” – either the stories that he has heard about the event 
itself or emotional imports taken from the tragic fiction of Macbeth, which is cited a few 
lines later. Ultimately, Carousel Square offers a tragic historical meaning as well as the 
“blended might” of mind and place; this is not, then, a “lapse of mental discipline” as Liu 
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suggests but rather an initial recognition of the power of such blending, of the need to 
emphasize equally the might of the mind and the might of the external world. 
Looking back across Wordsworth’s narrative, we see a progression from the 
infant’s initial sensorial engagement with the mother to a reciprocal engagement with 
external influences, which led to an increase in psychological reach and associative 
activity. Taking in the larger environment, and taking in the objects of material culture, 
Wordsworth works up to books, to cities, and through the latter he finds an environmental 
understanding of humanity and history – a history of both geological and human ages. 
Not only does Wordsworth’s mind grow capacious with each new engagement, spurring 
it on to further engagements, but he also reveals in his narrative’s layering and looping 
how associations from one scene become the under-senses or mental structures on which 
new realizations are built. The mind proves much like the palimpsest of the city or the 
layered effects of the diorama. 
Through my final exploration in this chapter, one that will lead quickly to The 
Prelude’s climax at Mount Snowdon, I argue that Wordsworth, in conceiving of the mind 
as a part of nature as much as a self-made (and thus man-made) entity, he must find a 
means of representing its natural and constructed qualities. Of course, the urban sphere, 
the sphere of human construction, is not truly distinct from the natural world. What we 
will see in the following discussion is a rural application of Wordsworth’s shift from 
street scenes to the urban panoramic, as was discussed in the prior section. Both the urban 
and rural scenes offer divergent modes of vision and differing modes of subjectivity, and 
I argue that in the following two passages, Wordsworth works to conjoin these divergent 
modes so as to produce an ultimate image of reconciliation between “Discordant 
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elements” and to make “them move / In one society” (1.348-355). In this way, I argue 
that the climax of Mount Snowdon portrays not a recapitulation of Simplon Pass’ 
affirmation of transcendent poetic vision, as Hartman suggests, but rather the ultimate 
recognition of what Wordsworth experiences in Paris.42 The convergence of urban and 
natural structures, of embodied feeling within a scene and the abstracted prospective view 
of it, and the joining of these divergent elements reinforces the full degree to which the 
“individual Mind” and the “external World” make through their mutual fitting a 
“creation” of “blended might” (“Prospectus” 63-68). 
In Book 8, the echo of the structure of the street scenes from Book 7 slowly and 
subtly emerge as Wordsworth recalls walking through a “narrow valley” where the sun 
shines through several, quiet “eyelet spots / And loopholes of the hills” despite the “mists 
and steam-like fogs / Redounding everywhere” (8.92, 89-90, 85-86; emphasis added). 
Certainly such a scene could be found in the mountainous area around Grasmere, and yet, 
the place seems highly evocative of the city Wordsworth has just left, with its own 
narrow streets, small offshoots of alleys, and industrial steam turned fog.  In this moment, 
Wordsworth notices a shepherd and his dog high up the mountain’s edge, which is “Girt 
round with mists” so that they appear to stand on an “island floating” in the fog (8.96, 
98). While the image is short lived, Wordsworth seems to provide the exact opposite 
view offered in Mount Snowdon, as though he were looking up at himself in that later 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Even Hartman does not seem fully convinced that Snowdon does recapitulate Simplon Pass, which 
reveals to Hartman the potential of the mind to transcend nature (226, 256). In addition to working to revise 
Hartman’s sense of Snowdon as a failure in Wordsworth’s transcendent progress, I also work against the 
assumption that Snowdon, as Theresa Kelly suggests, “restores the aesthetic perspective absent in Books 7 
and 10, where London and revolutionary Paris present unmanageable spectacles. Now the speaker is a full 
participant who can make something of what he sees” (128). Rather, Snowdon significantly builds from the 
under-presences of Paris and particularly London, carrying their “aesthetic perspective” into this new 
context and there expounding and expanding on its import. 
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scene. In that later scene, Wordsworth similarly stands as though on an island, 
surrounded by a “sea of mist” that touched his “very feet” (13.43, 54). That Wordsworth 
would have Mount Snowdon in mind here, and would allude to it in the book succeeding 
Book 7, makes sense given that Wordsworth’s actual ascent of Mount Snowdon occurred 
soon after he left London in 1791. 
But the image of the elevated shepherd quickly gives way to another memory, 
where a shepherd guided his dog with signals “in the bottom of a vale . . . thus teaching 
him / To chase along the mazes of step crags / The flock he could not see” (8.105, 108-
110). As the dog advances and retreats – “Through every pervious strait, to right or left, / 
Thridded a way unbaffled” (8.113-114) – the scene echoes of Wordsworth’s own 
animalistic pursuit of sensation amid the pleasures and blazoned store fronts of the city, 
but a pursuit still guided by the signals of natural habit. The language of mazes and 
“thridding” makes the connection difficult to overlook, as the only other times these 
terms are used is when Wordsworth describes his London experience earlier in Book 7 or 
his London arrival to appear later in Book 8. 
 Just like in Book 7, the embodied experience amidst the rural mazes in Book 8 
precedes the panoramic view over it in Book 13. Ascending Mount Snowdon at night, 
Wordsworth and his friend, Robert Jones, are guided by a shepherd and his dog. While it 
is daylight when they set out, the night soon comes on as Wordsworth leads the group 
with “forehead bent / Earthward, as if in opposition set / Against an enemy” (13.29-31). 
In this figuration of the head bent downward in opposition to an antagonist, we might 
read an allusion to the Revolution, but the image also recalls the playing of games and 
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cards with “head opposed to head,” suggesting that Wordsworth is once again engaging 
in a form of psychological play (1.539).  
Wordsworth eventually climbs above the fog that has girded the mountain, and in 
the sudden transparency of the air, the moonlight falls on the “turf” of the mountain “like 
a flash,” which inaugurates, supposedly, the transcendent moment to come (13.39-40). 
The scene Wordsworth describes is this: a sea of mist has filled the valley that leads to 
the ocean. From the encircling hills and mountains – a sort of shoreline around the body 
of fog – streams and torrents descend, then conjoin, and then roar towards the ocean. Of 
course, Wordsworth cannot see the valley floor, he can only hear “the roar of waters,” 
which seem to rise up through a fissure or “blue chasm” in the middle of the sea of mist 
(56-58). Wordsworth describes the streams as “roaring with one voice,” and while the 
scene is “[g]rand in itself alone,” Wordsworth is particularly struck by  
                                                .  . . that breach 
Through which the homeless voice of waters rose, 
That dark deep thoroughfare, had Nature lodged 
The soul, the imagination of the whole.                   (13.59-65) 
Wordsworth goes on to call this the “perfect image of a mighty mind” a mind that is 
“exalted by an under-presence” (13.69, 71). The under-presence of this scene seems 
highly evocative of the under-sense of the city, the place where he had found “among 
least things / An under-sense of greatest; sees the parts / as parts, but with a feeling of the 
whole” (7.711-713). On Mount Snowdon, then, Wordsworth looks down upon his prior 
experience – the inverse view from Book 8 and his experience amongst the roaring 
streams of humanity in the thoroughfares of the city. Not only the roaring crowd but also 
	  
149	  	  
their sublime conflation with the homeless figure that seemed to speak of “another 
world” becomes present at Snowdon, as the former scene had been one of those 
“Collateral objects and appearances” that had been “doomed to sleep / Until mature 
seasons called them forth / To impregnate and to elevate the mind” (7.623; 1.619-625).  
In accord with Langbaum, then, I find that Snowdon offers “the delayed effect of 
epiphanies” (29). 
The sublimity of the Snowdon scene results in large part, then, from an urban 
experience that is now one of those “structures” that “the mind / Builds for itself” but is 
“reared upon the base of outward things” (7.624-26). The mighty mind, Wordsworth 
suggests, functions just as the “mind [of] Nature,” which is itself “a genuine counterpart / 
And brother of the glorious faculty / Which high minds bear” (13.74, 88-90). The 
“[r]esemblence” of mind and nature results, as Keith Thomas has well argued, from the 
associative functions that Wordsworth sees inherent to each, for each exerts “upon the 
outward face of things” a certain “domination” in that each “so moulds [external objects], 
and endues, abstracts, combines” them (13.77-79). Like the mighty mind, like the mind 
of Nature, Wordsworth’s own mind shapes what he sees based on the association of past 
experiences internally held and the outward forms before him; here, Wordsworth too 
“endues, abstracts, combines” the various images of his progress into a coherent whole. 
He comes to a full recognition of the familial bonds within nature, within the mind, and 
the affinity that holds the two together, whether that be understood as a “sense of God, or 
whatsoe’er is dim / Or vast in its own being” (13.72-73). The scene does not evince 
mental transcendence over the material world but rather the power of associative 
affinities predicated upon and engaged with the external scene. 
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For higher minds, “[t]his is the very spirit in which they deal / With all the objects 
of the universe . . . . They build up greatest things / From least suggestion” (13.91-92, 98-
99). This is the recognition of mental empowerment through “blended might,” a sense of 
the mind as building great works, but works still tethered to the material world, still 
needing “suggestion” even if “least suggestion.” Those who have argued for 
Wordsworth’s transcendent vision have generally found the Snowdon scene lacking. 
Rzepka doesn’t even mention it, while Hartman says of the scene: “In it the poet comes 
face to face with his Imagination yet calls it Nature. It is the Prelude’s supreme instance 
of the avoidance of apocalypse” (226). While Abrams argues in Natural Supernaturalism 
for a sense of transcendent environmental engagement like Hartman does, Abrams also 
claims that at Snowdon Wordsworth sees the “mighty mind . . .in its free and 
continuously creative reciprocation with its milieu” (78). Here, Abrams claim is much 
closer to my own thinking in regards to the epistemic function of the environment.   
Also informative is Abrams’s sense that this “conclusion goes on to specify the 
circular shape of the whole” (79). Indeed, Wordsworth acknowledges in Book 13: “From 
love, for here / Do we begin and end, all grandeur comes, / All truth and beauty” (13.149-
151). Yet, I would add to Abrams’ claim that there is not one circular motion here, but 
several, and I would add to Wordsworth’s own claim that it is not only love to which we 
keep returning but also the city. Further on in the “meditation” that arises from the 
sublime image of the sea of fog around Snowdon, Wordsworth describes two loves, one 
that is the sensual enjoyment of nature and one that “proceeds / More from the brooding 
soul, and is divine” (13.66, 164-65). Thus, from the roaring chaos that was an under-
presence to the sea of fog, we come to a sense of brooding, which points to Book 1 where 
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we first saw the “tiresome sea” of the city and the “meditative mind” that like “the 
mother dove / Sits brooding” over the vast abyss of chaos (1.35, 150-53). That 
Wordsworth has such brooding in mind is further concretized in the 1850 version of The 
Prelude, where he more pointedly refers to the mind “that broods / Over the dark abyss” 
while looking over the valley from Snowdon (1850, 13.71-72).  Over the under-presence 
of urban chaos, Wordsworth again sits brooding, further contemplating the structures and 
visual modes presented to him in the city and now reworked in the mountain scene – an 
inverse of the allusions to mountainous nature that Wordsworth makes while in the city. 
Such is the repeating gesture of The Prelude – seen in Book 1, Book 7, Book 8, and 
implicitly in Book 13 – Wordsworth leaves London only to look back upon it, to consider 
not just the city itself but also how his psyche and poetic spirit have progressed through 

















CHAPTER 3 – THE MAKER OF HER OWN FORTUNE:  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINISM AND SELF-FORMATION IN  
 




The previous chapter on William Wordsworth’s The Prelude reconsidered the 
dominant, critical understanding of the Romantic subject – that inward, autonomous, 
transcendent self – by showing how Wordsworth’s exemplary depiction of mental growth 
revealed a subject who was psychologically enmeshed in, engaged with, and shaped by 
the modern human environment. This argument must necessarily proceed into the 
Victorian era, in which the environmental paradigm for subjectivity continues with 
increasing visibility and stronger scientific affirmation; yet, the assumptions behind the 
“inward turn” also remain, particularly in Victorian criticism that explores the reception 
of Romanticism’s key tenets.1 For example, Angus Easson has recently argued that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As discussed in the introduction, studies on the self by Charles Taylor, Dror Wahrman, and Nancy 
Armstrong have proposed that the inward turn continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth. One of the key critical texts on the urban space as literary subject, Richard Lehan’s The City in 
Literature (1998), argues that the urban experience at midcentury further promoted the inward turn, 
entrenching its cultural influence. Scholars have suggested that the Romantic subject continues to be a 
dominant model in Victorian literature. For instance, Jay Clayton famously argues for the presence of 
Romantic visionary experience and transcendent selfhood in Victorian novels; see Romantic Vision and the 
Novel (1987). Perpetuating the inward turn with a form of linguistic turn, E. Warwick Slinn claims “that the 
metaphysics of Romantic idealism give way to the more problematized perceptions of a consciousness tied 
to textuality,” pointing a self that was “inseparable” from the abstraction of language and thus equally 
conscripted to interiority (2), whereas Andrew Elfenbein suggests that the Victorian period continued to see 
the author’s product as a “expression of the most authentic depths of his or her personality” (4). More 
recently Lynn Voskuil has argued that Romantic subjectivity continues in a form of theatrical self-
expressions (23-26). This brief list does not include those works that have worked backwards from Freud 
(rather than forward from the Romantics) to espouse a form of deep and autonomous psychology at work in 
Victorian literature, such as Jill Matus’s Shock, Memory and the Unconscious in Victorian Fiction (2009). 
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work of Elizabeth Gaskell evinces the Romantic “concept of the creative power of the 
imagination” and its redemption of the human subject from an empiricist psychology 
with its “mental processes inevitably determined by association” (19). Given my previous 
claims regarding the associationist underpinnings of Wordsworth’s environmental 
psychology, I find that Easson misreads Gaskell’s inheritance, which leads to a 
misconception of Gaskell’s own depiction of subjectivity and subject formation.  
While I disagree with Easson on these significant points, he succinctly highlights 
a key dilemma within Victorian conceptions of the self: the apparent paradox of 
determinism and the individual will.  In this chapter, I argue that Elizabeth Gaskell’s 
North and South (1855) exemplifies the Victorian struggle with this paradox and, more 
significantly, resolves it via the paradigm of environmental self-fashioning. Informed by 
an associationist psychology and Unitarian thought, Gaskell’s bildungsroman offers a 
powerful and profoundly environmental take on psychological development, one in 
which the conscientious and willful heroine, Margaret Hale, develops the capacity to 
control her mental life and even effect a desired selfhood by choosing to actively 
participate in, rather than remain passive to, external influences. Margaret Hale moves 
back and forth between urban and rural spheres, and while these removals deliver their 
own hardships, they also provide an education based on direct experience – much like the 
one Wordsworth championed – through which Margaret realizes the interconnections 
between geographical place, climate, modes of life, and selfhood. As a result, Margaret 
becomes able to identify and control the environmental influences that shape her. 
In her seminal The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction (1985), Catherine 
Gallagher asserts that nineteenth-century novels in general, and in particular industrial 
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novels like Gaskell’s, were torn over the “deep contradictions” behind a deterministic 
understanding of the self and a belief in free will (34). As a result of evincing these 
contradictory “assumptions,” the industrial novel manifests conceptual and narrative 
disruptions, and Mary Barton exemplifies this literary phenomenon (5, 62-87). After first 
exploring the debate over determinism and free-will amongst Unitarian circles, Gallagher 
then shows how it leads to a similar “irresolvable paradox” within the novel, particularly 
in the character of John Barton (74). Gaskell is unable “to commit herself to a causal 
scheme” that grows “inconsistent” across the narrative, and critics may need to concede, 
Gallagher argues, that “causal interpretations” of the novel are “irrelevant” (67). Both 
locally and in general, Gallagher suggests that human agency and determinism were 
understood to be incompatible in the nineteenth century.  
Gallagher’s study remains a touchstone for Gaskell and Victorian scholarship – 
the result being a critical lineage that not only accepts its terms at face value but also 
equates the industrial urban environment with a determinism that proves the master of the  
individual will.2  Yet, individual will and external influence are only paradoxical if we 
assume that external influence can be nothing more than a disruption to the autonomy and 
/or essentiality of the self; thus, such an assumption expands beyond the free will / 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rosemarie Bodenheimer continues Gallagher’s sense of the inconsistency of determinism in Gaskell’s 
work (7), and  argues that Gaskell, among others, “carr[ies] on Romantic critiques of social determinism” 
(116) where the pastoral or true nature proves “antideterminist” by existing outside and arguing “against 
conceptions of socially determined development” (116). Hilary Schor, in her opening discussion of Mary 
Barton, refers to Gallagher’s reading of free will vs. determinism as “the most intriguing and enlightened 
consideration of Mary Barton” (211 fn1). Kristina Deffenbacher does not cite Gallagher but offers a similar 
position when she presents external determining influences and psychological control as antithetical. For 
more examples of Gallagher’s influence in Gaskell criticism, see Amanda Anderson 28, 115; Moira 
Ferguson 274; Patsy Stoneman 137-38; and Tamara Ketabgian 187 fn52.  For treatments of other Victorian 
authors, see Susan Zlotnick, who cites Gallagher in her discussion of determinism/ free will incompatibility 
in Hard Times, 36. See also Joseph Bizup’s Manufacturing Culture (2003), 74-75 and Lauren Goodlad’s 
Victorian Literature and the Victorian State (2004), 43. Gallagher herself returns to this issue in The Body 
Economic: Life, Death and Sensation in Political Economy (2009). 
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determinism debates and into the contending views of selfhood in Victorian culture. In 
this vein, Sally Shuttleworth suggests that “two conflicting models of psychology” 
existed in Victorian medical and cultural discourses: in one “the individual is figured 
both as an autonomous unit, gifted with powers of self-control”; in the other, the 
individual proves “a powerless material organism, caught within the operations of a 
wider field of force” (28).3 This dualism stems, I argue, from a cultural resistance to and 
anxiety over a materialist view of subjectivity espoused by contemporaneous sciences. 
The result was a tendency to emphasize the interiority of mental life – a tendency that 
Freudian psychoanalysis would further popularize. Even in contemporary scholarship, 
critics continue to isolate interior mechanisms as the means by which a sense of self can 
be stabilized – whether through the unconscious, imagination, or reason – while 
conceiving of external influence, particularly the shocks attendant to modern life, as a 
destabilizing force.4 
Gaskell’s model for the self greatly complicates this dualism, as she argues for the 
potential to control one’s psychology and one’s subject formation through the same 
materiality and the same sciences that were supposed to destabilize them. North and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Such an dichotomy has certainly been registered by other critics and has recently been noted by William 
Cohen, who highlights opposition presented by mass industrialism and “[d]iscoveries of an evolutionary 
biology and geology” to “the notion of the soul” (1). Furthermore, Athena Vrettos has recently 
substantiated Shuttleworth’s dual sense of Victorian psychology, though the former does briefly 
acknowledge the potential for these two forms to be conjoined; see “Victorian Psychology,” 68. Gregory 
Tate, in The Poet’s Mind: The Psychology of Victorian Poetry 1830-1870 also highlights the “dual account 
of psychology,” one that contrasts “the metaphysical soul” with “the physical brain and the embodied 
mind”; this particular formulation is in regards to Tennyson,	  though it mirrors a more general duality in 
Victorian psychology, as Tate sees it, between the philosophical and physiological (21, 4).  
4 Through a largely psychoanalytic approach, Matus explores the destabilizing effects of mental shock in 
Gaskell’s North and South but also “the threat to self-possession and governance that a non-unitary model 
of mind entailed, and how that threat implicated the already fragile illusion of an individual subject in 
possession of itself” (3). Of the criticism interested in subjectivity to be referenced in this study, the works 
by Louise Henson come closest to recognizing the potential of a stable subject formation through agency, 
which takes the form of active reason and scientific education (in opposition to the unconscious); see, for 
example, Henson 2003 and 2006.   
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South, I argue, portrays external influence in a manner that is neither inconsistent nor 
necessarily threatening; rather, the novel proves progressive in its effort to show how the 
structures of influence of a given locality, particularly the city, can be the very tools 
needed to cultivate an autonomous and empowered self. In prioritizing the externality and 
materiality of psychology in Gaskell’s writing, this chapter will be in dialogue with more 
recent scholarship that focuses on the body’s importance to Victorian conceptions of 
subjectivity.5 While this scholarship does recognize the external environment as one of 
many causes for psycho-physiological effects, its general thrust, as William Cohen 
argues, is to advance “the primacy of the body in the idea of the human” (xii).  It does 
little, however, to advance an understanding of environmental engagement and self-
fashioning that is integral to Margaret Hale’s self-formation and to Victorian psychology 
at large.  
Building on the environmental understanding of subjectivity seen in Radcliffe and 
Wordsworth, Gaskell further develops the spatial practices and habits that allow one to 
engender particular states of being and to cultivate certain characteristics. Yet, more so 
than these previous proponents of environmental self-fashioning, Gaskell shows how the 
externality of psychology, rather than an assumption of autonomous inwardness, allows 
for the resolution of what had long been seen as competing elements of self and place – 
the will and deterministic influence. In bringing the theoretical debate over determinism 
and will into play, Gaskell’s portrayal of self-development more effectively addresses the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rick Rylance’s Victorian Psychology and British Culture, 1850-1880 has proven an influential text on 
this topic, and many other studies that take a physiological approach to Victorian psychology and 
subjectivity have followed, including Matus’, Cohen’s, and Garratt’s, along with others like Anne Stiles’ 
Popular Fiction and Brain Science in	  the Late Nineteenth Century (2009) and Nicholas Dames’ The 
Physiology of the Novel: Reading, Neural Science, and the Form of Victorian Fiction (2007).	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contemporary debates amongst science and society regarding the nature of the self and 
the external forces of the world, particularly those in the urban sphere. This chapter 
contends that, in recognizing the individual as an agent within a materialistic, cause-and-
effect system, Gaskell encourages the reader to extend his or her own understanding of 
psychology, to see the self as enmeshed within its modern circumstances. While such a 
conception allowed Victorian culture at large to address social problems and effect social 
progress, more important to Gaskell, and more central to her bildungsroman, is the sense 
that each individual can learn to become the architect of his or her own existence. 
 
 
Margaret Before Milton 
 
 
Throughout North and South, Margaret’s selfhood is defined in terms of place, 
whether in personal characteristics, attitudes, or behaviors that link her to certain 
environments and the modes of life associated with them.6 In this way, the novel keeps 
Margaret’s subjectivity in causal and conceptual proximity to each locality’s structure of 
influence. In exploring Gaskell’s portrayal of Margaret before her arrival in the industrial 
city of Milton, the present section works to establish the influences of her first two homes 
– rural Helstone and London – and how they shape the core attributes that Margaret will 
go on to develop, alter, or even protect in the industrial city of Milton-Northern. In short, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Here, my thinking is in accord with Michael Wheeler’s sense that North and South offers “an 
environment of circumstances” that is a “central concern” in Gaskell’s fiction (68-69).  Margaret and 
Gaskell’s other characters “are inseparable from the places in which they live” (69). However, Wheeler 




I will establish that Gaskell’s bildungsroman is predicated on an environmental sense of 
psychological development.7 
While yet unaware of determinism’s authority over the self, Margaret Hale’s 
psyche and self are shown to be preoccupied with place in the first chapter of the novel. 
Drawn by duty into the pomp and circumstance of her cousin Edith’s wedding to Captain 
Lennox in London, Margaret thinks regularly of her imminent return home to rural 
Helstone (6).8  Edith’s character seems typical enough of her circumstances and station. 
She is described as “a spoiled child” who is “too careless and idle to have a very strong 
will of her own” (6); in clear contrast, Margaret looks forward to the duties she will soon 
take on as “only daughter in Helstone parsonage” (6). Margaret’s clear distinction from 
Edith, despite the fact that the two have lived together for much of their young lives, 
appears to result from Margaret’s early childhood in the country. Significantly, while 
meditating upon the nursery she had shared with Edith, Margaret recalls “when she was 
brought, all untamed from the forest, to share the home, the play, the lessons of her 
cousin Edith” (8). Also recalled are the “wild passions of grief” she felt when her parents 
first brought her to London with the idea of her being improved by the culture and luxury 
afforded by her widowed Aunt Shaw (8). Unlike Edith, then, Margaret has grown up in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Despite the critical attention to the novel’s social and material conditions, the influence of such conditions 
on Margaret’s own psychological development has gone largely unexplored. Wheeler’s study, perhaps the 
most environmentally oriented study on North and South is noted above. The majority of studies focus on 
her social relations and maturation, emphasizing her unifying influence on industrial society; see, for 
instance, Horton 205, Shirley Foster Elizabeth Gaskell 108-110, Schor 92, Zlotnick 110, Jane Spencer 91, 
Jenny Uglow 366-386, Valerie Wainwrigth 95-102. Raymond Williams points to Margaret’s “developed 
sensibility of the Southern girl” (92), but he does not expand on the causal or environmental implications 
behind this statement (Culture and Society, 92). Deffenbacher is the only critic, as far as I can tell, who 
develops an argument around Margaret’s psychology and environmental determinism, but she regards 
Margaret’s psychological control as antithetical to the deterministic influences in the novel, and her study 
takes on a largely metaphoric reading of the connection between psyche and place (123-125) 
8 All quotations will be taken from Oxford University Press, “Oxford World Classics,” 2008 edition. 
Hereafter, the title will appear as N&S in parentheticals when necessary.	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two distinct environments, which have both had their influence upon her. Sharing Edith’s 
home and experiences has tempered Margaret’s untamed nature rather than making her 
indolent. The wild passion of her former life in the country has been transformed into one 
of duteous volition.  
In her return to the rural parsonage of Helstone, Margaret’s affinity for the rural 
environment becomes clear. She quickly reacquaints herself with the “multitudes of wild, 
free, living creatures, reveling in the sunshine” (17), and the rural environment just as 
quickly begins to influence Margaret’s psyche as “her cares were all blown away as light 
as thistle down, and she thought of nothing but the glories of the forest” (22). Taking in 
the beauty of the woodlands, Margaret recognizes how the “many luxuries” of her 
London life “had only been troubles and trammels to her freedom” – the first of many 
connections that Margaret will make between an environment and the mode of life it 
affords (18). In Helstone, Margaret’s “out-of-doors life was perfect” (17), and much of 
this perfection has to do with the beneficial climate, which in turn allows for such a life 
spent out doors. In the country, Margaret is able to run through open spaces and “broad 
commons” (17). The spaces of Helstone, in clear distinction to the confining spaces of 
London (or any nineteenth-century city), provide a physical freedom that begets a feeling 
of freedom: here, Margaret can go where she pleases, guided only “by her own sweet 
will” (70-1). While Margaret’s will is emphasized, these feelings of freedom are afforded 
to her by the space she engages; her willfulness is thus dependent on her present context. 
Yet, the relationship between influence and will works both ways, as Margaret’s 
inclination towards Helstone results in her more willing subjection to its structure of 
influence. Rather than resist, Margaret takes on characteristics from Helstone in way that 
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she never did from London. This last point is reinforced when Henry Lennox, brother-in-
law to Edith, comes to visit. Henry attempts to send Margaret signals of his imminent 
marriage proposal, signals “a regular London girl would understand,” but Margaret does 
not (26). When Henry makes his offer, she rejects him, and she further reveals the extent 
to which she is not like London girls when she rationalizes this rejection by pointing to 
his urbane qualities as flaws.  
Margaret does retain some of the social airs she took on in London, however, 
which are most evident when she disparages certain neighbors for being “shoppy people” 
(19). Margaret is not so country-simple after all; it would be more precise to say that 
Margaret’s selfhood proves rather multifarious and heterogeneous. The dual influence of 
Margaret’s London education and country freedom establishes a core self defined by 
graceful simplicity and volition. Both localities, then, contribute to Margaret’s subject 
formation, but these are not the only spaces she will inhabit.  
 
 
Determinism and the Influence of Circumstances 
 
 
Before we continue with Margaret’s own self-formation, a few words will be 
necessary to better understand the dynamics of the determinism in North and South, a 
dynamic that proves more complex than criticism has acknowledged thus far. This 
section first turns to Gaskell’s relationship with early Unitarian beliefs and 
environmentalism in order to establish the theoretical concepts of determinism with 
which her novel engages. While Gaskell’s firm adherence to Unitarianism has been 
documented in the relevant criticism, disagreement remains as to whether Gaskell 
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subscribed to Joseph Priestley’s Unitarianism (as defined by a strong belief in 
determinism or necessitarianism) or to the more transcendent Unitarian beliefs espoused 
by William Channing and James Martineau.9 For this reason, it proves necessary to 
affirm Gaskell’s belief in the psycho-physiological influence of external conditions as 
such a belief is a prerequisite for the environmental self-fashioning paradigm. 
In the late eighteenth century, the associationist psychology developed from 
Locke’s and Newton’s studies of the mind became – thanks in large part to Joseph 
Priestley – foundational to the Unitarian understanding of human behavior, morality, and 
the role played by experience in shaping the self. Taking on a Newtonian understanding 
of the nervous system and cognitive function as within the purview of natural laws, 
Unitarians understood the need to address physiological conditions when considering 
mental development. As Priestley acknowledges, “the perfection of thinking should 
depend on the sound state of the body and brain in this life” while disease proves 
debilitating to the faculties of the mind (“Disquisition,” 244-45). Given this materialist 
understanding of the human mind, it is not surprising that Unitarians readily adopted, as 
Henson observes, a “scientific attitude towards the influence of environmental 
circumstance on physical well-being and moral character” (2002, 31).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As Henson points out, scholars have positioned Gaskell “both within the traditional Priestleyan camp, and 
associated with James Martineau's new style Unitarianism, with its emphasis on free will over 
predetermined law” (2006, 86). R. K. Webb argues that Elizabeth and William Gaskell were more 
amenable to Priestleyan Unitarianism, even if they agree with Martineau’s desire for a more heartfelt form 
of worship and social engagement; see "The Gaskells as Unitarians" (1988). In Victorian Literature and 
the Victorian State (2004), Lauren Goodlad suggests that Gaskell was influenced by Channing, who “urged 
spiritual rather than materialistic progress,” though she does not go so far as to say Gaskell denied a 
deterministic view (47). Jenny Uglow suggests that Gaskell finds a middle ground between the two 
perspectives or styles (Elizabeth Gaskell: A Habit of Stories [1993] 131). Similarly, Knight and Mason 
(2006) position Gaskell’s beliefs between those of James Martineau and William Johnson Fox, the latter 




 In addition to one’s mind being shaped via its corporeal base, the human mind 
was, according to Priestley, also determined by the experiences afforded by one’s 
circumstances. In summing up Hartley’s view, Priestley writes:   
 all our intellectual pleasures and pains [and] all the phenomena of 
memory, imagination, volition, reasoning, and every other mental affection 
and operation, are only different modes, or cases, of the association of 
ideas: so that nothing is requisite to make any man whatever he is, but a 
sentient principle, with this single property . . . and the influence of such 
circumstances as he has actually been exposed to.  (Hartley’s Theory, xxiv) 
Within associationist psychology, experience was the principle material in the 
construction of ideas, and repeated experiences allowed for those ideas to be considered 
in relation to each other so that resemblance, contiguity, and cause-and-effect patterns 
might be learned – the tendency or habit to make these connections was called, of course, 
association. The development of associations leads to the growth of knowledge and 
morality. Through the associations of pleasure and/or pain with past experiences, the 
subject develops a sense of right and wrong actions, so that “The moral sense is therefore 
generated necessarily and mechanically”– that is, the moral sense is necessarily 
determined by past experience (Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind, 338). 
 Priestley’s sense of “influence of [one’s] circumstances,” what I will refer to as a 
structure of influence, thus determines a certain set of associations and, in turn, a certain 
mode of consciousness.10 This structure of influence proves integral to Gaskell’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In the next section, I will further interrogate the relationship between structures of influence and 
determinism, both as it applies to Priestley’s necessitarian philosophy and Gaskell’s novel.  
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portrayal of realistic characters: characters reflective of people living in her own time and 
place. Stacey Gottlieb also highlights this “materialist, cause-and-effect” depiction of 
character in Gaskell’s fiction (60),11 which can be seen most succinctly in the opening 
pages of Ruth. There, Gaskell highlights “the circumstances which contributed to the 
formation of character” and the “daily life into which people are born” that “forms 
chains” of causation that are reinforced through “daily domestic habit” (Ruth 2). This 
depiction of character surmises well the associationist psychology discussed thus far, 
affirming that this environmental psychology informs Gaskell’s portrayal of character.  
In North and South, the deterministic influence of place is often made evident 
through the characters that surround Margaret Hale; through these characters, Gaskell 
establishes the structures of influence to which Margaret is also subjected, and it is 
through them that Margaret begins to understand the chain of cause-and-effect within 
which she must operate.  Scholarship on Gaskell’s fiction has well established the 
environmental influence of urban and industrial spaces, particularly on Margaret’s 
mother and the factory workers of Milton-Northern.12 Also identified by scholarship is  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In addition to Gottlieb, Webb argues for the centrality of cause and effect in Elizabeth Gaskell’s novels, 
as well as in William Gaskell’s religious outlook (164-65); see also Henson 2006, 103.  
12 When considering the psychological influence of urban influences in North and South, scholarship has 
tended to focus on working-class characters or Mrs. Hale; see, for example, Katherine Byrne 62-67, 
Mariaconcentta Constantini 122; Henson 2002 36-38. Over the last three decades, studies on urban 
influence in Gaskell’s fiction typically focus on Mary Barton or Ruth. Gallagher, one could argue, begins 
this trend by treating North and South for its portrayal of paternalism and focusing her discussion of free 
will and determinism on Mary Barton, the latter becoming the primary text considered by scholars writing 
on working-class conditions, the most recent (and perhaps best) being Ketabgian’s Lives of Machines; see 
also Stoneman 138; Henson 2002, 35-36; Joseph Childers’ “Industrial Culture and the Victorian Novel,” 
81-82. Ruth and “Libbie Marsh’s Three Eras” are also often studied in this context; see, for example, 
Moore; Gottlieb; Foster “Shorter Pieces,” 112; and Bodenheimer 163-164. 
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the ameliorative influence of rural spaces.13  In addition to a rural / urban spectrum, 
Gaskell presents, rather obviously, a northern / southern spectrum in this novel.14  More 
than rehearse these discrete discussions, though, my purpose here is to take into 
consideration the full spectrum and complexity of environmental influence in Gaskell’s 
novel. In recognizing these dual spectrums, we must also take into consideration the 
various conditions within each place, conditions made even more various once we 
include the different types of housing and even the distinctions between various rooms. 
When viewed this way, a simple one-to-one determinism of place and self developed in 
the scholarship above becomes increasingly difficult to rationalize and increasingly 
insignificant to Gaskell’s project. Instead, Gaskell portrays within many of the locations 
of North and South a heterotopia of micro-localities, which are nested within larger 
structures of influence that they mitigate or reinforce. 
Perhaps the most pervasive influence of circumstance in Gaskell’s novel is the 
quality of the climate, which is determined by the region, place, and micro-locality. The 
first emphasis on climatic conditions and their psychological influence occurs when 
Margaret returns to her rural home of Helstone. Helstone appears bathed in “sunbeams” 
and affords much “reveling in the sunlight,” evoking the association between well-lit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Scholars have often accepted the initial dichotomy of corruptive city and healthful country presented in 
the novel; see, for instance, Williams Culture, 91-3; Wheeler 70; and Nils Clausson 5-6. Others have, to my 
mind, correctly identified that Gaskell's use of rural settings, traditional romance elements, evades a clear-
cut dichotomy of country and city with intimations of a more complex reality; Lynette Felber points out the 
anti-pastoral representations of country life in North and South, particularly the last third of the novel (64); 
see also Martin 104. 
14 It is important that we see these spectrums as potentially overlapping instead of as conflated. For 
instance, Jenny Uglow points to a common view of the geographical dynamic as “the industrial ‘North’ and 
the rural ‘South’” (373). A similar conflation is suggested by Williams Culture 92. Yet, Gaskell provides 
examples of urban spaces in the south (London) and rural spaces in the north (the areas surrounding 
Milton). In short, we should recognize that the north / south and urban / rural spectrums are dual axes by 
which Gaskell charts an array of place-types. 
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spaces and positive mental states (17). Characters frequently note the “fragrance” of the 
“delicious air,” and Gaskell emphasizes the boon of Helstone’s southern bearing when 
she describes the air as “warm scented” (17, 41). Because of such qualities, the rural air 
affords a “revivifying principle” (88). In prioritizing the climate of the southern 
countryside, Gaskell stresses only one of its circumstances, though she will show how the 
larger structure of influences complicates this particular “principle.”  
Similarly, Milton-Northern’s general environment is closely tied with its climate. 
A manufacturing town that Gaskell has modeled after Manchester, Milton-Northern takes 
on many of the negative attributes identified by Sir James Kay in The Moral and Physical 
Conditions of the Working Classes (1832), as well as those espoused by Frederick Engels 
and others who argued for the connections between the physical and moral conditions of 
the working classes.15 Milton-Northern is such “an unhealthy place,” and so influential 
upon its inhabitants, that its poor conditions become a constant focus of the novel (N&S 
66). The Hale family worries over its poor air quality long before the reader first sees the 
industrial city; and the reader is never allowed to forget the “horrid air” either, as it is 
referenced upward of ten times in the novel (365; see also 45, 51, 59, 65, 88, 132, 185, 
251, 363, 365, 418). Mrs. Hale’s worsening physical and mental condition, as well as her 
eventual death, is repeatedly linked to the conditions of Milton, even if her symptoms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Gaskells were good friends with Sir James Kay and Lady Kay Shuttleworth, and much of the 
concerns Gaskell portrays in her novels regarding urban poverty match the “environmentalism” of Kay’s  
“a logic wherein the working-class's moral condition followed from its physical condition” (Goodlad 49). 
Other correlations between Kay’s and Gaskell’s sense of material causality and progress include, 
Deffenbacher 124; Joseph Childers 77; Ketabgian 74-77; John Chapple Elizabeth Gaskell, 422. Moore also 
places Gaskell’s depiction of urban poor in relation to the environmentalism of Kay and Chadwick, though 
Moore will go on to suggest that Gaskell’s portrayal of Lizzie Marsh ultimately rejects the their sense of 
determinism, seeing the living conditions of urban poor as a potentially transformative experience (74). 
Moore’s position, I argue, reaffirms the need to clarify Gaskell’s understanding of the environment as a 
structure of influences rather than a machine that turned out uniform subjects, a clarification that will begin 
in this section and continue in the next. 
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initially appeared in Helstone (88, 110, 139, 238). While the air quality of Milton is poor 
overall, particular micro-localities greatly worsen it and thus exacerbate its negative 
influence.16 Bessy Higgins’ own illness, colloquially referred to as “a waste,” is caused 
by the contaminated air of the factory. In her own words, she is “poisoned by the fluff” 
(102).  Along with highlighting the conditions within the factory, Bessy’s illness 
illustrates the connection between environmental conditions and psychological 
suffering.17  For Margaret, Bessy is not simply a human being in need of sympathy but 
also a strong example of determinism’s cause-and-effect chain – the despotic influence of 
the environment.18 
The homes of the poor, according to Kay and reflected in Gaskell’s novel, only 
reinforce the cycle of squalid conditions and the subjects they determine. Kay mentions 
how the houses of the working classes in Manchester are “uncleanly” and have “an air of 
discomfort if not of squalid and loathsome wretchedness,” which “pervades them” and 
which are only exacerbated by the “gross” habits of the tenants (15). In this way, the 
squalor of the laboring class’s environs “is exceedingly promoted by their reflex 
influence on the manners,” leading to a cycle of degrading conditions that evinced the 
determinism of industrial conditions (15). With their squalid state and general fatigue, the 
laborers were likely to fall “the victim of dissipation,” indicating the depletion of mental 
energy and fortitude (11). Gaskell represents a similar scene in the Higgins and Boucher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In nineteenth-century Manchester, the air in factories was particularly a concern for Kay, Engels, and 
Gaskell alike (Kay 10; Engels 162), 
17 Kay similarly shows how the physical degradation caused by factory conditions would lead to the failing 
of one’s strength, until “the paroxysms of corporeal suffering are aggravated by the horrors of a disordered 
imagination, till they lead to gloomy apprehensions, to the deepest depression, and almost to despair” (11). 
18 Constantini makes a similar point when she argues that “both Mrs. Hale's and the others' deaths are 
meant to convey and reaffirm a deterministic, almost amoral view of human life, a view that the 'strong' 
characters have instinctively learnt to accept and cope with” (122).	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households. The attempt of Mary Higgins to try to clean their home – which consists of 
scouring the central area of the floor with a stone and wet sand so as to loosen the caked 
on, ground in filth – only succeeds in accentuating the areas around the furniture and 
nearer the walls that “retained their dark unwashed appearance” (99). The Boucher 
household affirms the trend: it appeared to Margaret “as if it had been untouched for days 
by any effort at cleanliness” (295).  On the other hand, the Thornton household proves 
immaculately clean, well decorated, and affording of cultivation through musical 
instruments and craftworks. Having lived most of her life in this environment, Fanny 
Thornton appears rather languid and spoiled, and thus proves rather similar to Margaret’s 
cousin Edith who had grown up within the confines of similar (though more tasteful) 
luxury. Through the portrayal of these poor and wealthy households, Gaskell affirms the 
environment / subject cycles of causation that occur when the “daily life into which 
people are born . . . forms chains” that are reinforced through “daily domestic habit” 
(Ruth 2).  
Two other conditions of the daily life in Milton-Northern equally affect the 
diverse classes, even Margaret herself.  First, Gaskell extrapolates the psycho-
physiological results of monotonous activity beyond that of the laborer’s, and thus 
expands on the implications of Kay’s Moral and Physical Conditions.19 Margaret 
suggests to Mrs. Thornton, mother of manufacturer John Thornton, that any mind “too 
long directed to one object only . . . will get stiff and rigid, and unable to take in many 
interests,” a comment that implicated the factory owners as much as the factory workers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kay claims that prolonged factory work “continued from day to day, and from year to year, is not 
calculated to develop the intellectual or moral faculties of man. . . . The mind gathers neither stores nor 




(113).  Thus, the inflexibility and single-mindedness seems applicable to all the 
inhabitants of Milton; indeed, Mrs. Thornton claims it to be a beneficial quality: one 
“ought to have their thoughts and powers absorbed” in the singular task of “to-day,” he 
explains (113). Even so, such single-mindedness proves unsavory to Margaret, who takes 
note of the non-descript “crowds” with faces “set in lines of eagerness or anxiety” as they 
“jostled each other aside in the Mart and in the Exchange, as they did in life in the deep 
selfishness of competition” (418).20 In Gaskell’s most overt depiction of determinism, the 
people of Milton appear (with few exceptions) rigid in body and mind, a quality widely 
applied to most “Milton men,” and women, as they are noted for their “iron” or “granite” 
constitutions, their “inflexible” ways of thinking, their “unfeeling” natures. They are, 
persistently and ambivalently, seen as “hard” and as commanding great “power” (65, 
163, 166, 308, 416). The repeated insistence on the uniform qualities of the men and 
women reinforces a sense of environmental determinism, which seems to undermine the 
willfulness ascribed to Milton inhabitants.  
Compounding on the sense that industrial work or narrow focus leads to 
inflexibility, we must also consider that medical treatises had established a correlation 
between colder climates, decreased plasticity of the nerves, decreased sensibility, and 
greater activity.21 The influence of the northern climate is not exclusive to Milton, of 
course, but it is also evident when the Hale family first stops in the seaside town of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Gaskell’s description also recalls Engel’s famous description of town life, where he points to the “brutal 
indifference” and “the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interests” (24). Such indifference results, 
according to Engels, from a dehumanizing effect of monotonous modes of town life (i.e. a life of capitalism 
and specialization) on the subject, as “a hundred powers which slumbered within them have remained 
inactive, have been suppressed in order that a few might be developed more fully” (23-4). 
21 According to Falconer: “COLD, by blunting the power of feeling, in the manner above described, tends 
greatly to diminish the sensibility of the system in general” (14). Furthermore, “The diminution of the 
sensibility, contributes to make the people who live in cold countries less timid” as well as making them 
braver and more active (16).	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Heston.  Margaret observes that the shopkeepers of Heston are highly industrious and just 
as bustling as their Milton counterparts. Even though their fresh air seems more akin to 
the rural south, Margaret immediately contrasts the shopkeepers of Heston from their 
southern counterparts, as the latter would often be seen “lounging a little at their doors, 
enjoying the fresh air” and taking in the scene on the street (59). The colder temperature 
causes the denizens of Heston to adopt more self-enclosing customs, customs that seem 
interconnected with a more business-like mindset. Beyond forcing inhabitants indoors, 
colder weather had, in clear contrast to the southern climate, been seen as diminishing 
bodily and mental sensibility as well as inducing a more industrious and more frank 
dispositions. All of this can be seen in the behaviors and fashions of the Heston people, 
which so differs from Helstone and which makes such an impression upon Margaret that 
it “struck upon her mind” (58). While Heston does not afford the same exact structure of 
influence as Milton, it does offer many similarities. In highlighting numerous localities 
beyond Milton and Helstone, Gaskell depicts the great complexity of deterministic 
structures and how the overall climate, the structure of space, and the daily habits of 
denizens participate in conjunction, effecting a complex structure of influence upon the 
subject. 
Margaret’s travels from place to place begin to impress upon her not only the 
influences of those localities but also an awareness of the environment’s capacity to 
shape the psycho-physiological constitution of the subject. And through the most 
geographically distant character, Gaskell makes this capacity the most evident. 
Margaret’s brother, Frederick – who travels to Cadiz, Spain, amongst other localities far  
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south of Helstone22  – returns to the family at Milton when he finds out that Mrs. Hale is 
gravely ill. From his time in tropical climates, Margaret notices that his features have 
become “redeemed from effeminacy by the swarthiness of his complexion,” a visual 
signifier for the climatic conditioning that has changed his character, seemingly for the 
better. Along with his skin tone, he now shows a “quick intensity of expression” 
indicative of “latent passion,” attributes that are regionalized when Gaskell identifies 
Frederick’s “instantaneous ferocity of expression” as that which “comes over the 
countenances of all natives of wild or southern countries—a ferocity which enhances the 
charm of the childlike softness” (247; my emphasis). Interestingly, the ferocity 
engendered by the southern climate does not negate the Helstone “softness” but rather 
offsets it, enhancing its charm. In this way, Gaskell reaffirms that when considering the 
influence of place, we must consider all the localities in which the subject has lived. As is 
evident in Wordsworth’s own use of associationist principles, as explored in the pervious 
chapter, Gaskell reveals that each individual brings their own associative affinities and 
physiological preconditions to each experience, which greatly complicates the process of 
determination. 
Also important to note is how Frederick’s transformation follows a rather typical 
script that had been repeated in medical, anthropological, and travel literature for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The critical discussions of North and South that touch on Frederick focus, by and large, on his role in the 
mutiny and how it reinforces the concerns about authority and independence represented in the novel; see, 
for example, Stoneman 81, Uglow 372, Bodenheimer 88, Martin 101-02. Frederick is also brought up in 
discussion of international trade such as in Lee (450) and Byrne (66). Shuttleworth suggests that Frederick 
proves exemplary of “contemporary anthropological thought which cast women, children, southern, and 
primitive on a lower evolutionary level than that attained by the white Anglo-Saxon male” but, as Frederick 
is of the latter type, this reading seems flawed (“Introduction,” xvi); rather, it seems more accurate to 
attribute his alteration, and Gaskell’s scientific understanding of it, as having to do with climatic change on 
individual constitutions. Constantini does point to Frederick’s adaptations, though she uses it to reinforce 
her evolutionary reading of North and South rather than to affirm climatic determinism. 
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decades: the warmer environments, it became widely believed, increased one’s 
receptivity to external stimulus through its material influence on the body, and such 
receptivity, when taken to greater extremes, was tied to increases of passion and potential 
for mental distemper.23 No longer overly soft or relaxed, Frederick has become more 
passionate, even, at times, fierce.24  To Margaret, the far southern climates, along with his 
wild career, had “almost substituted another Frederick from . . . whom she remembered” 
(248). Because related to her, Frederick affirms for Margaret the malleability of her own 
physical and psychological being.  
Helstone, then, becomes more of a middle ground within the geographic spectrum 
of the novel, one with a rather various climate. Its “sultry” summer weather places it 
closer to the far south on the climatic spectrum than to Milton-Northern (17). As 
physician Thomas Trotter highlights in his View of Nervous Temperament (1808), the 
“warm summer” in southern England “has a similar effect” to climates further south in 
that its ”[e]xcessive heat . . . powerfully increases the sensibility of every part; and 
renders the mind more susceptible of pleasurable sensations” (101). Thus, it is no wonder 
that Margaret correlates Helstone with pleasure and fine feeling, but her views of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23According to the late-eighteenth-century physician William Falconer, an arid climate “increases the 
faculty or power, as well as the accuracy, of sensation or feeling” in both the body and mind, and “[f]rom 
this sensibility arises the passionate temper of those people, which was observed from early antiquity*, and 
their impatience under several circumstances of behavior” (I: 4, 1; pg. 6). More recent to Gaskell, James 
Johnson wrote in his 1827 The Influence of Tropical Climates on European Constitutions of the “general 
languor of body and mind” as well as the “irritability of temper” that results from life in southern climates 
(15). See also Thomas Trotter, A View of the Nervous Temperament . 
24 Edith reinforces Margaret’s sense of how circumstances in southern climates can shape one’s character. 
In a rather straightforward acknowledgement of this influence, Margaret says to Edith: “Do you know, 
Edith, I sometimes think your Corfu life has taught you . . . Just a shade or two of coarseness” (409). Here 
both the influence of experience and the influence of climate: Edith is taught coarseness, but coarseness 
also implicates Edith’s sensibility, thus her psycho-physiological alteration, and thus the potential influence 
of a southern climate that was believed to produce savage behaviors. Edith’s son, who is born in Corfu, also 
appears to have a rather bestial aspect to his character.	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locality prove more medical than idealistic. For instance, when discussing Nicholas 
Higgins’ desire to leave Milton for the south, Margaret tells him that the diversity of the 
climate, with its cooler, rainy season, would “kill you with rheumatism” (306). Margaret 
warns Nicholas of a rural life that sounds, in terms of the labor, much like the one he has 
known: “The hard spade-work robs their brain of life; the sameness of their toiled 
deadens their imagination” (306). What particularly concerns Margaret is that Nicholas is 
ill suited for such work and for such a climate because he has too long been conditioned 
by Milton. For instance, she notes how the food “is far different to what you have been 
accustomed” and how he would not find any of the “companionship” he has amongst his 
fellow workers in Milton (306). “What would be peace to them,” Margaret explains, 
“would be eternal fretting to you. Think no more of it, Nicholas” (306). In making these 
distinctions, Margaret provides a much more extensive view of the Helstone structure of 
influence; however, of greater consequence is that this particular structure of influence is 
class specific, including the modes of living afforded to person’s of the laboring class, but 
also the influence of these circumstances have been rendered differently for Nicholas 
than for the laborers who have lived there all their lives. Nicholas’ own psychological 
and physiological condition becomes a key variable within the structure of influence that 
he experiences.  
 
Conditions, Influences, and Sentience 
 
 
 Over the course of her time in Milton, Margaret comes to a greater awareness of 
external influence, which will ultimately allow her to recognize the ways in which human 
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subjects can shape the environment so as to engender positive effects. Yet, to do so she 
must first recognize the complexity of each locality’s structure of influence and to 
acknowledge that each locality can have negative affects on the body and mind. In a 
quintessential scene, which occurs after Mrs. Hale has died and after Margaret has 
witnessed the depraved living conditions of the Boucher family, Margaret acknowledges 
to her father: 
‘It is the town life . . . Their nerves are quickened by the haste and bustle 
and speed of everything around them, to say nothing of the confinement in 
these pent-up houses, which of itself is enough to induce depression and 
worry of spirits. Now in the country, people live so much more out of 
doors, even children, and even in the winter.’ 
 ‘But people must live in towns. And in the country some get such 
stagnant habits of mind that they are almost fatalists.’ 
‘Yes, I acknowledge that. I suppose each mode of life produces its 
own trials and its own temptations’ (301-02). 
This moment well summarizes many of the key points developed in the last section: the 
medical understanding of external influence as indicated by “nerves”; the sense of micro-
localities (such as the “pent-up houses”) that amplify the larger structure of influence; the 
interconnection of physiological and psychological conditioning; and the recognition that 
each locality affords certain modes of living and that all such modes come with their own 
structure of influence. The country, Margaret has realized, offers temptations as well as 
benefits: for the country dweller, life “tempts him to revel in the mere sense of animal 
existence, not knowing of, and consequently not caring for any pungency of pleasure for 
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the attainment of which he can plan, and deny himself and look forward’” (302).  
Significantly, the rural laborer gives himself over to an unthinking sensual existence, and 
this is precisely the opposite of what Margaret is currently experiencing: a growing 
consciousness of external influences that the individual subject must learn to properly 
navigate in order to cultivate a healthy life and sense of self. 
 By remaining cognizant to causes and effects, writes William Gaskell, we observe 
the “natural consequences of our actions  . . . , to trace our errors and vices to their issues 
and our miseries to their causes” (qtd. in Webb 152). Thus, rather than something innate, 
moral understanding results from external circumstances and one’s skill at perceiving 
cause and effect. Again, the key components of mental and moral development, 
according to Priestley, were the combination of a “sentient principle” and “the influence 
of [one’s] circumstances.”  I find it rather interesting that the argument provided by 
James Martineau – which Gallagher provides as the epigram to her chapter on Gaskell 
and the free will / determinisms debate – provides a similar construction to Priestley’s 
summary of associationism. Claiming that Necessitarian theory works “to annex human 
nature, and put it under the same code with the tides and trees and reptiles,” Martineau 
argues, “Our personality . . . is sure to recover from the most ingenious philosophy, and 
to re-assert its power over the alternatives before it” ("Three Stages of Unitarian 
Theology" 575).  While I do not want to ignore the differences between Priestley’s set 
(sentience and influence of circumstances) and Martineau’s set (personality and external 
alternatives), I do want to suggest that their distinctions are not so great as Gallagher or 
Victorian criticism has suggested.  
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For Priestley, the conflict of free will and determinism has more to do with 
semantics than with the nature of human agency. Priestley argues that humans absolutely 
have “volition” even if he cannot attribute “self-determination” to them in the strictest 
sense of the word (A Free Discussion 127-28, 136, 145-48). The point is made more 
clearly in Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illuminated, where Priestley argues that if 
by free-will one means “the power of doing what a person desires or wills to do, or 
deliberating, suspending, choosing, &c. or of resisting the motives of sensuality, 
ambition, resentment, &c. free will, under certain limitations, is not only consistent with 
the doctrine of mechanism, but even flows from it” (335). The will and the capacity to 
make judgments are, under Priestley’s view, the result of a sentient being coming to 
awareness within a world of cause and effect determined by absolute laws. This kind of 
free will is what Priestley calls “the popular and practical sense,” which is in 
contradistinction to “free-will in the philosophical sense,” that being the freedom to make 
choices outside of the influence of all other stimulus – to make choices as if every 
alternative was possible (335). In the most basic form of his argument, Priestley writes in 
a letter to Dr. Horsely: “I chuse to say that motives determine the mind, whereas you say 
that the mind determines itself according to the motives; but, in both cases, the 
determination itself is the very same, and we both agree that it could not have been 
different. Our difference, therefore is merely verbal” (“A Letter” 224). 
In short, Priestley suggests that all decisions are informed and motivated, and that 
philosophical free-will means, in its strictest sense, the possibility of decisions to be made 
outside of information, outside of circumstances. Priestleyan Unitarianism is, then, a 
religion that esteems information, a religion that accepts and embraces the influence of 
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circumstances. In his Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illuminated, Priestley 
acknowledges the difficulties that arise from a deterministic view, from the fear of a 
puppet-master God, particularly in the questioning of why one need act at all if 
everything is already predetermined. Priestly asserts that one would not need to act at all, 
of course, “if their own actions and determinations were not necessary links in this chain 
of causes and events, and if their good or bad success did not, in the strictest sense of the 
word, depend upon themselves” (502). By placing human actions within the chain of 
cause and effect, Priestley opens up both his religious determinism and his materialist 
understanding of selfhood to the influence of human behavior. By engaging with and 
shaping one’s environment, one becomes a part of the determining force. Thus, Priestly 
argues, “the system of necessity makes every man the maker of his own fortune” (503).  
In light of the above discussion, the paradox that Gallagher identifies between 
causality and a moral conscience, between individual agency and external determinisms, 
proves to be rather un-paradoxical after all. Gallagher, in following Martineau, assumes 
that external influence negates the potential agency of the inward subject, but I argue 
instead that, as Priestley himself suggests, external influence provides the means by 
which conscious decisions are made. The fact that the present consciousness of the 
subject has been determined (or we might say built from) knowledge gained via past 
experiences does not render that subject a passive receiver of influence; rather, because of 
sentience, each subject becomes an agent working within a complex world of influences.  
Only when we set in opposition a view of an autonomous self and a conception of 
determinism do we come to a paradox, and I would suggest that Priestley’s sense of 
determinism is not what scholars often assume: a mechanical system where 
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circumstances produce uniform subjects. Rather, as Gaskell has shown, the system of 
determinism proves much more complex, and for this reason I believe that Priestley’s 
articulation of  the sentient being amidst the “influences of [his or her] circumstances” 
proves more accurate for Gaskell’s own sense of environmental influence than the term 
“determinism” and the despotic nature often associated with that word. It is for this 
reason that the term “structure of influence” has been utilized in the present discussion 
and throughout the dissertation.25   
 The more despotic sense of determinism only proves applicable to Gaskell’s 
novel where the author identifies, largely through Margaret, the ways in which certain 
subjects are forced to develop within particular circumstances – a concern that reflects 
Wordsworth’s own critique of strict educational practices that do not allow one to learn 
from a variety of organically occurring experiences. Such despotic determinism is the 
function, then, of both material circumstances and the social constructs that bind subjects 
to those circumstances, and such a situation becomes a focal point in North and South, 
particularly in the chapter entitled “Masters and Men.” Here, Margaret asserts her 
concerns about the working class and their slave-like servitude to their factory masters. 
Taking on the parent-child model, Margaret likens the factory workers to “tall, large 
children” who are kept in ignorance so as to assure their “blind unreasoning kind of 
obedience” (119), this “unreasoning” aspect going against the fundamental Unitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In the introduction of this dissertation, I explain how I have coopted and revised Raymond Williams’s 
term “structure of feeling,” which identifies the experience or feeling of living within a set or system of 
social conditions that have a strong sway on self formation; Williams uses this expression instead of 
determinism so as to acknowledge that social institutions are never static, are always shifting, and within 
this shifting the individual still maintains some degree of agency; see Marxism and Literature 131-32. in 
Subjectivities, Regenia Gagnier’s provides an excellent example of the term’s definition and further critical 
engagement, though another excellent example relevant to Victorian literature can be found in Ruth 
Livesey’s more recent work, “Communicating with Jane Eyre: Stagecoach, Mail, and the Tory Nation.” 
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tenet that each individual must determine his/her world-view for him- or herself. 
Margaret’s implicit argument is that the laborers must be provided with better guidance 
and education (in a general sense). In response, Thornton continues using the child-parent 
metaphor, claiming that the working class is “happiest under the unfailing laws of a 
discreet, firm authority” (120). Mr. Hale furthers Margaret’s point, by retorting that 
children do need to be made obedient at first, but that “a wise parent humors the desire 
for independent action so as to become the friend and advisor when his absolute rule shall 
cease” (120-1).  
While there is much that has been said in regards to Mr. Hale’s paternalist model, 
I want to focus not on whether Gaskell ultimately subscribes to this model as the correct 
way of addressing the conditions of the poor; rather, I want to explore momentarily its 
assertions about the human subject, determinism, and agency. Within Mr. Hale’s model, 
a rather Unitarian model, the child grows into their individuality through an education 
determined by their parents. Unitarians especially promoted the controlling of 
circumstances and stimulus in the education of children. Through these educational 
practices, parents could “check whatever is wrong and vicious . . . before it be fixed into 
a habit”; indeed, the habits and minds of children were seen as “exceedingly pliable,” 
giving parents an “uncontrolled authority over” their children and allowing these authors 
“almost to mould them as [they] please” (“A Serious Address to Masters of Families,” 
453). Yet, as Margaret and Mr. Hale affirm, the ultimate goal of their own social theory is 
to lead the subject to a state of independence – that is, to teach them the ability to operate 
as an informed and active agent amidst the influences of their circumstances, 
circumstances they must learn to shape for their own improvement.  
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A similar perspective can be found in Kay’s The Moral and Physical Conditions: 
If we would really improve the condition of the lower classes . . . we ought 
to endeavor to make them acquainted with the principles that must 
determine their condition in life. The poor ought to be taught, that they are 
in a great measure the architects of their own fortune. (62) 
The model Kay suggests here is certainly in accord with Priestley’s, Unitarian 
educational reform in general, as well as the Hales. Gaskell offers Nicholas Higgins as an 
example of how guidance can lead to individual agency and self-determination. While at 
first a prime example of the lower-class worker whose circumstances led him to a life of 
squalor and intoxication, with the guidance of the Hales – a guidance that is by no means 
forceful or domineering – Nicholas is encouraged to take better care of himself and to 
even become a positive influence on those around him. Towards the end of the novel 
Nicholas has cleaned up and shows “a sober judgment, and regulated method of thinking, 
where were at variance with his former more eccentric jerks of action” (338). Equally 
significant is that Nicholas gains, through his own determination, employment with Mr. 
Thornton and goes on to help the latter plan and build a communal dinning-room for the 
workers of Thornton’s factory (361). In this way, Gaskell provides a physical index of 
Nicholas’ increasing capacity to effect changes within his own world.  
Yet, within this bildungsroman, Margaret is the key figure and though she shows 
a great deal of agency throughout the novel, I believe it is in the discussion of the factory 
workers, her interactions with them, and her observations of their own outcomes that she 
begins to sense the dual potential for positive external influence and positive social 
influence within the urban sphere.  Gaskell thus provides a sense of environmental self-
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fashioning that was integral to Unitarian educational beliefs (and the associationist 
psychology on which it was based), which ultimately led to “a new kind of human 
making” (Mason 159). Of course, the belief in a malleable self, I have shown in previous 
chapters, proves a continuation of eighteenth-century empiricism. Yet, what Mason 
means to highlight, I believe, is Unitarianism’s more systemic and aggressive approach to 
human malleability, an aggressiveness intended to make the most of the individual’s 
capacity to be improved via the proper circumstances and conditions. As Margaret sees 
and articulates the potential for human improvement in others, she also becomes more 
conscious of her own agency within the chain of deterministic causality. It is precisely 
Margaret’s agency to control her own psychological state and self-formation that proves 
the focus and argument of Gaskell’s bildungsroman. 
 
Margaret Hale’s Environmental Self-Fashioning 
 
 
Over the course of the novel, as we have seen, Margaret realizes the authoritative 
influence locality has on subjectivity, particularly the influence of Milton-Northern. Also 
in continual focus are the forces and forms of authority and independence. Given 
Margaret and Mr. Hales’ assertions to John Thornton that authority and individual agency 
can co-exist, it seems logical that a similar attitude be taken towards the seemingly 
contradictory powers of determinism and individual will. This final section, then, 
explores how Margaret Hale proves a paragon of environmental self-fashioning and how, 
in the process, she reveals the compatibility of external influence and personal volition. 
Margaret’s self-formation reveals to other characters within the novel the potential for 
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psychological control and self-cultivation that external conditions affords those who are 
willing to become active agents in the cause-and-effect chain of determinism. By 
portraying this paradigm of environmental self-fashioning, Gaskell resolves larger 
Victorian concerns about selfhood addressed in the introduction of this chapter, 
particularly the sense that external influence must necessarily be seen as antithetical to 
the individual will, self-control, and moral responsibility. 
 In exploring Margaret’s environmentally oriented subject formation, I also want 
to stress the spatial practices she enacts to become an active agent in the chain of 
causation and thus control (to some degree) the condition of her psyche and her sense of 
self. Through place-oriented habits, customs, home fashioning, and her efforts to control 
her own mobility, Margaret exemplifies a profound, if not always self-aware, form of 
psychological control, which is based on a contemporaneous understanding of external 
influence and psycho-physiology. Such practices, along with habits of thought, do not 
dismiss structures of influence; rather, they allow Margaret to mitigate and even utilize 
external influence for her own purposes, for her own environmental self-fashioning. In 
presenting Margaret’s subject formation amidst a deterministic milieu, North and South 
provides a conception of self and psychology as a function of engagement with external 
conditions rather than as an autonomous entity.  
 To begin my analysis, I will return to where we left Margaret in the first section. 
Margaret does not have much time in Helstone, and her hybridity and heterogeneity 
becomes all the more evident when the Hale family relocates to Milton-Northern in 
Darkshire. Her London refinement is particularly on display when she interacts with John 
Thornton, his mother, and his sister, Fanny. When dining at the Thornton home, the 
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elaborate and superfluous spread proves oppressive to Margaret’s “London cultivated 
taste” (160). Her “habits of society” prepare her for many interactions and new situations 
in Milton, but they also elicit criticism, particularly from Mrs. Thornton (61). Margaret’s 
rural habits, however, appear more readily, perhaps because of the way they stick out in 
Milton.  For instance, Margaret gathers some “hedge and ditch flowers” from the fields 
just outside town, causing Nicholas Higgins, who she is meeting for the first time, to say, 
“Yo’re not of this country, I reckon?” (72). After speaking with Nicholas and Bessy 
awhile, Margaret offers to visit them at their home. Such visits were seen as part of a 
philanthropic mission to assist the poor, a type of kind gesture that certainly qualifies as 
one of “the old Helstone habits of thought” (157); of course, these visits were a habit of 
Margaret’s at Helstone, where they were “an understood thing” (73). Nicholas Higgins 
understands, too, but his response suggests that he finds the gesture an “impertinence on 
her part” (73).  Margaret’s habits often mark her as foreigner while she resides in Milton, 
and her social customs in particular lead to many misunderstandings with Milton 
residents. 
What is not lost in translation, however, are the qualities Margaret has cultivated 
from her rural life, which come through in her sympathetic and sunny countenance. As 
we have already seen, such qualities were identified with inhabitants of warmer climates 
and contrasted with the frank and unfeeling natures of northern inhabitants. Bessy 
Higgins highlights this connection between affect and place after a visit from Margaret: 
“I wonder if there are many folk like her down South. She’s like a breath of country air, 
somehow. She freshens me up above a bit” (138). At first blush, the lines might suggest a 
merely symbolic use of climate for affect, which happens frequently across Gaskell’s 
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novel and many other literary works in the nineteenth century. Yet, given the novel’s 
persistent and associationist-informed focus on the correlation between external 
conditions and subjectivity, to say that these moments are merely symbolic robs them of 
their full import and impedes our own critical understanding of Gaskell’s project. More 
than just metaphor, the ease and frequency with which Gaskell uses climatic conditions to 
depict internal feelings and the expressions they engender further reinforces the extent to 
which she saw the external world as interconnected with human interiority. To reinforce 
the revivifying influence Margaret has on urban residents, Gaskell frequently describes 
her face as a “sweet sunny countenance” or uses some similar reference to sun, 
brightness, or sweetness, words also used to describe Helstone (124; see also 72, 192, 
340, 415). Such moments reinforce the extent to which Margaret’s subjectivity has 
incorporated the influence of her rural home.  
Still, Milton offers its own structure of influence, one that Margaret finds rather 
abrasive at first but to which she will inevitably assimilate and adapt. For instance, 
Margaret initially finds the streets to be a “disorderly tumult” that forces her take on a 
“pace” that the traffic necessitates (70-71). Yet, in time, Margaret learns “to thread her 
way through the irregular stream of human beings that flowed through Milton  
streets” (171).26  Margaret’s adaption is itself an effect of determinism, but it is one that  
simultaneously restores her agency. In addition to learning how to navigate Milton 
spatially, Margaret also learns to navigate Milton socially, becoming more involved in 
the lives of Milton people while she takes on their own customs and language (237). In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The key variable here is Margaret’s adaptation, as gained through experience. Initially, Margaret seem 
feel to have any willpower within the stream of humanity – she had to match its pace and struggle with its 
currents. Second, as with my discussion of determinism, which has prioritized the term “environmental” 
over “social”; here too we see how easily the social becomes contextualized as a part of one’s environment. 
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time, Margaret finds herself acclimating to Milton because she is disposed to doing so – 
having found a “human interest” in the Higgins – though interestingly this results from 
her continuing the social practices she had learned in Helstone (74). It would seem, then, 
that while Margaret adapts – alters certain habits, activities, and attitudes to be in tune 
with the place and people – she also maintains core aspects of herself that were explored 
above, such as her warmth, grace, and individual agency. All of these characteristics the 
Milton milieu appears to work against. 
Margaret’s ability to retain what might be referred to as her Helstone aspect is, in 
part, through mental determination, but there are external practices at work, too. 
Significant to Margaret’s efforts of maintaining valued characteristics is her affinity for 
fashioning. We see this in her fashioning of clothes – Bessy comments on how 
Margaret’s dresses are not like those of other middle-class women in Milton – as well as 
in her fashioning of Hale home in Milton. When Mr. Thornton first enters their warmly 
lit living room, he notices how,  
with country habits, they did not exclude the night-skies, and the outer 
darkness of air. Somehow, that room contrast itself with [his own, which 
was] twenty times as fine; not one quarter as comfortable . . . . It appeared 
to Mr. Thornton that all these graceful cares were habitual to the family; 
and especially of a piece with Margaret. She stood by the tea-table in a 
light-coloured muslin gown, which had a good deal of pink about it. (78) 
In this scene, familiar habits, the materiality of home decor and clothing, and the 
fashioning of a psychological atmosphere of peace and comfort all come together. The 
house the Hales rent in Milton had originally suffered from the “overloading” of gaudy 
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wallpaper and heavy cornices (61), a taste connected with commercial people and their 
general insensibility. Such is the case with the Thornton’s own living space, which is so 
encumbered with color and ornament that “it became a weariness to the eye” (160). In 
rejecting the over-stimulating décor originally in the house, Margaret utilizes Helstone 
fashions and habits to create a psycho-physiological effect similar to that which Helstone 
itself produces: one defined by grace, relaxation, and softness. Margaret’s decorative 
touches also point to the power of association and habit of thought, as these familiar 
objects keep Helstone, and its positive valances, in the minds of the family.27 Such 
power is, of course, under Margaret’s control, allowing her to cultivate desired habits of 
thought. 
The home becomes, in this way, a powerful technology for producing a desired 
structure of feeling and structure of self; it also allows for a degree of psychological 
management as it provides a space in which Margaret can gain control over external 
forces and internal responses. One such example of this control is the “genius for 
management” Margaret exhibits when determining who will inhabit what rooms of the 
house. Focusing primarily on the affinities of each person, and prioritizing those who are 
most in need of positive influence, Margaret parcels out the rooms: mother takes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The association of objects in the Hale home with Helstone is again revisited when Margaret prepares to 
leave for London. Interestingly, Margaret is described as setting out “again upon her travels through the	  
house, turning over articles, known to her from her childhood, with a sort of caressing reluctance to leave 
them—old-fashioned, worn and shabby, as they might be” (366). Placing “travels” within the house not 
only speaks to the sense that these objects have travelled from Helstone to Milton but also how these 
objects and their signification of home have also become associated with this house in Milton. The 
associative power of domestic arrangement is also seen in a strange moment when Mrs. Thornton decides 
to warm up to Margaret because “a sudden remembrance, suggested by something in the arrangement of 
the room” brings back to Mrs. Thornton’s mind a child of hers that died in infancy. The remembrance 
“melted her icy crust” (181). Gallagher cites such moments as illogical, and her overall discussion of 
association in North and South greatly overlooks the centrality of place within the novel’s method of 
signification; see Gallagher 170-181. 
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“cheerful” sitting area as she has been the most discontented by the move; Dixon, 
equally disgruntled, receives a back room away from the noise of stairs about which she 
had “grumbled so” at Helstone (61). Much in the same way that environmental 
psychology is often put in practice today – in architectural planning and the layout of 
retail floor space – Margaret makes a concerted effort to use constructed space to create 
a positive psychological climate within the home (something she was unable to do in 
Helstone). 
Another example of how home-space is used for psychological control can be 
seen in Margaret’s tendency to close herself off in various rooms when experiencing 
powerful emotions.28  While in Milton, and as her life becomes increasingly stressful 
from the labor riot and her mother’s worsening condition, John Thornton’s marriage 
proposal, her brother’s visit despite his being wanted for mutiny, her own trouble with the 
police, and the condescension of Mrs. Thornton, Margaret again and again uses the 
spaces of home to shelter herself, a physical withdrawal from the world that has clear 
psychological implications (191, 198, 254, 282, 345).  In this private space, Margaret 
releases “her strong will” from the “laborious task” of keeping up appearances, keeping 
emotions at bay; here she can cry “most heartily” and thereby “allow herself this relief” 
(191, 254). Behind the locked door Margaret can pursue her emotional process without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Matus focuses on the moments in North and South where Margaret experiences intense emotions that 
have “destabilizing effects . . . on identity and self-knowledge,” including when she swoons after the 
policeman leaves; yet, the only agency Matus appears to grant Margaret is through unconscious or 
impulsive acts (such as when she mechanically lies to the policeman (74, 79-81). Because of her focus on 
interiority, Matus does not discuss Margaret’s attempts to deal with strong emotion behind closed doors 




encroachment, or, as is the case when the policeman leaves and Margaret takes refuge in 
her room, she can sit tight until her “numbed faculties” return to working order (283).   
Such moments and the corollary, metaphoric use of domestic spaces like 
“cupboards” to figure Margaret’s psyche reveal her ability to partition and privatize her 
psyche. We should not, however, lose sight of the causal relationship between space and 
psyche that allows for the metaphoric correlation to have any significance29; rather, the 
influence of her environment becomes a powerful tool by which Margaret can take some 
control over her mental life.30 Such portrayals of the domestic space – or the country or 
city-street – remind us that the psyche is not a discrete system but is quite integrated with 
an external world. They also remind us of the ability of individuals and society at large to 
control the environment controlling them. 
Such practices might, however, increase Margaret’s metamorphosis via “town 
life” as she spends a good deal of her time “pent-up” in the Hale home – a spatial 
condition that “of itself is enough to induce depression and worry of spirits,” as we saw 
earlier. Yet, Margaret remains in a constant negotiation with the shaping forces around 
here, so that her control of space is not simply her ability to close psychic and physical 
barriers but to control them. Margaret’s control of domicile barriers becomes an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In their introduction to Domestic Spaces, Bryden and Floyd similarly point to how domestic space 
“participated in the formation of the psychical lives of those who inhabited it” while also mentioning how 
“the household interior becomes a metaphor for the psyche,” thus implying if not overtly stating the 
conjunction of causal and metaphorical aspects to the self / home relationship. More directly, Sharon 
Marcus points to the architectural determinism in Victorian thought and, particularly, architectural theory, 
showing how the belief in a physical structure’s “agency” over the human mind “contributed to the ease 
with which [the structure] could becomes personified as subjects that spoke to or influenced human beings” 
(118). My effort here largely builds from this understanding, which I argue allows for, amongst other 
structures of determinism, personal agency in subject formation. 
30 For this reason, I disagree with Deffenbacher’s account of the “psychic barriers” or purely symbolic 
figurations of Margaret’s psyche as well as with her sense that Margaret is able to “elude the determining 
influence of her spatial environment” through these imaginary practices of compartmentalization (124-25).	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important and repeated image throughout North and South, and it becomes a means for 
her to control psychological states and an important aspect of the independence integral 
to her sense of self. We have already seen that keeping an open window in the Hale home 
is a “country habit” that affords a sense of casual comfort, and we have also seen in 
reference to Heston shopkeepers how closed vs. open windows and doors has an 
inevitable affect on sociability – thus, while symbolic, the open window also has a causal 
relationship to sympathetic identification.31 The open window also has a mutually 
symbolic and causal influence on one’s psychological state, as is evident when Margaret, 
after John Thornton’s proposal, feels the closed bedroom fill with her own anxieties until 
“She went to the window, and threw it open, to dispel the oppression which hung around 
her” (198). While the air in Milton is, we know, less revivifying than air in the country, it 
can still prove more beneficent than the stifled air of a room.  
In addition to opening up the home to outside air, Margaret also proves eager quit 
the household in an effort to find emotional release and/ personal efficacy. After Mrs. 
Thornton reproaches Margaret based on rumor, and after Margaret indignantly leaves the 
room to shut herself up in her own, she begins to pace “in her old habitual way of 
showing agitation” (321). But realizing that “every step was heard from one room to 
another,” she sits down until Mrs. Thornton is heard leaving the house and then leaves 
the room and home altogether, “going rapidly towards the country” (323). Thus, 
Margaret uses spatial practices to express and affect her psychological state: she is aware 
of her behaviors within spatial-social context and takes control of the barriers of that 
space to suit her needs.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Moore makes a similar point in her discussion of “Libbie Marsh’s Three Eras,” 84. 
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Margaret’s control over domestic barriers is not limited to her own home, either. 
At the Thornton house, she leaves on her own will, and she earlier “threw the window 
wide open” on her own accord so as to get a better view of the strike mob outside (177). 
As a frequent visitor to the people of Helstone, Margaret became used to crossing the 
thresholds of others, and we see her continue this behavior in Milton. In one notable 
scene, Margaret even blocks the door of the Higgins home so that Nicholas cannot go out 
and drink (220-21). By taking control over domestic barriers, Margaret reveals her 
agency, controls her psychological state, and also seeks to affect the behaviors of others. 
Margaret’s spatial control points to the importance of agency and efficacy to 
Margaret’s psyche and self, as well as to the value of having a variety of duties. After 
learning about the severity of her mother’s illness, but knowing there is nothing she can 
presently do, Margaret goes out, and “the length of a street—yes, the air of a Milton 
Street—cheered her young blood before she reached her first turning” (132). Rather than 
let the mood of the house stifle her, Margaret wills herself out into streets that revivify 
her. While Margaret takes control of her physical mobility, thereby affecting her 
psychological state, she also makes the choice to visit the Higgins rather than the nearby 
fields; “It would not be so refreshing as a quiet country walk, but still it would perhaps be 
doing the kinder thing” (132). Here, Margaret makes a difficult choice between a country 
indulgence to brighten her spirits and a social good. Both afford a sense of agency and 
freedom, but the latter affords a greater sense of personal efficacy.  
Much of Margaret’s spatial practices amount to her exertion of agency, a 
willingness to take action, to be useful. Within the home, Margaret cultivates productive 
activity – whenever Gaskell depicts visitors to the Hale home, Margaret is always set to 
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some small task – and this greatly distinguishes her from the urban indolence of Edith 
and Fanny as well as from the poor domestic economy exhibited by the Higgins girls. 
Such habits also become a tool for dealing with her emotional states; for instance, when 
she learns that the legal attempts to set Frederick’s record straight are meeting little 
success, she becomes agitated, but then “she rose up, and determined at once to set to on 
some work which should take her out of herself” (345). Such moments may be minor in 
the scope of the narrative, but they point to habits that become integral to Margaret’s 
character, as well as to key scenes of the text. In the face of extreme situations, 
Margaret’s habit is to take action, such as when she protects John Thornton at the strike 
or agrees to tell Mrs. Boucher of her husband’s death (after all others refused to do so). 
All in all, Milton does have its effect on Margaret, but it is one specific to her, 
shaped by her own spatial practices and disposition. “If you live in Milton, you must 
learn to have a brave heart,” Mrs. Thornton tells Margaret the first time they meet, and 
Margaret is willing to learn this lesson (116). Only a year or so later, Margaret assures 
Frederick that she can accompany him to the train station and then walk back home 
alone, explaining “‘I am getting very brave and hard. It is a well-lighted road all the way 
home, if it should be dark. But I was out last week much later’” (262). Margaret’s hard 
quality likens hers to the inflexible and iron nature of other Milton folk, and Margaret is 
herself aware of this transformation. She is led to reflect on how much she has changed, 
like Frederick, in the eight years since the mutiny, eight years spent mostly in London 
and Milton. This part of her life had “produced such great changes in herself . . . . [H]er 
tastes and feelings had so materially altered” (248). Gaskell’s choice to incorporate 
“materially” is noteworthy, indicating the materialism that informs her understanding of 
	  
191	  	  
how tastes, feelings, and subjects are altered – and the correlation with Frederick only 
reinforces this materialist reading.   
After the deaths of her mother and father, Margaret’s Aunt Shaw comes to 
retrieve her and insists they return to London as Margaret “would never regain her lost 
strength while she stayed in Milton” (363). In London, though, Margaret feels as though 
an inmate in luxury and is little inclined to engage with this environment, spending much 
of her time, instead, longing for her independent, Milton life (372). Finding London at 
odds with her habits and desires, Margaret makes for Helstone only to find that it is no 
longer the place she once knew. Her home has been remodeled, a school has been added, 
“a tree gone here, bough there, bringing in a long ray of light . . . a road was trimmed and 
narrowed, and the green straggling pathway by its side enclosed and cultivated. A great 
improvement it was called; but Margaret sighed over the old picturesqueness, the old 
gloom, and the grassy wayside of former days” (394). Its wild freedom mitigated, 
Helstone has become a produced space like any other, a space that is conditioned by 
individual and social agency, reflecting the needs and values of the inhabitants. 
Particularly significant is the narrowed road and enclosed pathway that curtail the 
wayward habits of foot and thought – the word “narrowed” recalling the correlation 
between the factory workers’ monotonous lives and narrow interests.   
Because Helstone’s own unique structure of influence has been altered, the 
subjectivity it affords has also been changed, leading to Margaret’s crisis of self.  There is 
also the sense that, if Helstone can become modernized, so too can the pure interiority it 
symbolized and effected. No longer can she rely on the clear dichotomy of north and 
south and no longer can she assume some deep, inner self will always remain unchanged. 
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She feels her own “individual nothingness” and laments: “I am …so tired of being 
whirled on through all these phases of my life, in which nothing abides by me, no 
creature, no place” (400). Yet, upon Margaret’s later reflection, she realizes “I too change 
perpetually—now this, now that—now disappointed . . . because all is not exactly as I 
had pictured it, and now suddenly discovering that the reality is far more beautiful than I 
had imagined it” (401). Here, Margaret realizes the inevitability that places and selves 
will change, and that both she and Helstone have changed for the better. In this case, both 
have taken a firmer or more rigid feature, even as they retain much of their former 
brightness and warmth. Thus, we must note that Margaret, like Helstone, has not just 
changed for the sake of changing, for the evolutionary directive of progress through 
variation. Instead, Margaret has adapted herself and her surroundings to retain and 
cultivate certain core qualities of self, even if, at times, it required sacrificing past habits 
and affects.32 Margaret has changed, but this change has been a negotiation between her 
own desires and the structural influences of the environments she has inhabited, each one 
providing new influences and thus new effects within the structure of her own selfhood.  
While Margaret has effected a great deal of agency in the control of her 
psychological condition and her developing sense of self, her agency has not always been 
entire. Of course, as Priestley argued, choices do not happen in a vacuum, so all agency is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mariaconcentta Constantini outlines a thorough and intriguing analysis of North and South from a 
evolutionary perspective, and while I am sympathetic to her sense of Margaret’s ability to adapt to her 
environment, I do think this argument, or rather its lens, falls short in a few critical ways. The key issue is 
in how Constantini represents Margaret as always seeking change and how, in a Darwinian sense, change 
necessarily equals progress. Yet, Margaret appears quite resistant to change at times, though, particularly 
when she first arrives at Milton and when she returns to Helstone, as we have just seen. Furthermore, we 
have seen how environmental determinisms do not always effect positive changes – indeed, one can 
become insensible so as to deal with the cold weather or overwhelming stimulus. Rather, Gaskell presents a 
much more conscientious approach to adaption that is predicated on reason and agency rather (simply) 
biological directives. For another look at North and South and evolution, see Martin’s “Gaskell, Darwin, 
and North and South,” which focuses on social Darwinism and the novel’s emphasis on struggle. 
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to a degree contingent on one’s circumstances. Margaret has had the advantage of 
experiencing numerous structures of influence and gleaning from each their potential 
effects on subjectivity, from which she has been able to make decision about what 
aspects of self she would like to cultivate; even so, she has been forced to deal with 
present contexts that do not always abide by the structures of subjectivity she wishes to 
cultivate – and we have seen this tension and negotiation played out in her Milton 
narrative. In short, Margaret still lacks control of her own mobility; up until now, she has 
been unable to choose the structures of influence that best suit her desired subjectivity. 
Yet, Margaret has already shown a degree of agency in her mobility within 
Milton, and her decisions to move back to London is her own choice, even if that choice 
is encouraged by others. Her subsequent visit to Helstone is her choice as well, which 
comes in response to her sudden recollection that London life was a constrictive one. At 
her Aunt Shaw’s, she finds herself “an inmate” to the monotony that “the wheels of 
machinery of daily life” – a clear reference to industrial labor and an invocation of the 
rigidity it produces (372). Even more significantly, after Helstone, when Mr. Bell has 
returned to Oxford where his health takes a sudden turn for the worse, Margaret insists on 
visiting him, even by herself if she must, to the protest of her London company. The 
gesture of agency even catches her off guard: “she was surprised herself at the firmness 
with which she asserted something of her right to independence of action” (411). There is 
in this moment already a sense of how Milton has changed Margaret, who once accepted 
the luxurious prison of London, a sense of how Milton has afforded Margaret the 
hardness and bravery necessary to demand the independence that was so easily accessed 
(and so much beloved) in Helstone. 
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In taking increased agency over her own geographic movements, Margaret has, at 
the same time, taken full control over her subject formation. After visiting Oxford, and 
another brief stay in London, Margaret begins to plan where she will go next – and her 
choices are telling. At first, she hopes to travel to Cadiz to see her brother; and while the 
desire for familial comfort is at work in this choice, we must recall, too, how Margaret 
saw Spain’s climate as much improving Frederick’s character, a hope she might wish for 
herself. Yet, in realizing the improbability of a trip to Spain, she accepts that “she would 
have to content herself with Cromer,” but here the choice has little to do with her desire 
to accompany the London set.  Instead, Margaret sees that this place might be “the best 
for her. She needs bodily strengthening and bracing as well as rest” (414). The 
physiological bolstering and psychological recuperation – the effects of Cromer’s 
structure of influence – become the decisive qualities in Margaret’s first application of 
her new-found independence. Gaskell had her own affinity for the rural, seaside towns, 
and how it allowed her to escape, albeit momentarily, from the anxieties of Manchester,33 
and certainly Margaret chooses to undergo a similar convalescence. Watching the shore 
for long hours, noting the slightly agitated but “perpetual motion” of the waves, looking 
“out upon the more distant heave,” Margaret has a psycho-physiological experience 
(“She was soothed without knowing how or why”) bordering on the religious (she “heard, 
without being conscious of hearing, the eternal psalm”) (414).  Of course, to conjoin 
environmental influence with the divine is not at all surprising given Gaskell’s 
background; Priestley’s belief in necessitarianism held that all determinisms and natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Gaskell’s letters show that she was frequently prescribed the ameliorating effects of rural or seaside 
climate, either for herself and her daughter Marianne, and these prescriptions were often followed in the 
form of vacations to rural and/or coastal locations like Poulton-Le Sands, the family’s Boughton House, 
and Silverdale. See Chapple 83; and Foster 24. 
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laws led back to the same first cause, the creator. “The system of necessity makes every 
man the maker of his own fortune,” Priestley claims, and such is one’s “intercourse with 
the Deity” who through these determinisms condescends to offer the “familiar light of a 
parent or governor” (Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity 503-4).  Even in in this divine 
moment, Margaret’s selfhood is material, malleable, inherently unstable, but this selfhood 
is also autonomous and spiritual. Through the revivification Margaret acquires for herself 
via a beneficial, and beneficent, structure of influence, she is able to take stock of her life; 
this context for reflection “enabled Margaret to put events in their right places” (415). 
Margaret, it would seem, has cultivated a desired subjectivity that in turn has allowed her 
a profound degree of psychological control, an agency that will beget more agency. And 
this most recent change to her subjectivity and sense of self is apparent in “the look that 
Margaret’s face was gradually acquiring”; certainly, “Mr. Henry Lennox was excessively 
struck by the change” (415).  
As a way of concluding, I would like to place two narrative moments in proximity 
to show how Gaskell’s novel has shifted from a self-fashioning mode to one of 
environmental self-fashioning. In the first chapter, a London-placed Margaret is forced to 
try on Indian shawls bought for Edith, the latter being disinclined towards the garments 
and the “gipsy” life with which they are associated (7). Gaskell writes:  
Margaret’s tall, finely made figure, in the black silk dress which she was 
wearing as mourning for some distant relative of her father’s, set off the 
long folds of the gorgeous shawls . . . . Occasionally, as she was turned 
round, she caught a glimpse of herself in the mirror over the chimney-
piece, and smiled at her own appearance there – the familiar features in the 
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usual garb of a princess. She touched the shawls gently as they hung 
around her, and took a pleasure in their soft feel and their brilliant colours. 
(9)  
With little narrative yet in place, the scene is all subtle and unstable allusion. Certainly 
the shawls have come from India, sent by Captain Lennox for Edith to try on so that she 
might wear them in Corfu. Yet, their significance to Margaret is never quite clear – but 
nonetheless we see something significant in her reaction to them. There is something she 
sees in the “brilliant colours” set off against the more austere black dress that accords 
well with her character, or, at least, the character she would like to be. She looks to Henry 
Lennox, who has just entered, “with a bright, amused face” (9). 
At the end of the novel, in Cromer, Henry is again witness to Margaret’s fashions 
and self-fashioning.  Henry comments on Margaret’s appearance, suggesting that “[t]he 
sea has done Miss Hale an immense deal of good” (415). Edith argues, self-importantly, 
that it is because of the bonnet she bought for Margaret, but Henry retorts: “I believe I 
know the difference between the charms of dress and the charms of a woman. No mere 
bonnet would have made Miss Hale’s eyes so lustrous and yet so soft, or her lips so ripe 
and red—and her face altogether so full of peace and light.—She is like, and yet more . . . 
. like the Margaret Hale of Helstone.” (415). Henry is right to associate Margaret’s 
luminous aspect with place, even if he fails to identify what exactly is the “more.” Before 
him, of course, is not just the Margaret of Helstone, rather the Margaret who has been 
industrially fortified through her Milton experience and then revivified through her 
southern travels. A vagabond unbounded by one locality but connected to many, 
Margaret Hale has successfully embodied the iron strength of Milton-Northern in 
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Darkshire while still exuding the bright warmth of the south. Alike but different from the  
Margaret before, the one who saw in the mirror an ideal self, the one whose dual-nature 
was defined by an austere black dress and a brightly colored shawl. By the novel’s close, 
this initial fashioning through clothes has become a more intrinsic and more willful 















CHAPTER 4 – ‘INFLUENCE OF LOCALITY’: DICKENS’S ENVIRONMENTAL  
 




In Physiology of Common Life (1859), G. H. Lewes provides a definition for life 
as “the dynamical condition of the Organism" (2: 415). This “dynamical condition” 
equates to “the mutual relations of organism and medium that determine the 
manifestations we name Life; and the error is great when men attempt to solve vital 
problems without duly taking all external conditions into account” (2: 426, 436).  To 
explain the relation between mental being and place, Lewes adopts a Lamarckian view of 
psychology as Herbert Spencer had, suggesting that organisms acquire “characters and 
tendencies” through environment-mediated activities (2: 382). Lewes’s definition of life 
and understanding of the psyche offers a way to understand how organisms engage with 
their world as well as a standard by which to critique psychological verisimilitude in 
fiction. Adopting such a standard, Lewes famously criticizes Charles Dickens’ portrayal 
of human subjects, who have been given “mechanisms for minds, puppets for characters” 
(“Dickens in Relation to Criticism” 148). These figures, Lewes argues, act mechanically 
in response to external situations, suggesting that they do not learn or adapt in any clear 
or meaningful way. Their behaviors are “calculable”; they are like “frogs whose brains 
have been taken out for physiological purposes, and whose actions henceforth want the 
distinctive peculiarity of organic action” (148). 
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Lewes’s reproach brought scientific authority to similar complaints raised by 
literary critics of the time; George Eliot, for instance, had already praised Dickens’ 
“utmost power of rendering the external traits” but lamented the lack of “psychological 
character” in his fictional subjects (451). Both Lewes’s and Eliot’s complaints – the one 
outwardly focused, the other inwardly searching – have been critical touchstones ever 
since. What has resulted is a rather nuanced discourse over the status of subjectivity, 
ontology, and identity in Dickens’ fiction.1 Contemporary criticism has often accepted 
the supposed flatness of these characters, reframing it in some positive way.2 Others have 
sought to reclaim a sense of internal, psychological depth.3 Only a relative few of have 
prioritized external behaviors of Dickens’s characters, such as habits and mannerisms.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For more on the debate over Dickens’s characters, see Chase 96-98; Rosenberg 6-30; Vrettos 2000, 401.  
2 Ian Duncan argues that Bleak House can be read “as a massive critique of the humanist project of free 
indirect discourse” (19). See also James Buzard, Disorienting Fiction (2005) 120-134.  Karen Chase 
concedes the “incompleteness” of Dickens’s characterization, finding his fictional subjects to be inflexible 
and limited “features of personality,” going on to make the creative yet questionable argument that “If we 
must agree with Lewes that Dickens’s characters lack the ‘complexity of the organism,’ we can yet recover 
‘organic action’ by taking a wider view. The plot is the relevant organism, because the plot is a system of 
embodied personal forces—guilt, aggression, innocence, authority, punishment, desire” (103). James 
Kincaid agrees that “we come to the novels equipped to detect a real essence behind that role, a face behind 
the mask. But in Dickens we are forced to wonder,” but, he argues that the portrayal of roles and 
roleplaying is a deliberate questioning of the stability of selfhood (82, 77). Michael Kearns both agrees 
with Lewes but still explores Dickens’s depiction of internal psychic processes (138).    
3 Beth Herst and Andrew Miller similarly point to the alienated and fragmented psyches of Dickens’s 
characters, which result from modern life. John Kucich, focusing on repression, explores these characters’ 
“inwardly initiated self-conflicts” (246). For scholarship that more clearly engages Dickens’s portrayal of 
interior processes with the psychological theory of his era, see Harvey Sucksmith on memory (1970,166-
180), and Nicholas Dames on déjà vu (129-147), Jill Matus on trauma (83-120), Kearns on tensions 
between reason and emotion (136-140), Anna Neill on mental disorders, particularly epilepsy, and Fred 
Kaplan on mesmerism (106-138). 
4 Mary Noble discusses Darwin's use of Dickens’s descriptions of expression for his own The Expression of 
Emotions (1871), which affirms the psychological / biological realism of Dickens’s characters, at least in 
Darwin’s eyes. Vrettos makes the argument that the sometimes mechanical quality of characters in 
Dickens’s novels reflects the “competing narratives of mental flexibility and rigidity in nineteenth-century 
psychological writings” concerning the effects of habit (400); thus, it is precisely their repetitive aspects 
that prove their psychological realism.  Interestingly, Vrettos points to evidence in Dickens’s work of 
“mental permeability and intersubjective exchange that radically challenged the boundaries of mind and 
coherence of the self” (411). While Vrettos claims this as a particular interest, she glosses over the subject. 
I hope to offer a more developed study of mental permeability in Dickens’s work, prioritizing the 
reciprocity between subject and place and its role in cohering a sense of self.	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It is unfortunate, both for Dickens scholarship and for our critical grasp of the 
Victorian subject, that none of the relevant criticism has fully explored nor taken clear 
aim at Lewes’s primary criticism: the inability of Dickens’ characters to engage with 
their ecological mediums in reflexive, effective, and ultimately realistic ways. This 
omission highlights the general tendency in criticism to privilege the inward portrayal of 
character (much like Eliot does) and to neglect what psychological and evolutionary 
theorists of the mid-nineteenth-century were telling their contemporaries: the way 
subjects engage with their environment not only reveals their psychological capabilities, 
but also determines who they are and what they will become. These theories had taken a 
firm grasp on the literary culture of Britain by the time Dickens began writing his final 
completed novel, Our Mutual Friend, and to neglect the manner in which characters in 
this novel engage with and adapt to their environments is thus to ignore Dickens’s own 
evolving portrayal of the human subject. Furthermore, allowing Lewes’s criticism to go 
unchecked has encouraged scholarship to overlook Dickens’s efforts to portray urban 
organisms rather than urban puppets, efforts that highlight not simply the experience of 
the urban world but also the ways in which these characters respond in reflexive and 
adaptive ways. In this chapter, I argue that Dickens strives for a form of mimesis founded 
on biological and psychological principles and that the characters of Our Mutual Friend 
engage their diegetic environment in the adaptive and dynamic ways. By focusing more 
on external behavior in context to the world rather than on enclosed interiority, Dickens 
creates characters that his audience must meet, read, and learn in the same manner they 
would meet, read, and learn subjects in their own lives. 
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By the 1860s, Dickens had read  various forms of ecological discourse and 
adaptive psychology.5 Furthermore, he was aware of the pressure evolutionary theory 
placed on subjects to acquire tendencies and characteristics so as to be well fitted with the 
external medium. He was equally aware that all environments – even highly constructed 
and civilized ones – were still ecological spaces that operated on the same laws of 
environmental engagement and competition. All this is evident when Mr. Boffin 
acknowledges to Mrs. Boffin, after their drastic social ascension via inherited wealth:  
Our old selves wouldn’t do here, old Lady. Haven’t you found that out 
yet? Our old selves would be fit for nothing here but to be robbed and 
imposed upon. Our old selves weren’t people of fortune; our new selves 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Dickens owned many books espousing an associationist and/or Lamarckian perspective of the human 
mind, both of which stressed the adaptive capacity of psychology in response to the external world. 
Dickens owned Lewes’s Physiology and Bell’s Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with 
the Fine Arts (1806), the latter of which points to “the adaptation of the mind to the various relations in 
which man is placed” and that “the sensibility of the external surface of the body is a special endowment 
adapted to the elements around and calculated to protect the interior parts from injury”  (83, 86). Both 
Lewes and Bell stress the acquisition of traits by the individual organism, putting them in line with 
Lamarck’s own	  belief in acquired traits. Of course, both of these texts were written before Darwin’s Origin 
of Species (1859), which Dickens owned and which referenced Spencer’s Principles as the best work yet 
written on the evolution of the human mind.  Dickens also owned a number of books that took an 
associationist approach to the human mind, and thus an approach that stressed the mind’s acquisition from 
and adaption to the external world, including Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1824 ed.), 
Hume’s Essays Treatises on several subjects (Edinburgh 1825 ed.), Dugald Stewart's Elements of the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792), John Chapman’s The Purpose of Existence popular considered, in 
relation to the Origin, Development, and Destiny of the Human Mind (1850). In addition to theoretical 
works on human physiology, psychology, and evolution, Dickens also owned a wide variety of travel 
narratives with anthropological interests and books on natural history, including works by Cuvier, Buffon, 
Bewick, and Gilbert White, whose Natural History of Selborne [1825] has been described recently by Amy 
King as a pioneer in establishing an ecological world-view; see J.J. Stonehouse ed. Reprints of the 
Catalogues of the Libraries of Charles Dickens and W. M. Thackeray 1935. Dickens also wrote an article 
for All the Year Round entitled “Transmutation of the Species,” which includes a discussion of Benoit De 
Miallet’s, Lamarck’s, and Darwin’s theories of transmutation. Dickens did not own Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology, but even if he never read Principles he would have come across Spencer’s general argument in 
Lewes’s Physiology as well as in an article by Spencer in The Westminster Review, “A Theory of 
Population, deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility,” that argues against Malthus’ theory of 
population by utilizing Spencer’s own theory of human evolution and adaption. It is worth noting that 




are . . . . And we must be up to the difference . . . we must be equal to the 
change.  (464)  
Stressing fitness to context, Mr. Boffin knows the dangers that their new, aristocratic 
environs pose to them – environs that Dickens terms “the dismal swamp” in reference to 
the myriad human “alligators” who attempt to make prey of the Boffins (213).  Here, 
Dickens is in line with the scientists of his time but runs counter to a Victorian tendency 
to hold human civilization as separate from the world of beasts. As Herbert Spencer 
argues, “the environment of each organism comprehends all those other organisms 
existing within its sphere of life,” and “the most important and most numerous changes in 
the environment, with which each creature has to deal, are the changes exhibited by other 
creatures, whether prey or enemies” (382). Survival in the city is like survival in any 
other ecological system, and, throughout Our Mutual Friend, Dickens highlights the 
successes and failures of characters to adapt to the urban sphere. 
By taking an approach that stresses adaptive psychology and the biological 
foundation of urban experience, I hope to reclaim a sense of agency as well as a degree of 
ontological and epistemological stability for the urban subject in Dickens’s fiction. 
Through such agency and stability urban subjects could maintain and even fashion their 
subjectivity rather than have it be consistently subjugated to external, modern, social 
forces. Particularly when addressing the urban experience of Dickens’s characters, 
scholars have performed a double deconstruction: they have claimed the urban space to 
be illegible, a chaotic space of undistinguishable localities and overwhelming 
phenomena, and they have connected this to a pervasive experience of alienation and 
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estrangement that deconstructs identity and even threatens one’s essential humanity.6  In 
this chapter, I reestablish the urban subject within a legible ecological locality. To be 
more precise, I argue that we cannot assume one kind of urban experience that 
determines one kind of subjectivity. Rather, we must first understand the complexity of 
the urban environment as providing both an infinite number of threats to survival but also 
an infinite number of ways to adapt. Second, we must recognize the ways in which 
characters acquire an environmental literacy – an ability to read place and other subjects 
within it – allowing for the epistemic stability necessary for one’s cognitive 
correspondence with the external world. Third, through the creation of a productive 
correspondence, selfhood is no longer destabilized by place; rather, physical localities 
become a productive and even necessary means for reconstituting subjective states of 
being and a sense of self. Even in moments where subjectivity is formed through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In The Country and the City (1973), Raymond Williams points to the “the coexistence of variation and 
apparent randomness with what had in the end to be seen as a determining system,” thus leading to a 
“common condition and destiny” (154).  Williams also writes, “Dickens’s ultimate vision of London is then 
not to be illustrated by topography or local instance. It lies in the form of his novels” (154); Williams 
makes clear that what is alienated in the urban system is some essentially human quality, though it is not an 
“absolute” obliteration (1970, 124).  Some combination of Williams’ sense of a pervasive, determined 
alienation, the shift from geographical place to language as focus, and the sense of some essential human 
quality lost is by and large repeated in recent scholarship on urban experience in Dickens’s novels. In his 
“Reading Dickens Writing London,” Murray Baumgarten writes: “As place is destabilized, time may warp 
too, and the spatio-temporal instability becomes a feature of character identity, a sociological reality, a 
psychic condition, and a moral destiny” (224); see also Baumgarten 2006. Efraim Sicher claims that “[t]he 
city’s geography is mapped out through the reading of signs—linguistic as well as topographical – but the 
itinerary works against mimeses and represents the city’s illegibility by making it visible” (xix). For loss	  of	  
psychological	  control	  in	  the	  urban	  space	  in	  regards	  to	  Our	  Mutual	  Friend,	  see	  Robert	  Alter,	  50.	  See	  
Jeremy	  Tambling	  201,	  See	  Wolfreys	  1996;	  in	  his	  2012	  book	  on	  Dickens,	  Wolfreys	  similarly	  suggests	  
“if	  subjectivity	  is	  always	  tied	  to	  place,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  and	  if,	  moreover,	  place	  is	  not	  fixed	  as	  a	  series	  
of	  objects	  but	  protean	  .	  .	  .	  then	  subjectivity	  is	  always	  unstable”	  (2012,	  160).	  For	  Wolfreys,	  “Dickensian	  
subjectivity	  is	  always	  estranged”	  because	  “London	  shapes	  –	  or	  deforms	  –	  subjectivity”	  (2012,	  70,	  76).	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language and performance, the stability of place proves necessary for the stabilization of 
these more abstract and ephemeral methods of subject formation.7  
Like the precursors discussed in the previous chapter, Our Mutual Friend offers a 
paradigm of environmental self-fashioning as it highlights the influence of various 
localities and the capacity of characters to not only recognize external influences but also 
utilize and alter the external environment so as to promote and control self-formation.  
Like Wordsworth, Dickens depicts an environmental epistemology; but rather than 
exemplify the capacity to gain knowledge and meaning from the environment for the 
sake of creative prowess, Dickens shows how such a capacity is necessary for survival in 
the urban milieu. While highlighting the environmental literacy of characters – their 
ability to read both the environment and other organisms within it – Dickens requires his 
own readers to forgo their dependence on free indirect discourse and to begin to develop 
an environmental literacy of their own, a literacy that Lewes either lacked or failed to 
bring to his reading chair. The other form of adaptive psychology that Dickens develops 
is the role of cultural artifacts, such as the home, to serve as extensions of psychological 
functions. Like Wordsworth, then, Dickens recognizes the potential for external objects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I must be clear here – I do not mean to suggest that physical place and language are two separate variables 
in subject formation – certainly, language informs how one views the environment while environmental 
circumstances in turn shape and limit language. Still, Dickens’s novel shows that construction of self via 
language or role-playing is insufficient on its own. To alter selfhood regardless of place is to create a false 
correspondence, is to make place a theatrical space in which selfhood is wildly abstract and unstable. But 
by correlating the projects of language and environmental self-formation, a more productive and stable 
identity can be fostered. For scholarship on self-formation through language or role play, see James 
Kincaid, who argues convincingly that while “roles or role playing almost inevitably suggest to us a 
departure from a real self,” we should see in Dickens work an effort to question “the idea of selfhood as an 
isolated and stable entity” (77). Baumgarten (2001) and Cheadle both stress a similar sense of 
performativity as being integral to Dickens’s sense of character. John Farrell, who sees in Our Mutual 
Friend a “dialogical self” that is achieved via personal interaction, also suggests identity as influx and as a 
culmination of social experience. Pam Morris similarly looks to Our Mutual Friend and identifies a “lack 
of any stable or coherent meaning to 'I' [that] puts the self in process, enabling a continuous, contingent 
invention of identity as performance,” a performance that general happens in language, and with various 
levels of efficacy (2006, 205).  
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to assist in epistemic gain, but Dickens more clearly portrays how particular artifacts (like 
the home itself) become a form of prosthesis of the psyche – quite literally a technology 
of the self. More so than the previous texts, then, Dickens externalizes the human psyche 
to the point that the self is relational with the external world but also concretized within 
it, providing characters a greater ability to consider the person they are and to achieve the 
person they want to become. 
 
Dickens’s Ecology and Environmental Literacy 
 
 
Much of the scholarship on the landscapes and cityscapes in Our Mutual Friend 
has prioritized the symbolic valences of place.8 What gets lost in such an approach is 
Dickens’s depiction of a realistic engagement with the environment, an engagement 
based on material realities and adaptive capacities as they were understood by the science 
of the nineteenth century. For instance, these scholars prioritize moments of transcendent 
transformation through symbols of baptism – particularly in the narratives of Eugene 
Wrayburn and John Harmon – rather than recognizing the novel’s more pervasive 
portrayal of adaptive behavior, the latter proving a more stable, biologically-oriented, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For symbolic readings of Dickens’s cityscapes, see Alexander Welsh’s The City of Dickens, Karl Ashley 
Smith’s Dickens and the Unreal City, and Avrom Fleisham’s “The City and the River: Dickens’s Symbolic 
Landscape.” Other symbolic readings, which largely focus on the Thames as a source of spiritual 
regeneration, has caused critics to focus on the sudden transformations of John Harmon and particularly 
Eugene Wrayburn while they leave unexplored the slower adaptive processes exhibited by other characters. 
Smith, while focusing on this symbolism, points to the “river’s failures to signify in a religious way” (162). 
Adelene Buckland specifically challenges an evolutionary reading of Our Mutual Friend suggesting instead 
a geological catastrophism that stress transformation rather than adaptation (691). Even Catherine 
Gallagher stresses “the novel's use of apparent death and resurrection as a metaphor” (107), and Sicher, 
who spends much of his attention on sanitary conditions, largely reads the river via religious symbolism 
(346-369). Elizabeth Ermarth takes a	  somewhat different but still symbol-oriented approach as she focuses 
much of her reading on the river and dust mounds as “emblems for the linear flow of time and the 
disconnected heaps of rubbish produced by it” (197).	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realistic form of self-development. Dickens lends his diegetic setting a firm, biological 
groundwork, and in conjunction with his persistent portrayal of adaptive processes, 
Dickens ultimately depicts in this novel a scientifically accurate view of the engagement 
between a subject and their environmental niche. This model provides a causal 
foundation for much of the novel’s symbolic content, particularly as applied to the 
interconnection of place and psychological behavior.  
 Much like Gaskell’s depiction of Milton men, whose iron constitutions and grey 
dispositions reflected the influence of the industrial city, Dickens signifies the 
deterministic effects of place by creating semblances between the characters and their 
environment. We see it in the form of the Veneerings, as new as their new home (6); in 
Young Blight, as “dismal” as his “dismal window” above a “dismal” churchyard (86), 
and in Mr. Lammle and his cohorts, who shared with Mr. Lammle’s office “strong points 
of general resemblance” (261). The most obvious example, however, is the semblance 
between Gaffer Hexam and the muddy, polluted Thames. Dickens highlights the 
environmental influence of the polluted Thames – in fact, he names it – when Eugene 
Wrayburn and Mortimer Lightwood explore the riverside in search of Hexam. After 
Eugene expresses his feeling that the environment has permeated him, Mortimer pithily 
responds: “Influence of locality” (164). The polluted water and its “spoiling influences” 
affect everything around it, from the buildings and boats to the bodies and minds of those 
who inhabit its shores: even “the water-side heads . . . (like the water) were none the 
clearest” and “harbored muddled notions” (172, 63).  
Through this proliferation of place / person semblance, Dickens’s proves more 
successful than Gaskell in pointing to the micro-localities within the urban environment 
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and their unique structures of influence. The London of Our Mutual Friend proves not 
the monochrome Milton-Northern nor the city of fog in Bleak House but rather a 
conglomeration of waterways, streets, deserts, churchyards, parks and sanctuaries, 
varnished dining rooms, and dusty parlors. Equally significant in Dickens’s portrayal is 
that these micro-localities are not discrete but rather overlapping or nested.9 The blurring 
between localities and their structures of influence becomes clear in the depiction of 
water-side alleys covered in mud from “ill-savoured tides” (24), or when Dickens refers 
to the “back-alleys of water” created by the complex of docks on the Thames (171). The 
polluted river proves a key example of how the material conditions and influences of one 
locality could overreach its own boundaries. Whether it be the physical waste that drained 
into the Thames or the “moral sewage” that lived on its banks, such elements would not 
stay confined to its banks (21).10 While some of the “influence” here works on an abstract 
or symbolic level, we must not lose sight of the ecological underpinnings that tie the rest 
of the city to the Thames. Under such an ecological model, no space is truly discrete and 
no object or subject is truly autonomous, all are interconnected. The pervasive dust 
reinforces this condition, as it gets into the nested homes and even the nested minds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I use the term “nested” here as I did in the introduction, where I referred to Malpas’s sense that smaller 
localities “however well-defined and apparently self-contained, remain open to [external] influences and 
resonate so to speak, in response to them” (29). 
10 Pamela Gilbert’s “Medical Mapping: the Thames, the Body, and Our Mutual Friend” provides a 
compelling discussion of the polluted Thames’ influence on the health of the city, pointing in particular to 
the impact of John Snow’s studies on sanitation on the potential for filth in one area to contaminate water 
elsewhere; in “A More Expansive Reach: the Geography of the Thames in Our Mutual Friend,” Michelle 
Allen also points to “the river’s topographic and imaginary reach” in Our Mutual Friend, as a totality that 
extend across “an assemblage of local communities” as well as the river’s impact on the city’s global image 
(88, 90).	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characters – after falling into dust pile, Silas Wegg has his sense “brushed…into him and 
the dust out of him”  (489).11   
Within this environmental context, Dickens’s characters feel strongly the sway of 
external influence, but they do not remain passive to external forces. Instead, they prove 
active and adaptive agents in a reciprocal relationship with place. While I will contest 
Lewes’s conclusion throughout this chapter, I vehemently agree that the way in which 
subjects engage with their environment should be integral to how we read character, as it 
reveals conscious choices about who subjects are and what states of being they want to 
foster. In Dickens’ understanding, the process of environmental self-fashioning is never 
complete, it is necessarily an ongoing negotiation.  
Dickens begins his narrative with the most savage characters of the novel within 
the most natural part of the city: the Thames River. Here, Dickens establishes a form of 
evolutionary ground zero within mid-nineteenth-century London, revealing some of the 
most fundamental forms of acquired characteristics, which can be understood as a form 
of environmental literacy. On the first page of Our Mutual Friend, and between the 
Southwark and London Bridges, we find “a boat of dirty and disreputable appearance” 
(1). Gaffer Hexam is presented as a “[h]alf savage,” attuned to his natural environment 
through the two Lamarckian principles of acquired modification: direct influence from  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Like the water, the dust that pervades the novel equally pervades the city, permeating the boundaries 
between one location and another, between the inside of houses (constantly being dusted) and their exterior, 
but also between people and place. Many scholars have discussed that the dust likely included human waste 
as well as other forms of rubbish, most pointing back to Sucksmith’s "The Dust-Heaps in Our Mutual 
Friend" as the source of this argument, which has become a commonplace since.  
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conditions and acquired habits.12 Hexam’s “grizzled” appearance, complete with “bare 
brown arms” and a “sun-browned face,” emphasize the environment's direct influence 
(1). Hexam also appears in “such a dress . . . seeming to be made out of the mud that 
begrimed his boat,” which is equally “[a]llied to the bottom of the river” by the “slime 
and ooze” with which it is covered (2,1). Such semblances reinforce that Hexam’s and 
Lizzie’s present activity was “something that they often did,” thus something habitual (1).  
Stressing the habitual nature of their present actions on the river explains the 
semblance between Hexam and the river environment; it also sets up the notion of 
repeated behaviors and how they can lead to “functionally produced modifications” in the 
physiology of the subject according to Lamarckian theory (Hughes xxxviii). Hexam was 
not born with but rather acquired the characteristics of one “of those amphibious human-
creatures who appear to have some mysterious power of extracting a subsistence out of 
tidal water by looking at it” (74). Likening Hexam to a “bird of prey” (3), Dickens 
stresses Hexam’s keen ability to see the most subtle nuances of the Thames’ surface: “he 
looked for something, with a most intent and searching gaze”; “his eyes watch every little 
race and eddy in its broad sweep”; “[w]heresoever the strong tide met with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I see Dickens as being more engaged with the evolutionary models of Jean Baptiste Lamarck and Herbert 
Spencer, both of whom adopted and expanded on an associationist understanding of adaptive psychology. 
Thus, my approach differs from other scholars who have connected Our Mutual Friend with evolutionary 
theory, as they have by and large argued for Darwinian influences in the novel. Ernest Fontana and Nicola 
Bown have pointed to the selection of mates in Dickens’s work. George Levine and Howard Fulweiler have 
argued that evolutionary theory	  informs the tangled web of Dickens’s narrative structures. Yet, Our Mutual 
Friend barely considers phylogeny; rather, Dickens proves more interested in how individual subjects are 
able to cope with, adapt to, and succeed in the complex human environments (where social and physical are 
as interconnected and organism and external medium). Joseph Carroll’s Literary Darwinism (2004) also 
maintains a Darwinian perspective, though he does address “a passionate responsiveness to place” and the 
“sense of interdependence between place and person” appearing in nineteenth-century literature, but 
explains that such phenomena are the result of adaptions gained through natural selection (90, 98-101). 
While Carroll states numerous times that place is essential to experience and even that place can be 
understood to shape the self in nineteenth-century literature, his readings of these works repeatedly fall 
short of showing how this process occurs within the narrative.	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impediment, his gaze paused for an instant” (1,2). Through his regular habit of searching 
the river, Hexam has adapted to his particular environment in order to make a living.  
Hexam’s adaption to his environment for the purposes of survival exemplifies the 
key tenet of Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Psychology (1855): the sense that life 
equates to the “definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and 
successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences” (368; original 
emphasis). Spencer’s definition precedes and informs the one offered by Lewes; it also 
proves far more explicit. For Spencer, this creation of correspondence with or fitness to 
the environment includes, 
all those activities, bodily and mental, which constitute our ordinary idea 
of life; but it also comprehends, both those processes of growth by which 
the organism is brought into general fitness for these activities, and those 
after-processes of adaptation by which it is specially fitted to its special 
activities. (375) 
Spencer, like Alexander Bain, stresses the importance of sight to adaptive processes,13 
arguing that increased sensory capacities lead to the comprehension of a larger and more 
complex environmental sphere in which an organism can operate (Spencer 1855, 407). 
Spencer also points to the cognition of the environment beyond (but based on) direct 
sensation that allows for behaviors even more specialized in terms of space and time, 
“where the action of the organism is in correspondence with the changes of a particular 
thing in a particular spot at a particular period” (433; my emphasis). Hexam’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bain points to the importance of sensorial accuracy when he argues that a principal form of “human 
intelligence” is the adherence of  “sensations of sight . . . into an intellectual product” – that is a cognitive 
model of an object or place that can be integrated into complex thoughts and activities (411). 
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correspondence with the Thames environment proves similar as he is able to anticipate 
the trajectory of objects in the water based on the confluence of current and tide, which is 
evident given his directions to Lizzie on where to position the boat (1,2). These adaptive 
capacities – in addition to proving Hexam is more than a mechanized frog – ensure the 
maintenance of a stable epistemological relationship with locality, allowing Hexam to 
develop an environmental literacy that is not only helpful but also necessary for 
survival.14   
Like Hexam, Lizze also displays an acquired environmental literacy: in addition 
to watching the water’s surface, Lizzie reads Hexam’s face so as to respond to his 
expressions with the appropriate action. Like Wordsworth’s discussion of the blessed 
infant discussed in Chapter 2, Dickens extrapolates one form of literacy to another, 
emphasizing how the ability to read gestures and expressions – typically regarded as a 
social endeavor – originates in basic modes of survival. While this literacy proves 
Lizzie’s adaptive potential, it also offers a model of reading for the audience to follow.        
Lizzie’s habits of reading and her own expressions clue the audience to how they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 By emphasizing the epistemological stability that results from adaptation, I mean to show how such 
processes work to overcome the illegibility of the environment, which allows us to rethink the human 
experience of the chaotic city. Furthermore, I want to build from John Glendening’s sense in The 
Evolutionary Imagination in Late-Victorian Novels that“[h]uman understanding as it receives and processes 
data about the universe is . . . entangled with it in an epistemological sense,” which creates what I refer to 
as an epistemological fluidity where meaning and knowledge	  are not transferred but rather interconnect, 
effecting, as Spencer would say, greater correspondence with the environment. However, I want to 
challenge Glendening’s subsequent notion that this human understanding “is subject to the very same 
tension between order and chaos, with the latter exerting continual influence on the former. The 
indeterminacy inherent in evolutionary development imbues these novels and their characters with 
perceptual and cognitive confusion about both nature of external reality and their own natures” (31). Of 
course, Glendening focuses on the late-Victorian period so he is not particularly concerned with Dickens. 
Even so, I find misguided the fundamental notion that the external world is chaotic to those who 
comprehend the system of their present locality as well as the notion that engagement with the external 
world necessarily leads to a state of perceptual and cognitive confusion when understood via evolutionary 
theory. Spencer’s theory very specifically argues that the process of adaptation works towards greater 
epistemological scope and stability.	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supposed to acquire knowledge from the diegetic environment. When Lizzie reads 
Hexam’s face with “intensity” and “a touch of dread” on the first page, we learn to 
acquire information in a similar manner. We watch Lizzie as she shivers from anxiety 
and as her own face goes pale when Hexam finally eyes the sought-for object (2-3). In 
this first scene, Dickens offers not free indirect discourse; instead, he offers the reader a 
truly mimetic experience of life – like the characters in the text, we must gain information 
from context, behavior, and expression.  
 While Dickens initially depicts environmental literacy within the quasi-natural 
space of the Thames between the Southwark and London Bridges, he also shows how 
such forms of literacy prove integral to quintessentially urban figures like the police 
inspector. Through his environmental literacy, the Night-Inspector engages a legible 
urban sphere, and his ability to read this space and the subjects in it provides him with 
epistemological security – what Pam Morris refers to as “the sharp wisdom of street 
culture” in Dickens’ work (2006, 209).15 The Inspector’s character is based largely on the 
eponymous detective of Dickens’ “On Duty with Inspector Field,” published in 
Household Words in 1851. In the article, Dickens emphasizes Field’s ability to look at 
someone and attain a “perfect mastery of their character” (267), as well as his ability to 
navigate the urban labyrinth. Following Field through a series of alleys and doorways, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Pam Morris’s article provides a point of departure for my own thoughts on knowledge, identity, and 
place. Much of her analysis focuses on Bradley Headstone, a “taught-self” who disavows his class origins 
and whose “rote education has dislocated [his] words from his own passion and desire” (2006, 207-208). 
The result is loss of his “capacity for playful self-invention” (207). Morris provides Jenny Wren as a 
counter example, who is street wise and fashions her own identity through language. Morris does not 
acknowledge the environmental underpinnings of this discussion, which is my own undertaking. I will 
argue that Headstone’s rote education also dislocates himself from place, which further undermines his 
sense of self. Wren and the Night-Inspector both learn from their environment and in turn learn how to use 
that environment to supplement their psychological processes, including a sense of self and subject 
formation. However, only the Night-Inspector will be discussed at present; Miss Wren will receive more 
attention later in the chapter. 
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Dickens describes the scene as “the flapping and counter-flapping, like the lids of the 
conjurer's boxes”; despite the perplexing scene, however, Inspector Field is able to read 
and demystify these urban spaces as he “shows their secret workings” (268).  
The Night-Inspector, also referred to as Mr. Inspector, reveals the same 
capabilities, as Dickens portrays early on his astute assessment of Hexam’s character and 
his survey of Julius Handford’s appearance and behavior to the extent that he takes “note 
of every hair of [Handford’s] head” (Our Mutual Friend 24, 26-27). Equally important, 
Mr. Inspector performs a type of cognitive engagement with place that proves integral to 
this study. In the activities of Mr. Inspector and other characters to be discussed later, 
Dickens portrays, I argue, a form of epistemic action that Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers refer to as “active externalism” of the mind – that is, the active use of external 
objects and spaces to assist cognitive processes.16 More obvious examples of this active 
externalism can be seen when Noddy Boffin uses chalk on a stool to total the wages he 
has agreed to pay Silas Wegg (51). Similarly, Bradley Headstone considers how he might 
have utilized the surrounding environment in his attempt to murder Eugene Wrayburn, 
Headstone, and standing in front of his class, he “had half a mind to draw a line or two 
upon the board, and show himself what he meant” (709). While the context is rather 
dramatic, the quotidian use of chalk proves, in fact, a perfect example of how external 
objects are commonly used to assist in cognitive operations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Clark and Chalmers are both practitioners of philosophy and cognitive science, which they integrate in 
their joint study, “The Extended Mind” (1998). Their contemporary example of epistemic action that 
externalizes mental functioning is the manual rotation of blocks (by pressing a button) in the game of Tetris 
rather than the mental act of rotating the block within one’s own mental model. They point to a study by 
David Kirsh and Paul Maglio (1994) that documents how the use of the external device speeds up the 
process of cognition. To rotate the block physically is still an Epistemic action” even if it occurs outside the 
mind. Epistemic actions, then, are those that “alter the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes 
such as recognition and search” (Clark and Chalmers 8). 
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In terms of the Night-Inspector, such epistemic actions are coupled with the 
faculty of imagination in order to derive information from the environment, such as when 
he is working on the Harmon case. Upon hearing the Jury’s report on Harmon’s death, 
Mr. Inspector becomes “additionally studious”; the report, 
caused him to stand meditating on river-stairs and causeways, and to go 
lurking about in boats, putting this and that together. But, according to the 
success with which you put this and that together, you get a woman and a 
fish apart, or a Mermaid in combination. And Mr. Inspector could turn out 
nothing better than a Mermaid, which no Judge and Jury would believe in. 
(31) 
Rather than rotate an object to better understand it or diagraming a scene, the Night-
Inspector moves himself within the physical environment, gaining different vantage 
points and culling different information from the objects about him. This action allows 
him to take in every aspect of the environment and piece together how each element 
might have participated in the overall action of the crime. It reveals environmental 
literacy to be more than a reading of one’s environs: it also serves as a form of cognition 
through space and external objects. 
 The Night-Inspector proves more successful when he uses the same processes to 
get to the bottom of Hexam’s death later on in the novel (174); still, his lack of success in 
this first instance is worth considering a little longer, as it points to the role of 
imagination in the cognitive engagement with place. In associationist psychology, the 
imagination helps to conjoin ideas into larger, more complex cognitions. This is precisely 
what the Inspector does, taking a multitude of discrete ideas about this object or this 
	  
215	  	  
space and putting them together with the known facts of the crime in an effort to reach a 
conclusion. The mermaid image highlights Dickens’s associationist sense of the 
imagination, as it was believed that new objects or ideas could only be imagined by 
imaginatively conjoining already experienced objects and ideas: hence, the ideas of fish 
and woman would become a mermaid. That Mr. Inspector’s end result is compared to a 
mythical creature offers a moment of levity, to be sure, but it also stresses another key 
principle of environmental epistemology: despite the fact that all information is 
subjectively acquired, it is still being tested and retested against a continuous, objective 
reality.17 While this failure might seem to call Mr. Inspector’s capabilities into question, 
as Farrell has suggested,18 I argue that it highlights the ongoing dynamic of a cognitive 
engagement with the external world, one comprised, inevitably, of trial and error. That 
Mr. Inspector recognizes his error – suggested in the correlation of his conclusion to a 
mythic being – points to his ability to learn from his experience, which is to say, points to 
his ability to adapt.  Through such adaptation, Mr. Inspector can gain epistemic certainty 
and, as a result, psychological stability, making him an apt foil to the estranged urban 
subjectivity explored by Williams, Baumgarten, Wolfreys, and others. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Evolutionary anthropologist Konrad Lorenz argues that practices just like those exhibited by the Night-
Inspector are quintessential to learning, the ontological form of adaption: human beings gain information 
from their environment, work that information into their cognitive patterns and then “match[] their results 
against reality” and in this gain from and comparison back to reality, human beings learn both from their 
success as well as their failures (24). 
18 Farrell argues that “there is a curious ineffectuality about the Night-Inspector in spite of the keenness, 
neatness, and knowingness that we are meant to admire in him. For all his prowess, the Night-Inspector 
"could turn out nothing" (31; 1.3) and thus he disappears as a significant character” (785). Yet, as I show, 
the Night-Inspector does	  try his hand again later when solving the death of Hexam. Also, the Night-
Inspector does reappear later in the novel when he goes to the Rokesmith home to interrogate John 
Rokesmith about his falsified identity as Julias Hansford. Last, while the Night-Inspector struggles to solve 
the Harmon murder, the fact that Harmon is not murdered makes the Inspector’s difficulty not only 
understandable but even reinforces why his conclusions should be compared to a mermaid – there is no 
way his conclusions, based on the information he has, could fit the reality of what had happened. 
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Returning to Lizzie and Hexam, two more examples of active externalism can be 
noted, which further show how characters in Dickens’s novel create a productive 
correspondence with the external world. In Lizzie’s example, Dickens follows a pattern 
established in the preceding chapters and shows how an affective response to landscape 
can prove an effective means of contemplating one’s own relationship with that 
ecological niche. Though Lizzie has adapted to life on the urban Thames, she attests that 
she does “not like it,” and her feelings for this habitat are shown in even greater 
complexity when she looks on “the great black river with its dreary shores” and sees it 
“dim before her, stretching away to the great ocean, Death” (3, 71).19 Such moments are 
not the imaginative act of projected feeling term “pathetic fallacy” but rather an evolved 
mechanism for registering a locality’s structure of influence – its personality – and one’s 
own attitudes about it.20  What might seem like a visionary experience, then, becomes a 
moment of psychological verisimilitude, a recognition of psychological engagement with 
the locality’s particular structure of influence.  
Spencer offers a rather similar take on aesthetic responses to place in his 
Principles when he acknowledges how various stimuli of a place lead to larger structures 
of influence. He notes that “daily experiences” with a place and its various objects will 
result in an accumulation of each feeling induced by each object over time, leading to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A similar description of the Thames can be found in an article Dickens wrote for Household Words 
called "Down with the Tide" (1853): “[T]his river looks so broad and vast, so murky and silent, seems such 
an Image of death in the midst of the great city's life” (527). As with the scene in Our Mutual Friend, the 
deathly aspect of the river results from the overall effect of its various elements and associations. 
20 See the prior discussions of the blessed infant in Wordsworth’s The Prelude and Gaskell’s tendency to 
intermix facial and landscape features, which is a means, I argue, of codifying the affective influences of a 
given locality. Wordsworth’s uses the term “lineaments” as a type of skeuomorph when the infant’s 
psychological engagement with the face of the mother expands to a wider engagement with its material 
environs. The continued use of lineaments and expressive features not only suggests how reading a 
locality’s structures of influence builds from the initial practices of reading the mother’s facial expressions 
but also evinces how external objects continue to have an affective sway over one’s state of mind. 
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composite states of feeling and still “larger aggregation of states,” which ultimately 
merge into “a more complex feeling . . . produced by being in that locality” (589). 
Through her engagement with place as well as her evolved capacity for feeling, Lizzie 
acquires a more complex view of her current mode of survival, an acquisition that is 
necessary for her future growth. By allowing her thoughts to mingle with the external 
space as she meditates on her present circumstances – her mind entangled with the 
associations the river carries for her (pollution and corpses)21 – Lizzie thinks through her 
present environment and recognizes its utter undesirability.  
Lizzie and Hexam engage with the same environment and adapt certain 
tendencies so as to effect a productive correspondence with its conditions and influence; 
yet, they develop in remarkably different ways, which is most clearly indicated in their 
feelings toward the mode of life this locality affords. Lizzie’s imaginative tendencies not 
only allow her to think critically about the environment but also to consider other 
possible modes of living, which she frequently does while “reading” her or her brother's 
future in the fires kept at home. Hexam, on the other hand, more willingly engages with 
his present mode of life, and he actively uses the space and structures around him to 
improve his correspondence with his present environment. In the scene when Eugene 
Wrayburn and Mortimer Lightwood visit the Hexam household, Gaffer Hexam exhibits 
his knowledge of the handbills regarding dead men, which were “stuck against the wall” 
of the house. Despite his illiteracy, Hexam claims, “I know ‘em by their places on the 
wall. . . . I know ‘em all. I’m scholar enough!’” (22). Similar to Lightwood’s datebook 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Here I am again adding to Glendening’s sense in The Evolutionary Imagination in Late-Victorian Novels 
that“[h]uman understanding as it receives and processes data about the universe is . . . entangled with it in 
an epistemological sense” (31).	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kept by Young Blight or Mr. Boffin’s paperwork filled by Mr. Rokesmith, the wall of the 
house provides a material form by which to store and recover information – a mnemonic 
extension that allows Hexam to remember for whose body he is searching, where they 
might have drowned or been dumped, and what personal effects they might have. Of 
course, having the images and personal information also allows Hexam to identify the 
bodies he has found and to know whether or not there is a reward for them. That Dickens 
means for us to read the scene as indicative of the externalization of mental activity 
becomes clear through the mixture of metaphor and causation when Hexam moves the 
lantern “over the whole” of the wall “as if to typify the light of his scholarly intelligence” 
(23). Here, light directs attention and marks its place, thus proving an indexical rather 
than purely symbolic sign for consciousness.  
Lewes had claimed that Dickens’s characters offered only “calculable” behaviors, 
that they were like brainless “frogs” lacking “organic action” (148). Yet, when read with 
a sense of environmental literacy (rather than a desire for direct access to a character’s 
interiority), we begin to see several forms of dynamic engagement with external 
conditions, forms in accord with the theories of psychological adaptation in Dickens’s 
own time and forms that even anticipate more recent theories regarding mental 
engagement with the human environment. Building on the theme of environmental 
literacy, I argue that an ability to gain positive information from one’s environment (and 
other subjects in it) is necessary to a productive correspondence between internal 
psychological states and external conditions. I also want to argue for a positive rather 
than negative approach to epistemology and place where the urban sphere is concerned. 
From Raymond Williams to more recent scholarship by Baumgarten and Wolfreys, the 
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city is portrayed generally as an illegible space, one lacking in identifiable localities, 
which induce experiences of estrangement and alienation.22 Such is the result of a purely 
phenomenological approach to urban experience, one that limits itself to the reception of 
the external stimulus rather than going on to explore the dynamics of reciprocity and 
adaptation. An approach that reinforces the environmental underpinnings of epistemology 
yields different results, reinforcing the potential for positive knowledge and stable 




Urban Adaptation, Prosthesis, and the Home 
 
 
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on environmental forms of literacy 
and epistemology, and while the next section will continue to show how Dickens’s 
characters successfully adapt to and correspond with their external environment, it will 
also explore some of the more ontological implications of urban engagement in Our 
Mutual Friend. In this discussion, I argue that the active externalization of epistemic 
action begets not only knowledge but also a sense of self as infused in the material 
objects and cultural artifacts with which a subject frequently engages. The home, in 
particular, proves such an artifact, one that had evolved into a tool for conscious self-
development and, importantly, self-adaptation. Much more than a kitsch trope of 
Victorian culture, more than an apparatus for reinforcing bourgeois norms, the ideal 
home of Dickens’s novel proves an evolutionary technology, one that confirms his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See footnote 6. 
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characters’ psychological engagement with the external world but also one that 
exemplifies the externalization of self and its value to adaptive processes.   
The externalization of self in Dickens’s novel is also of value to contemporary 
criticism, as it reminds us of Lewes’s declaration: “the mutual relations of organism and 
medium [are what] determine the manifestations we name Life; and the error is great 
when men attempt to solve vital problems without duly taking all external conditions into 
account” (436). No analysis of subjectivity in any age, particularly an age in the process 
of developing a completely new paradigm for the self / world relationship, is complete 
unless it is willing to explore subjectivity beyond the confines of interiority and beyond 
the confines of the body. What we gain by addressing psychological processes of 
engagement with, adaptation to, and even cognition in the external world, is a much fuller 
recognition of how psychology is formed and how it actually functions as contextualized 
within the objective reality of biological conditions. While such externalization might 
seem to render the subject unstable and exposed to external influence, it in fact allows for 
an ontological fluidity, a certain flexibility of self that reinforces its capacity to adapt. 
This section explores the externalization of the self through the technological supplement, 
i.e. prosthetic, of the home and how such externalizations allow for the conscious 
development of the self in the act of adaption. The conception of prosthetics I use is 
developed in part from Spencer’s evolutionary psychology but is based in Dickens’s own 
depiction of the home as prosthesis.  
Spencer offers numerous insightful approaches to the current status of the human 
psyche and environmental context based on his fundamental definition for life: the 
“heterogeneous changes . . . in correspondence with external coexistences and 
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sequences” (368), which includes not only the simultaneous and successive changes in an 
organism,” whether in the body or mind, “but also those structural arrangements which 
enable the organism to adapt its actions to those in the environment” (374). By structural 
arrangements, in this instance, Spencer follows Lamarck in suggesting that the structure 
of the organism becomes developed through use or disuse, thus restructuring itself so as 
to be best adapted to the processes and habits needed to survive in its given environment.  
But what about the arrangements made outside the organism?   
The question leads to one of Spencer’s most important claims in Principles 
regarding the “mutual dependence of the operative and cognitive faculties” (457). 
Spencer begins by discussing how organisms that develop complex “fore-limbs,” in 
becoming more sophisticated in their ability to manipulate objects, gain the ability to 
observe qualities of objects and, as a result, contemplate new uses for them. From there, 
Spencer argues that human arts (sophisticated physical manipulations) and sciences 
(sophisticated perceptions of external phenomena) lead to ever greater and more complex 
forms of operative and cognitive faculties (457-461).23 As humans develop higher 
“cognitive and operative processes, the advance is towards a reciprocity so active that 
each further cognition implies elaborate operative aid, and each new operation implies 
sundry elaborate cognitions” (461). This proves a key point within the critical 
conversation as it highlights the ways in which all technologies assist in the development 
of cognitive function – whereas scholars taking a Marxist perspective and/or focusing on  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Engels makes the same argument in “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,” 
which was written in 1876 – twenty years after Spencer’s own account. 
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industrial machinery have either left out the psychological ramifications of prosthetics or 
have seen them as degenerating the mind by fostering mechanistic tendencies.24 
From this approach to arts and sciences and the reciprocity of cognition and 
physical operation, we begin to see that culture – in both its material and mental sense – 
is an extension of biological processes rather than something altogether separate from 
nature.25  But also, the arts and sciences become extensions of the human organism as 
well, so that thermometers and microscopes are “artificial extensions of the senses” while 
wheels and hammers are “artificial extensions of the limbs” (461). As extensions of the 
evolutionary process, prostheses prove to be extensions of an organic, adaptive process. 
They represent inherently human activity rather than a demarcation of the post-human.26  
Such an understanding of prostheses (one that predates Marx’s and the notion of post-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Implicated in this statement are the two main critical works with which I am engaging, Elaine Scarry’s 
The Body in Pain (1985) and Tamara Ketabgian’s The Lives of Machines, both of which chart a Marxist 
rather than evolutionary perspective on the extension of the human subject through tools and machines. For 
Ketabgian, given her focus on the “human-machine complex,” industrial prostheses largely subjugate the 
human being in body and mind rather than facilitating a productive development for the subject or its 
psychological process in particular – though she does stress that Marx’s utopian hopes make room for such 
a possibility (20-23, 26). When discussing Dickens in particular, Ketabgian highlights “a form of 
subjectivity that is an effect of repetition,” which “creates a suspicion of psychic depth that infuses its most 
docile characters with a threatening mechanical aspect” (12). In turning to Our Mutual Friend, and away 
from industrial prostheses per se, I recognize a much more productive prosthetic program that specifically 
affords both psychological development as well as human agency in that process. For Scarry, the purpose 
of all made objects is to “remake human sentience” (307), that is, to assist the human in its life project in 
some way, Yet, her models for this discussion – a coat and the nation state – emphasize the bodily and 
political aspects of the human life project, whereas cognitive development (and the deliberate manipulation 
of one’s sense of self) are left unexplored (307-313). 
25 As Spencer notes, “even the most transcendent achievements of rationality are but the carrying still 
further that specialization of the correspondences between the organism and its environment, which is 
displayed in the evolution of Life in general” (435-436). He also argues that humans have “been adding to 
their physical environment a social environment that has been growing even more involved” (381). Thus, 
the cultural aspects of the human species prove an extension of nature rather than an antithesis. 
26 Here I am specifically challenging Herbert Sussman’s and Gerhard Joseph’s sense that “Dickens's novels 
occupy an important place in the historical transformation of the human into what has become known as the 
‘posthuman’” (617-618). While I find Spencer’s articulation of the human nature of prostheses to be more 
convincing that Marx’s, it is worth noting that Scarry similarly points to the making of tools and artifice as 
both a very much human act and as potentially leading to prostheses. Even so, Scarry only addresses 
prostheses in the modern sense of artificial organs implanted through surgery, but her discussion of how 




humanism) reinforces the sense of human nature as an environmental engagement in the 
conscious effort of self-improvement rather than a subjection to social forces or the 
historical moment. Prostheses, ultimately, are a tool for perpetual self-becoming.  
Spencer’s discussion of cognitive and operative functions also points to an 
ontological slippage or fluidity between the organism and the environment.  This fluidity 
is evident not only in his discussion of tools as extensions of the body but also in his 
discussion of body parts, such as the “fore-limbs,” as tools themselves. In Spencer’s 
discussion, hands do not have a clear ontological distinction from external tools as both 
are mechanisms that assist in the life-project of the human organism. With this in mind, I 
would like to return to Lizzie Hexam as we initially found her on the Thames River. 
Here, Dickens highlights the efficacy of Lizzie’s “lithe action” when rowing, stressing 
again that such behaviors are acquired from “usage” (2). Upon Hexam’s signal, Lizzie 
“instantly answers to the action in her sculling” and “presently the boat swung round, 
quivered as from a sudden jerk” (2). The scene reinforces the sense of prosthetic 
extension that Spencer outlines, as the boat is both symbolically and literally an extension 
of Lizzie’s anxiety and movements, respectively. What is more, the sense of Lizzie’s 
hands as tools can be seen in the following sentence: “Lizzie took her right hand from the 
scull it held, and touched her lips with it, and for a moment held it out lovingly towards 
[Hexam]”(3). Analyzing this sentence, Andrew Miller smartly points to “the use of body 
parts as objects,” which “slides from the syntactic to the ontological” (150). But rather 
than stress the dismemberment that Miller, Albert Hutter, and Leslie Simon see as central 
to the novel and its concern over fragmentation, this moment reveals instead a sense of 
ontological fluidity.  Whereas fragmentation breaks down identity and meaning (breaks 
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down what was once fixed or essential), ontological fluidity allows for meaning and 
identity to be transformed, exchanged, gained and/or given. Ontological fluidity, 
however, does not necessitate a conflation of subject and object, or between subject and 
environment, but rather reflects the circulation of information and meaning inherent in an 
ecological perspective.27  
 Admittedly, Lizzie’s example of prosthetic extension is a bit ambiguous and 
might only be understood within a theoretical perspective (whether Spencer’s or Marx’s); 
however, given the extent to which prosthetics abound in Our Mutual Friend, Dickens 
certainly exhibits a clear interest in such notions of extension, ontological slippage, and 
person-object semblance. The most obvious example is the wooden leg of Mr. Wegg, 
which Dickens describes early in the novel. Altered by the “dusty corner” where he 
spends his days, Wegg has become “a knotty man, and close-grained, with a face carved 
out of very hard material” (45). As a gnarled tree in the desert, Wegg’s wooden leg 
synecdochically completes the picture. Yet, correspondence with an unhealthy places is 
not particularly beneficial, and Wegg’s prosthesis often complicates as much as it 
improves his ability to adapt to other environments. In one representative moment, where 
Wegg searches the Boffin Bower for hidden treasure, he “hops up ladders, like some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 I want to stress the importance of “ontological fluidity” in this context, a notion that revises what I see as 
an error in Marx’s thought on human use of tools. Perhaps it is the emphasis on making rather than simply 
the use of technological supplements, but in Scarry’s discussion of the made object as a “projection of the 
human body,” such extension works “to deprive the external world of the privilege of being inanimate – of, 
in other words, its privilege of being irresponsible to its sentient inhabitants on the basis that it is itself non-
sentient (281, 285). I would argue that a prosthetic extends the self into the world and creates ontological 
fluidity, but it does not entirely negate the external sphere of its own ontology. Rather, ontological 
significance, I am arguing, moves back and forth between environment and subject. Granted the subject can 
choose to shape that environment, but doing so never makes that space the kind of “lever” Scarry outlines, 
where production of a tool leads intentionally and directly back to a remaking of the subject. Even in 
shaping the environment, humans do not possess full control over it, hence my emphasis throughout the 
dissertation that environmental-self fashioning is always a process of negation. I believe Dickens’s novel, 
along with Spencer’s theory, confirm this sense of negotiation.	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extinct bird” (213). Here, Wegg’s prosthesis both effects and symbolizes his unfitness for 
the actions connected with that environment. 
 Most prostheses in the novel, however, stave off extinction rather than induce it. 
In a rather brief instance at the Podsnap residence, Dickens depicts a gent “with one eye 
screwed up into extinction” while the other is “framed and glazed” by a monocle. It is 
with the latter “organ” that he peers down at Georgiana Podsnap as if she were at the 
bottom of a well (139).28  Here, the prosthetic does not cause or mark extinction but 
attempts to thwart it. Its success is questionable, however, as the somewhat functional 
ocular organ appears like one of Mr. Venus’ specimens “framed and glazed” behind 
glass. Other prosthetics crop up throughout the book. Several characters wear spectacles. 
Jenny Wren’s crutch-stick becomes a fixture of the character over the course of the novel 
and allows her the mobility necessary for her work. While Dickens, through these 
characters, points to prostheses in a stricter sense, he shows a willingness to expand the 
notion to other technological enhancements, which we have already seen with Lizzie. A 
similar instance occurs when Dickens depicts Rogue Riderhood with several blunt 
weapons on his person that are referred to as “appendages” (354). Also through 
Riderhood, Dickens again identifies the body as a biological tool – when Riderhood 
nearly drowns, the narrator questions whether the lifeless body is still Riderhood “in 
sooth” or rather “the outer husk and shell of Riderhood” (443).   
The last scene offers, then, a conception of the body as one of many possible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The choice of the word “organ” is also significantly ambiguous, as it could potentially refer to both the 
ocular organ of the eyeball or the prosthetic itself. Ketabgian makes the cogent point that organ can refer to 
both vital body parts as well as “tools, instruments, and mechanical contrivances” (19). This blurring 
inherent in the word organ reaffirms Spencer’s own argument, of course, about how external devices can be 
understood as artificial senses or limbs.  
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shells or external devices by which the human being is protected and in which he or she 
can develop. Another is the home. That Dickens understands the home as a prosthetic 
tool in a biological and evolutionary sense is made clear when he writes the following in 
regards to Boffin’s Bower: “Whatever is built by man for man’s occupation, must, like 
natural creations, fulfill the intention of its existence, or soon perish. This old house had 
wasted more from desuetude than it would have wasted from use” (183). Invoking the 
Lamarckian paradigm that regards evolution of an organism’s structure as resulting from 
use or disuse – a phraseology that reappears in Spencer, Lewes, and even the associative 
psychology of Bain – Dickens depicts the home as an evolutionary extension of the 
inhabitant. Rather than a metaphorical projection, the image suggests an ontological 
fluidity that extends from subject to home. Without depriving either of their individual 
status, they mutually create and maintain a productive fitness in correspondence with the 
external world. 
The home, then, becomes a tool of self-extension for the purpose of self-
evolution, a conception that will be born out over the following analyses of the Boffins’ 
home. When Silas Wegg first visits the Boffins, upon entering the parlor he notes this 
“queerest of rooms,” which appears to be split down the middle in terms of its décor. On 
one side, it appears “more like a luxurious amateur tap-room than anything else” with its 
comfortable seating, its floor covered in “sand and sawdust,” its shelves that offer various 
foods, and a table on which rests “eight volumes” of The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire (55-56). On the other table is a set of “case-bottles of inviting appearance,” and 
that side of the room reveals more “garish” décor replete with “a flower carpet” and such 
“hollow ornamentation as stuffed birds and waxen fruits under glass shades” (55). Queer, 
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perhaps, but Boffin’s explanation is simple enough: Mrs. Boffin is  “a highflyer at 
Fashion” while he does not “go higher than comfort”; thus, Mr. Boffin claims, “Mrs. 
Boffin, she keeps up her part of the room, in her way; I keep up my part of the room in 
mine” (56). As Wegg looks around, Mr. Boffin assures him, “you begin to know us as we 
are” (57). Such a statement certainly affirms the notion of the home as an expression or 
reflection of the owner’s personalities. 
Yet, the parlor does not reflect who the Boffins are so much as it shows who they 
want to be and what kind of subjectivities they want to foster. Mrs. Boffin’s rather 
sophomoric attempts at domestic fashion affirm that this is new to her; in this space she 
can test out her tastes and cultivate them. That their next house proves more sensibly 
furnished and suggests the advances she will make. Furthermore, Mr. Boffin’s life has 
not been one of comfort, nor of literary tastes, and thus these are qualities of being that he 
wishes to promote, rather than ones he has already acquired. As a prosthetic, the home 
proves an artificial environment where the inhabitants control, to varying degrees, the 
influences working upon them. This sense of the home as constructed nature is even 
suggested by the floral carpets and taxidermy animals. A space of ontological slippage 
between self and world, the home also marks the link between biological systems and 
psycho-social cultivation – an evolutionary conception that Spencer names and Dickens 
portrays. 
In addition to the home itself, the objects within the home also prove useful tools 
for psychological adaptation: Mr. Boffin’s collection of The Decline and Fall offers an 
apt example. Again, Spencer’s evolutionary psychology provides a valuable lens.  Much 
of what distinguishes humans from other animals, Spencer suggests, is their “secondary 
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process of extension,” or the means to conceive and thus potentially utilize environments 
beyond that which is immediately present. One of the most important modes of indirect 
perception is acquiring the perceptions of others through “maps” or, we might infer, 
literature (Principles 409). Boffin’s collection of the Decline and Fall provides him with 
the perceptions of others, about a place and a cultural dynamic through which he gains 
valuable insights about his own circumstances and the threats they pose. Reminiscent of 
Priestley’s sense that the mind dilates in response to the world it perceives,29 Boffin 
listens to Wegg’s reading of the volumes while “intently staring with his eyes and mind 
at the confounding enormities of the Romans” (59). Not only are Boffin’s horizons 
widened – he now conceives of a much wider world – but he also begins to identify with 
the Romans’ plight and to recognize the potential threats that lead to a fall.30 As Boffin 
admits, these narratives “are scarers. And even now . . . I don’t see a way to our bettering 
ourselves” (60). The “our” implies the Romans with whom Boffin identifies, but Boffin 
recognizes the need for himself and Mrs. Boffin to adapt in order to avoid a similar fate, 
even if he cannot quite conceive of how to do so.31  
The tool of the book reflects the house’s own function as a form of identification 
with something outside the self, which then leads to self-realization. By identifying the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Priestley argues in Lectures on Oratory that the mind is only conscious of “the ideas that are present to 
it”; it must “conform itself to them,” and “enlarge or contrast with its field of view” (126-27). 
30 Boffin is particularly concerned with the trials of Commodus, who Wegg pronounces “Commodious” 
and who “fights in that wild-beast-show, seven hundred and thirty-five times.” Also concerning to Boffin is 
“Vittle-us” who has spent an entire fortune in only seven months (59). The mispronunciation of Commodus 
seems to invoke the word commodious, which, in its meaning of spaciousness and utility, ties together the 
functionality of the parlor, the content of the Decline and Fall, and mind-expanding lessons Boffin is 
learning. 
31 My reading of Boffin goes against the grain of the usual scholarship, which suggests that Boffin’s virtue 
is based on that which is good in him and does not change throughout the novel. Many see Boffin as 
unaltered by the novel’s end, but like Margaret in Gaskell’s North and South, Boffin must necessarily adapt 
to his new conditions in order to retain his positive qualities. While rather simple and trusting at first, 
Boffin develops a shrewdness and capacity for scheming so as to defend himself.	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self with the external object, the self becomes present in the external sphere where it can 
be considered objectively or put in relation with new ideas. The ontological fluidity of the 
prosthetic, then, allows for epistemic action. Paradoxically, it is the grounding of the self 
in the external space that allows for a profound awareness of the self’s malleability. 
Through such actions, the self becomes simultaneously stable and changeable. The 
process of altering the self becomes domesticated, no longer an estrangement but rather a 
self-conscious form of adaptation that prepares the subject for external conditions with 
which it must inevitably contend. 
As with all prosthetics, as with all organs, the home must continue to be 
functional, must continue to support the growth of the organism. The Boffins eventually 
come to realize that the “gloomy house” of the Bower no longer serves their needs. A 
new home will provide the Boffins with enough space for their philanthropic intentions 
as well as a new template through which to continue the process of self-extension and 
alteration. Besides, the Bower, because of its old age and the neglect from its previous 
owner, has taken on “[a] certain leanness” that inevitably “falls upon houses not 
sufficiently imbued with life (as if they were nourished upon it)” (183). Dickens goes on 
to write that the house had “an air of being denuded to the bone,” a phrasing that proves 
significant because it points to the house as a biological structure (“bone”) and because it 
utilizes terminology – “an air of” – used throughout the book to signify the external 
expression of characters’ psychological states. Like Lizzie on the bank of the Thames, the 
Boffins appear to cognize the structure of influence of their home in an anthropomorphic 
fashion, and this allows them to conceive of the health of their home and the kind of 
health it will provide them. The language is metaphorical, but, as I have argued 
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elsewhere, its effectiveness is predicated on underlying, biological functions. The Boffins 
appear to sense the home is a biological extension, but, as prosthesis, it is one they can 
cast aside and replace. 
Approaching the relationship between self, home, and city in such a manner 
provides a new way of thinking about the status of each and their interrelationship, 
particularly in terms of Dickens criticism.  One of the primary notions this reading 
revises is the sense of a dichotomy between home and urban space, where the former is 
pure and transcendent and the latter is the source of social ills and corruption32; 
Alexander Welsh puts it rather simply: “if the problem that besets [Dickens] can be called 
the city, his answer can be named the hearth” (142). Many of Dickens’s novels do 
champion the domestic space, as does Our Mutual Friend, but the home’s function is not 
simply to fortify the subject from the external world but rather to provide the materials 
and space to help the subject psychologically adapt, thereby achieving a state of fitness 
with his or her external world.  Part of this process requires that elements of the external 
world be brought into the home, whether in the form of other subjects, the ideas of others, 
or through social influence.  
In thinking of the home as a prosthetic extension of self, I agree with other 
scholars that the home often comes to reflect the self or even to work as a site of self-
expression,33 but I also argue that such a function is only a small part of the home’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See McCarthy’s “Making for Home: David Copperfield and His Fellow Travelers”; Efraim Sicher’s 
“Bleak Homes and Symbolic Houses: At-Homeness and Homelessness in Dickens”; also see Allan Grant 
87-88.  
33 Armstrong, for instance, points to the home as a sight of self-expression or as a reflection of the self 
throughout her rather thorough study Dickens and the Concept of Home (1990), such as on 2, 36, 92, 106, 
127, but does not come to an understanding of the reciprocal nature of the home, which thus ignores its 
more important function as a space to actively shape the self.	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purpose in Dickens’s novel. As Grier points out, and as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, the Victorians were well aware that the “physical setting and details” of the 
home had “the power to shape human character” (6). But the question becomes: for what 
purpose was the subject being shaped, and how does the prosthetic model of evolution 
alter the way we think of this capacity for self-shaping?  Frances Armstrong suggests that 
in Our Mutual Friend the struggle the characters face is not “to be home in one’s home” 
but rather “to be at home with oneself” and, as distinct for the first two, “the main priority 
is to be at home in the world” (139). Each of these senses of home are necessarily 
interconnected, however, when we consider the home proper as an extension of the self, a 
micro-environment within the larger sphere, and also an apparatus with the express 
purpose of adapting the subject to external conditions. Dickens certainly stresses the 
necessity of using the home to fashion the self – not one’s ideal or “real self,” as 
Armstrong suggests, but one that is best fit for its social and biological context (150). 
Such is the dynamic of the negotiation with the urban environment within the paradigm 





In this last section, I turn our attention to the two characters that most clearly 
exhibit the processes and results of psychological adaptation to place: Bella Wilfer and 
Jenny Wren. This will allow me to bring together the ideas that the previous sections 
have established regarding the influences of heterogeneous localities, environmental 
literacy, and ontological extension. It will also allow me to work against a trend in 
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criticism on Our Mutual Friend to focus on John Rokesmith (aka Harmon) and Eugene 
Wrayburn, prioritizing a narrative and an ideological account of sudden, and often 
religious, transformation.34 While Bella and Jenny take different paths, both engage a 
variety of external spaces replete with their own unique set of influences and affordances, 
and both characters respond to those localities in reflexive, adaptive, and ultimately 
realistic ways. I also want to continue to outline the ways in which Our Mutual Friend 
teaches us to read characters via context, via the same forms of environmental literacy 
that the characters themselves exhibit and that human beings utilize in their own daily 
engagement with the modern world. 
Bella Wilfer offers a prime example of adaptation as her sense of selfhood 
changes more than any other character in the novel. Bella also highlights that adaptation 
does not always mean self-improvement, but she ultimately learns to recognize 
environmental influence and how to use it for positive ends. The hypothesis for Bella’s 
trial in the novel seems best summed up by Rokesmith’s view that “there is affection 
enough in her nature, and warmth enough in her heart, to develop into something 
enduringly good under favourable conditions” (372; my emphasis).  Implicit in 
Rokesmith’s sense of “conditions” is both a social and environmental meaning. As I have 
argued in the last chapter and this one, the two are hardly separable since social 
conditions manifest in physical forms and since people and culture are components of the 
environment.  
Willful since a very young age, Bella suggests that she only became a “mercenary 
little wretch” after the expectation of great wealth through marriage to John Harmon and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See footnote 8. 
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the disappointment of his supposed death (319). While Bella has learned to crave money, 
her change in attitude towards Rokesmith also provides evidence of how she has been 
conditioned by her circumstances. Initially curious to the point of having an interest in 
him, Bella grows to be “contemptuous” of Rokesmith and eventually rejects him as a 
lover (308). What has changed between her initial and subsequent responses to 
Rokesmith is her invitation to live with the Boffins in their mansion. Dickens emphasizes 
this very point by noting that it was “not so very long ago that Bella had been flustered by 
the discovery that this same Secretary and lodger seemed to like her,” yet that was before 
“the eminently aristocratic mansion and Mrs. Boffin’s dressmaker had . . . come into 
play” (309). It is not simply that Bella’s social status has altered but that she has been 
moved to an environment where that social status manifests in a physical form, which 
inevitably bears its influences on her sense of self and how she relates to others. 
The influence of the Boffin mansion on Bella’s outlook is also registered in her 
attitude towards other spaces, particularly her family’s home. The initial portrayal of the 
Wilfer home suggests that it is not exactly commodious; in fact, little mention is made of 
the home’s interior appearance as Dickens emphasizes instead the family’s engagement, 
then Bella sitting on a rug by a fire, and later the family sitting around a white-clothed 
table to eat a dinner as pleasant as it was uncommon given their means. In short, the 
emphasis is more on comforts, even if meager. When Bella first returns for a visit, we see 
the home through a rather different lens, namely Bella’s altered view of the world: “The 
family room looked very small and very mean, and the downward staircase by which it 
was attained looked very narrow and very crooked. The little house and all its 
arrangements were a poor contrast to the eminently aristocratic dwelling” to which Bella 
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had become accustomed (310). Upon returning to the mansion, we again see the space 
from Bella’s view: “the brilliant furniture seemed to stare her out of countenance as if it 
insisted on being compared with the dingy furniture at home” (322). Rather than provide 
a view of Bella’s interiority as discrete from the world, Dickens reveals Bella’s thoughts 
through external contextualization. The figuration is simultaneously symbolic and 
indexical: the furniture, as part of the environment that shapes her attitudes, also begins to 
reflect her changing character. Such active externalization allows for the possibility of 
self-critique and thus a more active approach to subject-formation.  
Bella has certainly adapted to her new environment, and Dickens makes Bella’s 
adaptability an integral part of her identity when her father states, “Now what I will say 
for you, my dear . . . is, that you are so adaptable. So adaptable” (317). Yet, Bella also 
reveals that adaptability can be a double-edged sword, its value being predicated, 
ultimately, on what kind of person the individual becomes. After viewing her two homes 
in relation to one another, Bella laments that “my life and fortunes are so contradictory 
altogether that what can I expect myself to be!”(322). With such diametric conditions, 
manifested in diametric places with which she identifies, Bella’s selfhood becomes rather 
dubious.  
The aristocratic influence appears to win out for a time, but Bella also seems self-
conscious and even displeased with this change. Her descriptions of herself as 
“mercenary” and “avaricious” are certainly not meant as sources of pride, and she begins 
to exhibit behaviors that she then immediately regrets, such as when she opens up to Mrs. 
Lammle about Rokesmith’s affection for her. But if her exposure to two diametrically 
opposed, external conditions correlates with her internal struggles, she at least recognizes 
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that external influence: this is evident both in her sense that the furniture of the mansion 
looks smug upon her return but also in her acquisition of self-extending habits. For 
example, Bella later looks at herself in the mirror in a moment of self-critique: “You have 
been positively swelling your features,” she accuses her image, “you little fool!” (378). 
Here, the mirror performs the same prosthetic extension as the home, offering a form of 
ontological extension so that Bella can adopt an objective approach to herself. 
In contradistinction to Eugene Wrayburn, who attempts to understand himself by 
turning inward and finds only an “embodied conundrum” (286), Bella increasingly 
utilizes her environment to make sense of what kind of person she should become and to 
engage the process of self-fashioning. In addition to her use of the mirror to achieve an 
objective view, Bella begins to compare herself to other models who are also 
contextualized by place.  She recognizes how Mr. Boffin’s circumstances are changing 
him, telling her father that “Mr. Boffin is being spoilt by prosperity, and is changing 
every day” (460).  Of course, we find out latter that Mr. Boffin has intentionally behaved 
as such a model to prove just such a point, but Bella still deserves credit for recognizing 
Mr. Boffin’s behavior as undesirable, for connecting said behavior to his circumstances, 
and for identifying with his behavior-circumstance dynamic in a manner that leads to 
self-consciousness.  
Dickens provides Bella with a more positive model for selfhood in Lizzie Hexam, 
whom she finds in the more healthful environment of the country. Just before Bella has 
the chance to meet Lizzie, Bella begins to experience the “softening influence” of the 
rural sphere for herself (518). Here again, Dickens indicates her change of character via 
her changing attitude towards Rokesmith. After “leaving the little street and emerging on 
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the wooded landscape by the river” on their walk, everything about her interaction with 
Rokesmith becomes more “natural,” a word they use three times in their conversation 
(518; 518-20). Dickens stresses again and again the affective qualities of the scene, 
particularly when he points to the river in this locality free of urban pollutants as a 
“mirror” that reflected only “what was peaceful, pastoral, and blooming” (523). In 
contrast to the last mirror into which Bella gazed, she sees that this one reflects a rather 
different type of self, one predicated on peacefulness and health rather than on 
avariciousness and contradiction. Bella is able to occupy, for a moment, a different 
structure of influence and thus a different subjectivity. Subsequently, she meets Lizzie 
and thus witnesses a simpler, rural selfhood. Bella must soon return to the city, but only 
after being impressed by Lizzie to the extent of feeling sharply her own failings in 
comparison. 
 From this point on, at least until the final chapters of the novel, Bella increasingly 
takes control of her engagement with space, choosing which spaces she occupies, how 
she occupies them, and how they should influence her.  In the scene where Bella finally 
decides to confront Mr. Boffin regarding his altered character, she ceases with her 
passive and silent state and bursts forth with animation and passionate words. As the 
other characters remain still, Bella moves back and forth across the room as she addresses 
Mr. Boffin, Rokesmith, and Mrs. Boffin in turn. Eventually, she decides to leave the 
house that has been both a home and a corruptive influence upon her. Significantly, she 
not only says goodbye to the Boffins but also to her “dear room,” with “a parting kiss of 
her fingers,” and to the house in general, as she kisses the outside of the front door after 
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“softly closing it upon herself” (601, 602). Such actions reinforce the affective 
connection with place and the sense of the home as an extension of those who inhabit it. 
 Thus, Bella quits the Boffin mansion, and its influences, on her own accord. She 
walks to the business district of the city to see her father, who is shocked by her 
intrepidity. When Rokesmith enters the office, having followed Bella there, he hugs her, 
and she seems to disappear completely in his embrace. The image seems to obviate her 
independence and identity, and certainly we must acknowledge that, as Bella soon 
becomes Mrs. Rokesmith, this obviation of her identity will occur again but nominally 
(604-06).35 Yet, on a spatial level, the representation of Bella’s identity and agency 
suggests a different story. It is Bella who decides that they should be married in 
Greenwich and Bella who decides where they, along with Mr. Wilfer, shall dine 
afterward. When Bella and John visit her family to acknowledge their elopement, Bella 
takes charge of the room: she runs into it, embraces the family, seats them, instructs John 
to kiss her mother and sister, instructs John to cut some bread and butter while she herself 
makes tea, and proceeds entirely to dominate the conversation. Her mother and sister, 
who usually dictate the action in the house, remain passive and “helpless” (678-79).  
Bella also controls the house she comes to share with John in Blackheath. Dickens 
notes many of Bella’s household activities, which include cooking as well as “such 
dusting and washing and polishing, such snipping and weeding and trowelling and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Many critics have had problems with the way in which Bella’s new found agency seems to be obviated 
by her marriage. James Marlow points to these concerns, (186), as does Gail Houston (181) and  Philip 
Collins (128). Ermarth perhaps puts it best when she claims, “Bella suddenly seems lobotomized, no longer 
thinking of a self or even appearing to have one. Her ‘disappearances’ into husbandly embraces at the end 
are really no joke” (208). While I agree that Dickens eventually undermines Bella’s agency to a degree, I 
do think these critics have failed to see the ways in which Bella’s agency continues through the process of 
her marriage and even after, an agency based in her control over the environment and her self-formation. 
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small gardening, such making and mending and folding and airing, such diverse 
arrangements, and above all such severe study” (681-82). Here, Dickens invokes once 
again the positive psychological and moral associations attendant to good food, 
cleanliness, order, and fresh air. While Bella’s role, one could argue, is socially reductive, 
it also indicates a heightened evolutionary consciousness: Bella understands the role of 
environmental influence and takes firm control of her own environmental self-fashioning. 
That Bella educates herself in her new home is also significant. The first object of 
study is her “sage volume entitled The Complete British Family Housewife,” which 
recalls Dickens’s attitudes about the need for educational reform, particularly the 
necessity of making one’s education practical to his or her own life and environment.36  
And her education doesn’t stop with the domestic text or with the domestic sphere as 
Bella has taken to a daily “mastering of the newspaper”; in doing so, she does more than 
attain a knowledge of the city equal to Rokesmith’s; rather, her knowledge complements 
or even exceeds his, allowing her to “beamingly shed it upon John in the course of the 
evening” (682). Bella, then, informs John of the urban sphere rather than the other way 
around. Bella’s purpose in reading the newspaper complicates the typical figuration of 
the Angel in the House, which suggests a sheltering from corruptive worldliness. Bella, 
rather, actively studies the urban world, particularly its economic aspects. As with 
Boffin’s volumes of the Rise and Fall, Bella gains from the perceptions of others, which 
become a tool that expands her consciousness of and improves her correspondence with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For more on Dickens and the practicality of education see Marlow (140-143), Collins (81, 128-130), as 
well as David Paroissien. Both Marlow (143) and Morris (2006, 196) point to education as a form of 
adaptation or evolution, though they don’t connect it with a wider understanding of adaptive psychology or 
with an environmental perspective.  Spencer also published on the practicality of education during the 
1850s and 60s; see Essays on Education, 23-26. 
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the modern world. This activity does not entirely undo the limited role to which Bella is 
subjected, but the point is that she fashions this space and the knowledge she gains within 
it. In this space, Bella’s ontological fluidity and epistemological scope is within her own 
control; such control and efficacious use of place highlights her profoundly adaptive 
psychology. 
 It is unfortunate that Bella’s journey doesn’t end there. Eventually, John decides 
to reclaim his proper identity and inheritance, which inevitably relocates him and Bella 
from Blackheath to the Boffin mansion – the one environment she had rejected.  Of 
course, John decorates the mansion in a fashion determined by Bella, so she does 
maintain her hand in the home’s fashioning and thus its structure of influence. Dickens, it 
seems, tries to engender a happy union between John’s search for self and Bella’s 
triumph through environmental self-fashioning, but still, this final relocation undermines 
the spatial agency that had become a central aspect of Bella’s character. All this being so, 
Bella still exemplifies how a self-conscious approach to one’s own adaptation, in 
conjunction with an awareness of environmental influence, becomes an effective, even 
necessary, means for controlling one’s own subject-formation in the face of modern 
pressures. Bella does not, I must emphasize, reject the urban sphere but creates her own 
niche within and correspondence to it. 
 If Bella proves the most malleable character in the novel, Jenny Wren proves the 
most adaptive, which is due in part to the necessity of overcoming her physical and 
familial hindrances. We first see Jenny Wren from the perspective of Charley Hexam, 
who is in search of his sister, Lizzie: 
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 The boy knocked at a door, and the door promptly opened with a spring 
and a click. A parlour door within a small entry stood open, and disclosed 
a child—a dwarf—a girl—a something—sitting on a little low old-
fashioned arm-chair, which had a kind of little working bench before it. 
(222) 
As Ian Duncan might say, Jenny Wren appears as one of Dickens’s grotesques or 
“transhumans” (18). Barely a girl, Wren is more “a something.” Wren, of course, names 
her physical affliction before we can even question it, saying that her “back’s bad” and 
her “legs are queer” (Our Mutual Friend 222). Yet, Jenny’s physical condition becomes 
an opportunity for Dickens to reveal the power of adaption: she not only exhibits her 
ecological literacy, prosthetic savvy, and environmental self-fashioning, but she does so 
both within the home and in the city at large. In other words, Jenny is able to extrapolate 
the domestic adaptation I have charted throughout this study to the urban environment.  
While numerous characters can read the urban sphere effectively and register its various 
psycho-physiological influences without a sense of estrangement or alienation, Jenny 
Wren takes her correspondence with the urban sphere even further. She reveals a 
profound capacity to refashion her mental engagement with the urban world in ways that 
are not delusional but rather quite productive. Truly the paragon of adaptive psychology 
in Our Mutual Friend, Jenny Wren exemplifies the human condition in the modern 
world, but even more importantly, she teaches the audience how to read the urban 
ecology and how to make it their own. 
Like Bella and the Boffins, Jenny reveals a proficiency in fashioning her domestic 
environment to accommodate her needs. In the initial passage above, Dickens notes that 
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the door opened with “a spring and a click” and we soon learn that Jenny has “a handle 
within her reach” from the chair that allows her to open the door (225). There is also the 
sense that the “old fashioned arm-chair” has been refashioned, or, outfitted with “a kind” 
of working bench, suggesting that the bench is not typical but rather suited to the unusual 
“girl” and her industry of making dresses for dolls. This agency over space, as we have 
seen with other characters, translates to a sense of environmental control, and Wren is 
seen directing Bradley, and Headstone, who has come with him, to sit down and to “shut 
the street door” (222).  
 Jenny’s use of this space also reveals her capacity to fashion particular states of 
being through the structures of influence it affords. Not only is the house described as 
“orderly and clean” despite being somewhat “dingy,” a description that, again, points to 
an understood connection between physical, mental, and moral conditions, but Jenny and 
Lizzie also have a particular “arrangement” of the room, which they use to effect a 
positive emotional state: Lizzie places the candle on the mantelshelf, 
remote from the dressmaker’s eyes, and then put the room door open, and 
the house door open, and turned the little low chair and its occupant 
towards the outer air. It was a sultry night, and this was a fine-weather 
arrangement when the day’s work was done. To complete it, she seated 
herself in a chair by the side of the little chair, and protectingly [sic.] drew 
under her arm the spare hand that crept up to her. 
‘This is what your loving Jenny Wren calls the best time in the day 
and night,’ said the person of the house. Her real name was Fanny 
	  
242	  	  
Cleaver; but she had long ago chosen to bestow upon herself the 
appellation of Miss Jenny Wren. (233) 
Jenny shows the ability, with the help of Lizzie of course, to fashion her environment, to 
accommodate both her physical needs and to effect subjective states of being. It is not 
coincidence, I argue, that Dickens notes this particular arrangement of space, which 
exemplifies Jenny’s capacity for environmental self-fashioning, and puts it in direct 
proximity with her nominal self-fashioning.  In these initial scenes, Jenny affirms that she 
is “the person of the house” (222), and Dickens reuses this phrasing four times on the 
following page, affirming the close interconnection between Jenny and the space she 
inhabits.  
Indeed, the house appears as an extension of Jenny, just as her crutches do, but 
this also means that what occupies the house also occupies her psyche. Such is the case 
when Jenny’s alcoholic father comes home after an evening at the bars. Jenny’s 
relationship to her father is rather strange, or, more accurately, rather inverted as she 
plays the parent to his childish antics. After sending her father to his room, again showing 
her control of space, Lizzie tries “to bring her round to that prettier and better state. But 
the charm was broken. The person of the house was the person of a house full of sordid 
shames and cares” (243). Though the house is not specifically described as a 
physiological part of her body, it becomes clear that the house and Jenny are 
ontologically blurred if not indistinct. 
 While the house is an extension of Jenny’s subjectivity, she shows the capacity to 
use a variety of spaces and techniques to effect environmental self-fashioning.  Outside 
the home, Jenny and Lizzie take up the habit of studying books with Mr. Riah in his 
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rooftop garden. The scene effectively mixes urban and natural aesthetics – they appear 
“against no more romantic object than a blackened chimney-stack over which some 
bumble creeper had been trained” and amidst “[a] few boxes of humble flowers and 
evergreens” – and thus suggests a means of augmenting urban structures of influence 
(281). When Mr. Fledgeby finds them on his rooftop (for he owns the building), Jenny 
says, “you don't know what the rest of this place is to us; does he, Lizzie? It's the quiet, 
and the air” (281). Up here, Jenny suggests, they can distinguish themselves from the 
people below who “are alive, crying, and working, . . .you seem to pity them so! And 
such chain has fall from you, and such a strange good sorrowful happiness comes upon 
you!” (281). Jenny goes on to imagine the rooftop as a type of heaven, where they can 
“be dead” and feel the weight of daily struggles, the chains of daily life, fall from their 
bodies and psyches. But, as the efforts of self-education and small garden suggest, their 
rooftop haven affords not stasis in death but transformative potential through personal 
rebirth. Thus, a metaphoric death of the past self becomes connected with causal 
processes of environmental self-fashioning, as both infer the emergence of a new sense of 
self.37 
Perhaps the most significant adaption has to do with Jenny’s trade: doll dressing. 
While critics have tended to focus on her niche industry, in which she turns salvaged 
textile scraps into glorious, miniature dresses, I want to focus specifically on the sensory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 F. S. Schwarzbach sees in the rooftop garden scene a microcosmic metaphor for how the city as a whole 
could be transformed from the “dehumanized wasteland” it otherwise appears to be” (210). In general, my 
own approach to Dickens’s portrayal of urban experience is most sympathetic to Schwarzbach’s reading 
than to the other scholars to which I have referred because of his emphasis on constructive changes that 
would improve urban existence. Yet, Schwarzbach’s sense of constructive change has to do more with 
urban planning than with individual adaptation, and most of his attention to individual characters 
emphasizes the more metaphysical transformations that other scholars of prioritized. 
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and psychological aspect of this endeavor.38 Jenny’s observational skills are perhaps her 
most defining characteristic, being mentioned far more frequently than her stature or 
crutches. In her first scene with Charley Hexam and Bradley Headstone, Dickens writes, 
“she would glance at the visitors out of the corners of her grey eyes with a look that out-
sharpened all her other sharpness” (222). Jenny’s power of observation is again 
highlighted in an interesting moment where Wren signals to Bradley that she is watching 
him as he watches Lizzie: she “made a double eye-glass of her two hands, looked at him 
through it, and cried with a waggish shake of her head: ‘Aha! Caught you spying, did I?’” 
(226). Here, Jenny’s “double eye-glass” only mimics a technological extension of her 
senses, pointing to the heightened power of her observation. Jenny also shows a 
heightened sense of hearing, as she is able to discern the footsteps outside her door and 
identify to whom they belong, an ability that must certainly be acquired through repeated 
experience (225, 234). Jenny’s sensitivity to the minute variations around her certainly 
contradict Kearns’ assertion, following Lewes, that Dickens’s characters did not make for 
believable human organisms because they were not able to acknowledge and respond to 
minute variations.39 
While Jenny’s observational aptitude proves her environmental sensitivity, the 
cognitive awareness to which it leads is equally significant. Repeatedly throughout the 
novel, Wren states, in regards to a variety of people, “I know their tricks and their 
manners!” (repeated four times on 224 as well as twice on 241, and once on 243).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Much of the scholarship to address Wren’s character focuses on her ability to utilize textile waste to 
make dresses and other outfits for dolls, see Gallagher 96, Talia Schaffer 124-25, Nancy Metz 68. 
39 Kearns argues: “Lewes’ distinction between ‘moving like pieces of simple mechanism’ implies two 
important criteria for credible characters: they must be organisms, and they must demonstrate finely 
modulated responses to slight variations in stimuli. In assessing the achievements of Brontë and Dickens I 
will show that their metaphors of mind did not enable them to meet these criteria” (138).	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Jenny’s ability to read other characters and contexts – to identify social and physical 
threats – allows her to gain psychological control over her urban environment. This 
environmental literacy does more than alert her to dangers, however, proving a 
significant component in her dress-making process. After her father’s funeral, Jenny sets 
straight to work upon a miniature version of the clergyman’s robes, acknowledging to 
Mr. Riah, “'we Professors who live upon our taste and invention, are obliged to keep our 
eyes always open'” (734). Like the Night-Inspector, Jenny is a scholar of the urban sphere 
and its inhabitants, which suggests a degree of epistemological mastery. 
Jenny’s creative process reveals other forms of psychological control over 
environment. As with her observational skills, Jenny’s imagination proves to be a 
psychological function that was developed through necessity and later applied to her 
industry. Early on in Jenny Wren’s narrative, she describes the visions she used to have 
of birds and angelic children who would visit her and take away her pain – presumably 
related to her disfigurement. Later on, Jenny uses this ability to augment her reality, to 
alter it in a way that proves professionally lucrative. Showing Mr. Riah a window case 
filled with dolls dressed in her own designs, Jenny explains to him that the source of her 
inspirations are the ladies who she observes at “a Drawing Room” or on “a grand day in 
the Park, or a Show, or a Fete, or what you like.” When Jenny spots one “very suitable” 
for her endeavors, as she explains, “I take particular notice of her, and run home and cut 
her out and baste her.” While Jenny’s observational skill is notable, it is the way that she 
refigures the context of these moments through her agency of imagination that proves so 
compelling. While the women sometimes note her “staring,” they do not seem to mind. “I 
dare say,” concludes Jenny, “they think I am wondering and admiring with all my eyes 
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and heart, but they little think they're only working for my dolls!” (436). While, 
objectively, Wren appears the poor gawker, a cripple literally and socially beneath the 
women she watches, she has adapted this social context for her own creative and 
financial gain. Subjectively, then, the space becomes altered, refashioned to suit Jenny’s 
needs – no longer a red carpet, it becomes a runway on which the upper-class women are 
transformed into Jenny’s models.  
In her capacity to refashion the social dynamic of this space through imaginative 
practices, she has added something to it – not something so tangible as a lever and spring 
system to open the front door, but certainly a mechanism that gives her power within a 
space where she would otherwise possess little to none. This moment proves rather 
significant as it shows how individual practices – whether physical or mental operations – 
can overcome the restrictive codes written into social space. Rather than let the scene, or 
should we say the social powers it manifests, shape her, Jenny reconceives the dynamic 
of the place. The subjective, imaginative lens through which Jenny views the urban world 
allows her to take something away from it: information from which to make a living, a 
sense of personal agency, and a sense of ontological stability. Unlike the other characters 
of the novel – who either accept the external environment as it is, physically leave it, or 
physically shape it – Jenny’s capacity to reconfigure her relationship with her milieu goes 
beyond the material. In making Jenny one of the weakest characters in the novel, 
physically speaking, Dickens points to the capacity of the willful mind to psychologically 
adapt, to develop new modes of thinking and states of being so as to survive an urban 
environment that for many is not easily left behind or kept outside. Jenny proves the most 
adapted to the urban environment, proves the most capable of taking what her 
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environment affords her and transforming it into a means of survival and even personal 
growth. 
 After explaining her creative process to Mr. Riah, the two head to the Six Jolly 
Fellowship-Porters, and in a single moment Dickens links the numerous extensions of 
Jenny’s identity. Upon meeting Miss Abbey, who pays special attention to Jenny’s 
crutch-stick, Jenny reaches into the same pocket that holds her house key and produces a 
business card on which is printed her name and profession (437). A crutch, a key, a 
business card – along this list of objects we move across three forms of self-extension, 
from physical, to psychological and emotional, to professional. Each item allows Jenny to 
engage with her external world and exemplifies her capacity to adapt to the difficult 





 Through the various forms of environmental literacy and self-extension presented 
in the novel, Dickens offers a template for adapting to what has been commonly regarded 
as a chaotic and illegible urban environment.  The novel is not without moments of 
transcendence, but they are predicated, I argue, on more fundamental and biological 
processes of adaptation. If we ignore the capacity to utilize external spaces as ontological 
extension or for epistemic action as exhibited by numerous characters in this novel, then 
we will continue to miss out on what makes these characters truly human. We miss the 
psychological, biological, and urban realism of his characters and the opportunity to 
acquire our own environmental literacy and to implement it within our approach to 
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nineteenth-century British literature at large. Such an approach, I argue, is a necessity if 
we are to appreciate the mastery in Dickens’s depiction of character (as well as 
Radcliffe’s, Wordsworth’s, and Gaskell’s) but also his sense of how the world we make 
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